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ABSTRACT 
PAKISTANI PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT: 
FROM THE 1960s TO THE 2000s 
 
MAY 2019 
 
SOFIA HAMDANI CHECA, B.Sc., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COLLEGE 
 
M.B.A., QUAID-E-AZAM UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Dan Clawson 
 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to understand the differences in the nature of the pro-
democracy movement in Pakistan from the 1960s to the 2000s, with a focus on the latter. 
The dissertation is composed of three different papers. The first paper is an analysis of 
the changing civil society in Pakistan. I argue that in order to understand why the two 
movements were so different, we need to look at not just a snapshot of the civil society, 
but its evolution over the years. Rather than thinking of civil society as a static collection 
of different groups and organizations, this research analyzes it as a combination of groups 
(or structures) as well as processes that changed over time.  The second paper is a study 
of the stark urban-rural and class divides that exist in the country, which I argue, lead to 
people having different opinions about voting, politicians, and electoral politics in 
general. A big part of this story is the alignment of the Pakistani military’s business 
interests with certain sections of the society. Both these factors – the changing civil 
society as well as the urban-rural and class divides – have implications for who 
viii 
participates in the movement and the demands being made. The final paper examines the 
diversity within the prodemocracy movement of the 2000s, which makes it rather unique 
compared to other movements analyzed in the social movement literature. I analyze 
diversity within the movement in terms of the wide array of ideological leanings of 
movement participants as well as the different kinds of coalitional models that co-existed 
within the movement: loose coalitions, pragmatic coalitions, Frenemies, and opposing 
movements. The research is based on interviews conducted with activists who were 
involved in either or both movements as well as an analysis of blogs, newspaper articles 
and other secondary sources. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan is a lower middle-income country in South Asia, strategically located in 
a key part of the world with India in the east, Afghanistan and Iran in the west, China in 
the north, the Arabian Sea in the South, and just across the Gulf of Oman from the United 
Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia. The country came into being in 1947 as the 
British ended their rule in India and divided the country into two: the Hindu-majority 
India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. Pakistan is the only country specifically created in 
the name of Islam and currently has the second highest number of Muslims of any 
country in the world. At the time of its creation it consisted of two wings separated by 
India in the middle: the western wing (now Pakistan) and the eastern wing which 
separated from the rest of the country in 1971 at the end of a bloody civil war and is now 
Bangladesh.  
With a size of 796K squared kilometers (a little over the size of Texas), the 
country has a population of about 210 million people. It is the 36th largest country in the 
world by area but the fifth most populous one. Its population increased by almost 60% 
between 1998 and 2007 (the years of the two latest censuses).  Pakistan is going through 
what has been called a youth bulge, with more than 50% of the population being younger 
than 25 years of age (compared to about 32% in the U.S.). The country is ranked 147th in 
terms of the Human Development Index and performs quite poorly even compared to 
neighboring countries in South Asia with 30% of the population living under the official 
poverty line and a literacy rate of less than 60%.1 Spending on health, nutrition, and 
                                                 
1 According to experts, even this number is inflated. 
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education, is only about 3% of GDP. The country spends more than 50% of its budget on 
defense and debt-servicing. 
Pakistan is an ethnically and linguistically diverse country.2 It consists of the 
following administrative units: 4 provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 
Balochistan; the Federally Administered Tribal Areas; and the capital Islamabad. Punjab 
is the most prosperous and populous province in the country. The population of each 
administrative unit is: Punjab 53%, Sindh 23%, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 15%, Balochistan 
6%, Tribal Areas 2%, and Islamabad 1%. The country is not as diverse when it comes to 
religion though: more than 96% of the population is Muslim while Christians, 
Hindus, Ahmadis3 and other religious minorities constitute less than 4% of 
the population. 
Pakistan has had an antagonistic relationship with neighboring India since its 
inception. The countries have fought three wars (1948, 1965, and 1971) as well as an 
undeclared, contained war in 1999. Pakistan has the sixth-largest standing armed 
forces in the world and is also a nuclear power. To this day the Pakistani military takes up 
a huge chunk of the Pakistani budget in the name of national security.4 Overall, the 
country has had a turbulent political history and a troubled relationship with democracy 
ever since its inception.   
                                                 
2 The main ethnic groups are: Punjabi 44.7%, Pashtun (Pathan) 15.4%, Sindhi 14.1%, Sariaki 
8.4%, Muhajirs 7.6%, Balochi 3.6%, and others 6.3%. 
3 Even though Ahmadis consider themselves Muslims, the Pakistani state declared them non-
Muslims in the seventies. 
4 The statistics in this section were taken from the following websites: Pakistan Bureau of 
Statistics (www.pbs.gov.pk), CNN 
(https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/30/world/asia/pakistan -fast-facts/index.html), 
World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview), DAWN 
(https://www.dawn.com/news/1354793/exploding-population-bomb), and BBC 
(https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12965779).  
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Created in 1947, the country did not have a constitution until 1956 and did not 
have general elections until 1970. In its short life, Pakistan has gone through four 
democratic or non-military interregnums (1947-1958, 1971-1977, 1988-1999, and 2008-
to date), which means that in its seventy years of existence, political parties have been in 
power for only about half those years. Even during that time, political parties have not 
been allowed free reign to run the country. Between 1951 and 1958 for example, seven 
prime ministers were dismissed but the country only had two Governor Generals and one 
Commander in Chief (Zain 2010: 92). The first military coup in 1958 came at the behest 
of the civil bureaucracy. Between 1985 and 1999, all five prime ministers were removed 
before their tenure was over, directly or directly by the military (one of them while Zia 
was still in power). So far, nine legislatures have been dismissed before their tenure was 
over (ibid), leaving only three elected governments to complete their constitutional terms. 
At the same time, the country has also experienced three pro-democracy protest 
movements since its birth: against General Ayub Khan in 1968-69, against General Zia-
ul-Haq in 1981-86, and against General Pervaiz Musharraf in 2007-08.  The three 
movements were different in terms of their locus of activity (urban vs. rural) as well as 
class composition.  In the late sixties, it was not just student activists, academics, other 
members of the intelligentsia, but also workers’ unions and farmers’ organizations that 
were active in the movement. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto – the leader of the movement in West 
Pakistan and founder of the Pakistan People’s Party – took his socialist manifesto to the 
rural areas and mobilized people in many different parts of the country.  Similarly, the 
Movement for Restoration of Democracy against the Zia regime – led by PPP’s Benazir 
Bhutto – spread from the urban to the rural areas and by 1983 became almost entirely a 
  4 
rural Sindh5 phenomenon. The movement was brutally crushed in 1981 and then in 1983 
(with the use of violence including police brutality at protests, public floggings, 
imprisonment, torture and assassinations) to again resurface in 1986. The anti-Musharraf 
movement on the other hand was concentrated almost entirely in urban areas and even 
there was limited to certain subsections of society, contrary to the previous two 
movements.  Except for the lawyers (who are a diverse group in terms of socio-economic 
status) and political party workers, the rest of the participants mostly belonged to the 
upper-middle and upper classes. The first student protest that took place was in one of the 
most elite private institutions in the country, the Lahore University of Management 
Sciences (LUMS).  While certain sections of Pakistani society such as women’s rights 
and civil rights activists, artists, lawyers, and journalists have been part of all three 
movements, the movements of the 1960s and 2000s were markedly different in terms of 
who else participated.  
This dissertation is an attempt to understand the difference in the nature of two of 
those three movements: that of the 1960s and that of the 2000s, with a focus on the latest. 
What we have are two pro-democracy movements that are very different in terms of their 
movement demands, and substantially different in terms of their composition. The 
movement of the 60s – populated by students from public universities, members of the 
intelligentsia, as well as workers, members of many trade unions and to a lesser extent, 
the peasantry – demanded an end to the military regime, general elections, universal adult 
franchise, as well as improved labor laws and an overall improvement in the living 
conditions of the poorer segments of the society. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and eventually his 
                                                 
5 Sindh is one of the four Pakistani provinces.  
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Pakistan People’s Party became the face of the movement in (then) West Pakistan. The 
movement of the 2000s on the other hand – populated by lawyers, members of different 
NGOs and civil society organizations, students from primarily private institutions, as well 
as educated, mostly English-speaking urban professionals – focused primarily on the 
reinstatement of the Chief Justice and other judges deposed by Musharraf and on the 
resignation of Musharraf. The movement was divided on whether it should call for 
elections or not, and many of the groups avoided working with or even giving the 
impression of being associated with political parties.6 This dissertation is an attempt to 
understand what changed between the 1960s and 2000s that caused the movements to be 
so different.  
Obviously the two movements exist in very different international contexts. In the 
sixties, youth and workers around the world were involved in different social movements 
guided to a large extent by socialist ideals.  Owing probably to the Pakistani 
government’s pro-US stance through most of the Cold War and the downfall of the 
Soviet Union, socialism and communism today are, for the most part, nothing more than 
taboo words in Pakistan. The movement of the 2000s took place in a completely different 
context.  A series of events starting with the terrorist acts of September 11th 2001, the 
Pakistani government’s longstanding support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, Musharraf’s 
decision to withdraw that support under U.S. pressure, the U.S. “war on terror,” 
Musharraf’s decision to become one of the close allies of the US government in this 
‘war,’ and the expansion of this ‘war’ into areas inside Pakistan all provide a very 
different national and international political context.  
                                                 
6 It wasn’t until towards the end of the movement that Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League 
became somewhat of a force within the movement.   
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I thus argue that in order to understand why the prodemocracy movement of the 
2000s was so different from that of the 1960s, we need to analyze (i) how civil society 
changed in Pakistan over that period, (ii) the differences in national and international 
context at the time when the movements emerged, as well as (iii) the urban-rural divide7 
that exists in the country in terms of participation in and attitudes towards formal politics. 
The mid-to-late 60s was a time of growth of student activism and trade unionism in 
Pakistan. The left, even though under attack in the country, had allies internationally, and 
all these segments were inspired and affected by what was happening globally in terms of 
students’ and workers’ movements worldwide. By the 2000s, all student groups and 
workers unions had been crushed and depoliticized by several military regimes and ‘civil 
society’ was, for the most part, characterized by NGOs and the like.  That, combined with 
the fact that the urban-rural divide has worsened in the country where the urban middle and 
upper classes are even less aware of the concerns of the ruralites, consumerism is on the 
rise, and the country is under the spotlight of the international media in terms of its 
relationship to Islamic terrorism, led to the focus of movement participants to be very 
different from what it was in the 60s.  
 
                                                 
7 The urban-rural divide probably has its roots in the creation of Pakistan itself (and the party 
which supposedly represented the interests of the Muslims of India and led the movement for 
the creation of Pakistan); was strengthened by the socialist visions of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (the 
first and most popular populist leader the country has seen, as well as the winner of the first 
general elections in the then Western wing of the country); as well as the economic policies 
implemented by the military regimes and the nature and composition of the military itself. This 
issue will be explored in depth in Chapter 2 of the dissertation. 
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1.1 The Prodemocracy Movement of the 2000s 
The Pakistani Lawyers movement that started in 2007 dominated the national and 
international media for a couple of months. It all started in March 2007, after a meeting 
held at the military headquarters between then president General Musharraf—who had 
taken power after overthrowing the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif 
in a bloodless coup in 1999— and then Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. In the preceding 
year and a half, the Supreme Court had taken up a couple of cases and made judgments 
the military chief deemed unfavorable, the latest one being the case of the “missing 
persons.”  Missing persons refers to people who have been secretly detained by the 
intelligence agencies on the suspicion of having links to terrorist organizations. Human 
rights organizations claimed that the intelligence agencies were using this pretext to also 
arrest and/or abduct members of the separatist movement in the province of Baluchistan. 
In any case, the whereabouts of these missing persons were unknown to their families. 
The day before the meeting with the General, a Supreme Court bench headed by 
Chaudhry had sent notices to provincial and federal governments about 148 missing 
persons. At the March 9th meeting, the General tried to convince the Chief Justice to 
resign or face charges of judicial misconduct.  The Chief Justice refused to tender his 
resignation and was then removed from his position by the General.  The next day, 
protocol for the Chief Justice was withdrawn and he and his family were not allowed to 
leave their house. While the Pakistani constitution allows the president to remove a judge 
from the bench, it can only be done if “the Supreme Judicial Council finds him guilty of 
misconduct or incapable of performing his duties” (Ghias 2010: 990). Musharraf had 
attempted to fire the Chief Justice before the council had completed any inquiry. 
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Additionally, the meeting took place on army quarters, while the president was wearing 
his military uniform. Two days later, on his way to the court, the Chief Justice was 
manhandled by the police, as a police officer grabbed him by his hair and tried to muscle 
him into the car. All this sparked a movement led by the lawyers, demanding the 
reinstatement of the Chief Justice.   
For the next four and a half months the lawyers boycotted courts, held rallies, 
protested in the streets, and faced arrests, baton-charges and teargas shelling by police. 
Throughout this time though, the legal fraternity was pretty much on its own. The only 
support they got was from some hardcore political party activists. While most people in 
Pakistan were captivated by the images of the lawyers marching in their black coats, 
being beaten and arrested by the police, their support for the movement was mostly 
verbal. After a few months of struggle, owing no doubt to the pressure of the movement 
and the support it got from the media, the general public, and internationally, the Chief 
Justice was eventually reinstated on July 20th, 2007. A thirteen-member bench of the 
Supreme Court restored Iftikhar Chaudhry with full dignity and authority.8 This was the 
first time in Pakistan’s history that a Supreme Court verdict contradicted a sitting military 
ruler.  
The second phase of the movement, the phase that is the focus of this dissertation, 
started when General Musharraf declared emergency rule on November 3rd of the same 
                                                 
8 After restoration, Chaudhry recused himself from any case involving Musharraf, but the Court 
resumed the governance and political functions. Chaudhry focused on public interest litigation, 
including high-level corruption scandals, reopened hearings on the sugar and oil price-hike 
cases, opened the privatization of PTCL (Pakistan Telecommunications Corporation Limited) 
for review and reopened the issue of missing persons, forcing the regime to acknowledge the 
detention of more missing people and to release them. He also ordered the regime to release 
people who were not declared missing but who were being held without trial (Shoaib 2010, p. 
1011). 
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year. Right before emergency was imposed, the Supreme Court was hearing a case on 
whether a member of the military was constitutionally permitted to run for the office of 
the president, as Musharraf held both titles of President and Chief of Army Staff.9 
Emergency rule was imposed before the court could reach a decision. With the 
imposition of emergency, the constitution was suspended, a Provisional Constitutional 
Order (PCO) was issued and all justices were asked to take oath under the new PCO. 
More than sixty Supreme and High Court judges, including Chief Justice Iftikhar 
Chaudhry, refused to take oath and were subsequently dismissed and placed under house 
arrest; thousands of lawyers and activists were also arrested; and several ordinances were 
issued placing restrictions on electronic and print media. A new Chief Justice (Abdul 
Hameed Dogar) was sworn in.  
The imposition of Emergency was followed by a mobilization of lawyers, 
university students and civil society activists. For the first time during the “Lawyers’ 
Movement,” other segments of Pakistani society became actively involved. The non-
lawyers’ part of the movement is the focus of this dissertation. The main demand of the 
movement was the reinstatement of the Chief Justice, the end of emergency rule, and the 
ouster of Pervaiz Musharraf. While the lawyers were the backbone of the movement and 
had the organizational structure and recent (and past)10 experience for mobilization, what 
                                                 
9  In a very controversial move, Musharraf had gotten himself re-elected as president in October 
2007 before the general elections.  Under normal circumstances in a parliamentary system, the 
members of the national assembly are elected through general elections and then the national 
assembly elects the president. 
10 Lawyers in Pakistan have actively participated in all three pro-democracy movements, using 
both street protests as well as legal challenges through the court as strategies.  Author James 
Traub, writing for the New York Times, said of the Pakistani lawyers that they “see themselves 
as the custodians of Pakistan’s liberal traditions;’ that many of the lawyers he spoke to “in 
Islamabad and Lahore, and in smaller towns in Punjab and Sindh, had been involved in the 
struggle against authoritarian rule since as far back as the 1960s and the era of Ayub Khan. 
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was interesting was the sudden “awakening” of university students and other parts of the 
civil society. Not only was this interesting because university campuses had been silent 
for decades after student politics had been crushed by the previous military regime of 
General Zia (1977-1988), but also because the movement was comprised of many if not 
mostly people who had never before participated in politics. Many of them, part of the 
educated, English-speaking urban middle and upper class, had actually supported 
Musharraf when he took power, overthrowing a democratically elected government.  The 
movement was able to achieve its stated goals less than two years after it started: 
Musharraf’s resignation came in August 2008 and the reinstatement of the judges in 
March 2009. While the movement did not specifically demand elections, the momentum 
created by the movement no doubt helped political parties negotiate with Musharraf and 
demand elections which were held in February 2008 and were considered free and fair 
according to international observers, notwithstanding minor irregularities. 
 
1.2 The Why and How 
The Pakistani prodemocracy movement presents an interesting case study for 
students of collective action for a number of reasons.  While a lot of work has been done 
on social movements in Europe, the United States and Latin America, the same cannot be 
said about South Asia (India probably being an exception).  Analysts have discovered 
that frameworks based on research in one region cannot be applied, as is, to other areas. It 
is thus important that social movement research expand its boundaries to include less-
                                                 
Some had been jailed by Ayub, others by Zia or even Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, himself a lawyer but 
no friend of civil liberties” (Traub 2008). According to Asma Jahangir, lawyer and human 
rights activist who later became the president of the Supreme Court Bar Association, "[t]he bar 
is the only organization in Pakistan that has consistently held elections, and we are now reaping 
the benefits… It is a very functional democracy" (as quoted in Sappenfield and Montero 2007). 
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analyzed areas.  Another reason why this specific case should be of interest is the 
peculiarity of the nature of the transition to democracy in the country.  Rather than having 
a long, or short, period of transition Pakistan has experienced a back and forth between 
dictatorship and democratic rule in its short period of existence. Turkey is probably the 
only other similar case; and even Turkey has now changed course. This not only provides 
an interesting case-study for a long-drawn-out process of transitioning to democracy but 
also for a comparative analysis of social movements. While it can be difficult to do a 
comparative analysis of social movements that occur in different countries because of 
different cultures and histories of the countries, comparing movements that took place in 
the same country has the bonus of many factors being constant, making it easier to draw 
conclusions about the differences in the movements. 
The main focus of the research is to understand the movement of the 2000s, using 
the movement of the 1960s as a reference point.  According to Klandermans, comparative 
research on social movements has several advantages in methodological, practical, as 
well as theoretical terms (1993).  It helps not only develop better criteria that can be used 
to compare movements but also helps identify factors that shape movement participation 
and success as well as helps improve theories related to social movements (ibid: 384-
400).   
This research is a historical analysis of sorts, using comparative qualitative data 
based on two main sources: in-person semi-structured interviews and document 
research. Using a multiple method research design has several advantages.  It allows the 
researcher to use these as a means of verifying information, understanding different 
perspectives of empirical reality, obtaining different kinds of data, and use one method to 
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compensate for the disadvantages of the other (Denzin 1978, Berg 1995, Klandermans 
and Staggenborg 2002, Klandermans, Staggenborg, and Tarrow 2002).   In this study, 
each source (semi-structured interviews, newspapers, blogs, academic journals and 
books) will provide different data and at the same time also serve as a means to verify 
some of the information received from other sources.  Additionally, this method provides 
for a multi-layered level of analysis.  One of the main strengths of this method is that it 
allows for comparisons both within and between movements.  For example, it allows the 
researcher to look at differences in goals and composition of the two movements as well 
as differences in attitudes towards politicians and other relevant actors within 
movements. 
In-depth interviews have been described as a good tool to determine “feelings, 
emotions, motives, life histories, and interpretations of complex phenomena” and 
archival and case studies are very useful in analyzing the evolution of a movement over 
time (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002: xv-xvi).  These semi-structured interviews 
provided very useful information about people’s motivations for participating; their views 
about movement demands as well as other actors involved; their ideological leanings; 
their views about politicians and the military; information about their 
groups/organizations; conflicts within and between groups; and means of mobilization 
and the like.  As Blee and Taylor point out, semi-structured interviews have been vital to 
social movement research and can provide information about participants’ motivations, 
their views about movement messages, the subjective meanings they attach to understand 
their social world and justify their actions, as well as their hope and critiques of the 
movement (2002: 92-95).  Such interviews are especially useful because they provide a 
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broader understanding of the heterogeneity of views among movement participants; 
something which cannot be acquired by looking at internal documents of groups or 
organizations or statements of movement leaders (ibid). 
I used a combination of methods to choose interview participants.  The following 
strategy was used for choosing interviewees: 
• Identify, in advance, key activists from both movements using newspaper articles, 
news-blog accounts, listserv archives, previous books and articles, and informants 
with whom I was already in contact.   
• Ask acquaintances who were part of the movement who they believe to be the key 
activists within their group/organization and/or the movement. 
• Use all available sources including personal contacts, online search engines, 
blogs, and published articles and books and their authors to find contact 
information for those people. 
• Contact as many of those people as possible from the US or after arriving in 
Pakistan. 
• Ask those people and others to identify people whom they think meet the criteria 
mentioned above.  
• At the end of each interview, ask people to help identify others I should interview, 
either those who worked with them or those they saw as key figures in other 
movement groups. 
 
In the absence of the ability to draw a random sample of activists, my proposed 
combination of methods provided a comprehensive view of issues related to the 
movements.  Relying on just one method could have resulted in problems since there is 
no agreement on who (individuals or groups) were the key activists or what kinds of 
activism mattered most.  Similarly, some crucial people may have preferred to operate 
behind the scenes and worked to avoid public identification while others who claim to be 
crucial may actually have been bit players at best.   
Given that I was personally involved with organizing protest events in the U.S. 
against the Emergency in Pakistan and that I was acquainted with a few people who were 
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part of both movements, I relied on personal contacts to make initial contact with 
possible interviewees.  I had also been a subscriber to a listserv that was used, among 
other things, to coordinate events in different cities in Pakistan, which was also helpful in 
reaching out to possible interviewees. Before conducting interviews in Pakistan I 
conducted a few pilot interviews in the U.S. with people who were involved in one or the 
other movement. 
I conducted a total of forty (40) interviews with activists currently based in the 
cities of Lahore (Punjab), Karachi (Sindh) and the twin cities of Islamabad (capital) and 
Rawalpindi (Punjab), which were among the main centers of protests. The interviews 
were conducted over a period of two months (December 2008-January 2009). It should 
be mentioned here that elections had been held in February 2008 (after the lifting of 
Emergency in December 2007), which by most accounts of international observers were 
considered free and fair. Musharraf had been forced to resign by August 2008 and two 
months after the interviews were conducted, the Chief Justice and all other deposed 
judges were reinstated in March 2009. Another point to note is that I was unfortunately 
not able to conduct interviews with people who were active in the provinces of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa or Balochistan during the anti-Musharraf movement. While some of my 
interviewees did belong to those provinces, they were not currently residing in those 
areas. Given safety issues, I did not travel to those areas either – all of which definitely 
leaves out the views of certain sections of the population. 
Out of the forty interviewees, twenty eight were active in the movement of the 
2000s, six were involved in the movement of the 1960s, five in both, and one was 
involved in the movement of the 1980s but was interviewed because he was openly 
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critical of the movement of the 2000s and had made the conscious decision to not join the 
movement.  Given that the focus of the research was the most recent movement, the 
distribution of activists interviewed is justified. A little more than half of the interviews 
(twenty-three) were conducted in person, and the rest were conducted over the phone.   
In terms of professions, there were ten students, four lawyers, six academics, one 
journalist, six political party workers, one ex-military person, two lifelong independent 
political activists, and four were associated with the NGO world while the remaining six 
belonged to other professional classes (doctors, working for multinationals etc.). It should 
be mentioned though that these categories were not as clear cut in the sense that some of 
the academics also worked with NGOs, or some of the students had just recently 
graduated (at the time of the interviews) and had started working in a multinational or an 
NGO. The interviewees were given the choice of giving the interview in English or Urdu. 
Twenty-nine chose to do the interview in English and eleven chose Urdu. Amongst those 
who chose English, some of the interviewees, especially those above the age of 50 or so, 
used a mix of Urdu and English, while the younger activists spoke almost entirely in 
English. It should be noted that none of the political party workers chose to interview in 
English. In Pakistan, as in the rest of South Asia, fluency in English is usually a very 
good indicator of one’s class background. 
Except for the one interviewee who was not involved in either of the movements 
under consideration, all other interview participants had either been actively involved in 
organizing protests and similar events or had attended a substantial number of protests 
and events organized by their group and/or in their school, neighborhood or workplace.  
This provided me with a broader understanding of the movement and gave me the 
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opportunity to analyze whether participants’ goals, attitudes and opinions differed based 
on their socio-economic status but also ensure that these views were indeed 
representative of people who were well entrenched in the movement. 
While conducting the interviews, when I told the participants that their identity 
will be kept confidential and their names will not be published in any research, many of 
them replied that they wouldn’t mind even if their names were actually published.  Since 
then though, at least one of the interviewees was abducted by intelligence agencies and 
tortured for their continual activism. It is for this reason that I have tried to keep people’s 
identities and group affiliations as vague as possible, to the extent that I could without 
compromising the integrity of the research. I have not used pseudonyms for the interview 
participants to avoid attributing multiple quotes or views about different issues to the 
same person in an effort to increase the anonymity. 
The document research consisted of an analysis of newspaper articles and blogs 
covering protest events and the movements in general as well as books and academic 
journal articles on the political history or nature civil society in Pakistan, or either 
movement. This information was used mostly to analyze changes in civil society in 
Pakistan as well as confirming or filling in missing information about either movement 
gathered through the interviews. 
Given the methods used, this research was able to combine different aspects of a 
number of social movement frameworks, without ignoring the broader context in which 
the movement existed. The analysis was carried out on three levels: the individual level 
(what motivated the participants to become part of the movement; movement 
composition or the socio-economic backgrounds of the participants); the meso-level (the 
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goals of the movement/different groups involved in the movement; the organizational 
forms; means of communication; conflicts within and between groups); and the macro-
level (the national and international context in which the movements emerged and 
developed).  This framework allowed for a thorough investigation of the struggle for 
democracy and the nature of civil society in Pakistan since the sixties. 
The following questions guided this research: 
How has the nature of civil society in Pakistan changed since the sixties? 
What accounts for differences in movement composition over time? What 
motivated people to get involved? 
What effect does movement composition have on the attitudes and goals of the 
movement/movement participants? 
What effect does the diversity of groups have on the goals and nature of the 
movement? 
What effects do the available organizational forms have on the goals and nature 
of the movement? 
How does the national and international context affect the movement? 
 
While the ‘aggrieved population’ may consist of many segments of the society, 
only certain segments become active participants in a movement, based on the presence 
and nature of networks; the subjective meanings that people attach to the situation faced; 
as well as the expectation about the potential for change as a result of their mobilization.  
The initial composition and goals of a movement are influenced by the nature of civil 
society which is a result of the overall national context.  Additionally, movement 
composition not only shapes the organizational form of the movement, but the material 
interests of the participants also factor in the reshaping of movement goals over time. All 
this occurs, and is affected by, the international context within which the movement is 
taking place.   
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In terms of the nature of Civil Society in Pakistan, I argue that the replacement of 
the more ‘traditional’ networks that used to characterize civil society (labor unions, 
student unions, etc.) by a-political NGOs and the like, has implications for social 
movement initiation and development.  For one, the fractured nature of the Pakistani civil 
society is sure to affect or at the very least be mirrored in the nature of the most recent 
prodemocracy movement. Additionally, the differences in the kinds of networks available 
to people to mobilize as well as in the political attitudes and socio-economic backgrounds 
of people populating these spaces are sure to have an impact on the nature of social 
movement composition and goals. I argue that the antagonism towards formal politics 
and politicians exhibited by segments of the current movement is a result of the military’s 
efforts to co-opt and depoliticize civil society.  Additionally, the socio-economic 
backgrounds of the participants shape these attitudes, thus leading to differences in 
attitudes and goals between movements, depending on what groups are dominant; as well 
as within different segments of either movement. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as such: Chapter 2 provides an overview 
of the changes in Pakistani civil society since its inception and discusses these changes 
with regards to the national and international context of the time. Chapter 3 discusses 
what is meant by the urban-rural divide, giving some background as to why this divide 
exists and how its intersection with the prevailing class divisions manifested itself in the 
pro-democracy movement in 2007-2008. I do this whilst making comparisons to the 
movement of the 1960s. Chapter 4 describes how the nature of civil society on the 2000s 
affected the nature of the movement in terms of its diversity. In so doing, I look at 
differences that existed in the movement specifically in terms of the goals of the 
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movement and individual groups; attitudes towards key issues of the time; as well as 
conflicts that arose between different groups, and how all that affected the nature of the 
movement as well as its chances of success.  The last chapter provides some concluding 
remarks and discusses lessons that could be learned from this movement. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
The pro-democracy movement of the 2000s differed significantly from that of the 
1960s. In the late 1960s workers, labor unions, and students from public schools (and 
eventually political party members) played a central role in the pro-democracy 
movement; in the 2000s, labor involvement was negligible, and student activists 
belonged predominantly to private/elite schools of the country.  In the 1960s movement 
demands pertained to larger issues of social and economic justice such as demands for the 
end of military rule, general elections, universal franchise, improvement in working 
conditions for workers, educational reforms and the like. In the 2000s however, the most 
active members of the movement belonged to the professional classes, primarily lawyers. 
While this is obvious, given that the movement had its roots in the lawyers’ movement 
for the restoration of the Chief Justice (which started earlier in the same year), but even 
when one leaves out the lawyers, the rest of the movement was still dominated by urban 
professionals and upper-middle and upper-class students. Their demands revolved 
primarily around the restoration of the Chief Justice and other deposed judges and an end 
to Musharraf’s rule. Later, some public university student groups added the demand for 
the restoration of student unions. The movement was divided on the call for elections and 
once announced, on whether to participate in them or not.  Additionally, most groups 
stayed away from being associated or even giving the impression of being associated 
with political parties or politicians. This chapter will look at the evolution of Pakistani 
civil society over time, culminating in the anti-Musharraf movement of the 2000s in order 
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to analyze how the state of civil society during those two periods affected the 
movements.  
There are of course many differences between the two periods – 1960s and 2000s.  
The country lost its East wing, now Bangladesh, in 1971.  In the 1960s the country had 
not yet held any general elections, while in the 2000s, it had experienced a number of 
elections and periods of democratic rule. In the late 1960s, television was just a few years 
old in Pakistan; in the 2000s, it was a household item and no longer dominated by the 
state-owned television channel. The international context was also different: the Cold 
War in the 1960s versus the War on Terror in the 2000s; relatively removed Vietnam 
versus next door Afghanistan.  The rules of the global economy had shifted from various 
versions of state regulation to neoliberal “free markets.”  Additionally, the country 
experienced a period of Islamization in the 1980s under another dictator, Zia-ul-Haq, as 
well as massive funding from the United Stated and Saudi Arabia to fund the Jihadi 
insurgency against the USSR in Afghanistan. 
This paper argues, however, that if we are to understand the difference in the pro-
democracy movements of the 1960s and the 2000s, we must come to terms with the 
changing character of civil society in Pakistan. It is my contention that the nature of civil 
society in Pakistan changed over time owing to national and international circumstances, 
which in turn affected the avenues available to people to organize resulting in two very 
different movements. This paper provides an historical analysis of the nature of civil 
society in Pakistan, emphasizing how local and international events affected 1) the kinds 
of networks and spaces available to people to mobilize and 2) the discourses used to 
oppose dictatorships and politicians alike (including the use of religion). This analysis, I 
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believe, is important to be able to understand the varying political attitudes and socio-
economic backgrounds of the people populating these spaces at different time periods, 
and how the material interests of the participants all shape the nature of social movement 
composition and goals, which is the subject of the next chapter.  
Looking at the nature of civil society in Pakistan, it is clear that the more 
‘traditional’ networks that used to characterize civil society including labor and student 
unions—spaces where people advocated for their own collective rights—have been 
replaced by mostly a-political, donor-funded NGOs and the like—where people advocate 
for the rights of others, and are dominated by educated, English-speaking, liberal urbanites. 
Additionally, left-wing politics and discourse among students and academics is much 
weaker in the 2000s than it was in the 1960s. Pakistan has also, in the past twenty years or 
so, seen a marked increase in religious militancy. Not just that but the role that religion 
plays in everyday life has also increased markedly which has affected civil society in two 
ways: religion now plays a much bigger role in political debates and the like,11 plus, the 
number of religious groups or welfare groups associated with them has increased, thus 
taking up a much bigger space within the “realm” of civil society. Changes in media, more 
specifically electronic media, are also a substantial part of the changing nature of civil 
society in Pakistan. In the 1960s, radio waves were dominated by the state-owned channel; 
there was only one state-owned television channel with very few people owning a TV; and 
obviously no internet. In the 2000s, the airwaves were burgeoning with private media 
                                                 
11  While religion, or Islam, also featured dominantly in the political debates of the 1960s, it was 
mostly to negate the negative connotations of socialism being “atheistic;” thus the discussion 
about Islamic Socialism. To take an example of the different context of the two times in terms 
of religion: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (who became the most popular political figure of the late 60s in 
West Pakistan and went on to win the elections of 1970s) and other leaders of the left openly 
drank, something which would not be possible in Pakistan today. 
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channels and televisions are now a household item – which was a direct consequence of 
Musharraf’s policies. Most upper/upper-middle class people also own computers and have 
access to the internet; plus, internet cafes are a plenty in bigger cities. Some of the national 
and international happenings that  were responsible for triggering these changes include, 
but are not limited to, the direct and indirect role of the military in Pakistani politics; the 
repression of the Left (primarily by the military) and the military propaganda against 
politicians; the use of religion by the military and politicians for their own purposes; the 
demise of the USSR; the rise of neoliberalism; US-Pakistan relations; the Afghan war (80s) 
and the “War on Terror.”  
 
2.1 Why Study Civil Society 
Almost throughout Pakistan’s history, the United States has supported military 
regimes in the country for its own purposes (during the cold war to help counter Russian 
influence; in the 2000s to help wage the ‘war on terror’). Many academics and journalists 
have followed the lead.  Samuel Huntington, for example, argued in the sixties that 
among all the leaders in modernizing countries after World War II, Ayub Khan (the then 
dictator) came closest to “filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or ‘Great Legislator’ on 
the Platonic or Rousseauian model” (Huntington 1986: 251).   Similarly, Pamela 
Constable, the South Asia Bureau chief for the Washington Post, has credited him with 
attempting “to build a grassroots ‘basic democracy’ and a modernized economy” that did 
not bear fruit only because the Indo-Pak war of 1965 led to the collapse of his regime 
(2001: 17). 
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Democratically elected civilian leaders on the other hand, are treated a little 
differently. Even though at the time this article was written (2001), the country had been 
under the rule of democratically elected governments for only 17 out of 54 years of its 
existence (none of the governments having been allowed to complete their tenure), while 
discussing the problems the country faces, it is only civilian leaders and not military 
rulers that are singled out: “Ever since its traumatic birth as a nation-state following the 
partition of India in 1947, Pakistan has struggled unsuccessfully to build a functioning 
democracy. Its civilian leaders have proven consistently corrupt, autocratic, and inept. Its 
public institutions have failed to mature, its civic life has remained largely confined to a 
tiny elite, and its internal tensions between Islamic and secular values have never been 
resolved” (Constable 2001: 15). 
U.S. support for Pakistani dictators, as well as the double standards used by 
numerous academics and journalists when talking about dictators and civilian leaders has 
continued to the present. Discussing Musharraf’s coup in their edited book about the 
Pakistani civil society, for example, Weiss and Gilani pronounced his rule to be different 
from that of previous dictators. Musharraf, according to them, seemed “bent on making 
the country function again” (Weiss and Gilani 2001: ix).  This, apparently, was “a new 
breed of military rule… hindered not by the politics of selfishness but by the sentiment of 
love of country and compatriots” (ibid). They described the period of democratic rule 
between Zia’s and Musharraf’s dictatorships as an “apparent ‘democratic’ interregnum” 
which in reality was nothing but a continuation of “the processes unleashed by [General] 
Zia ul-Haq in July 1977” (ibid).  It should be noted that Zia’s rule, imposed in July 1977, 
was one of the harshest periods of dictatorial rule the country has experienced so far. But 
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Musharraf’s military government, we were told, was “breaking new ground by assigning 
capable, qualified people to hold key positions in government” (ibid). The authors ended 
the piece on a very hopeful note that: “Perhaps the promise of a better future which 
prompted us to write this book will be realized sooner than even we had anticipated” 
(ibid).  
It almost seemed like Musharraf couldn’t do anything wrong: “The Musharraf 
regime has received some credit for refraining from military excesses. While some 
former government aides and allegedly corrupt businessmen have been jailed, political 
activities largely banned, and pressure placed on the independent press, the security 
forces have not resorted to violence” (Constable 2001: 16).  Furthermore, despite the fact 
that at the time the article was published, as mentioned earlier, democratic governments 
had only ruled for only about a third of the country’s existence, and even during those 
years the military was the one calling the shots on all the major decisions, both civilian as 
well as military governments seem to equally share the blame of not having instilled 
democratic norms in the Pakistani polity: “In the past, both Pakistan’s civilian and 
military governments have failed to inculcate lasting democratic values and practices, 
creating a vicious cycle of cynicism and corruption” (ibid). 
Another popular trend in recent years, both within academics and the media has 
been to focus on Islamic fundamentalism and extremism when talking about Pakistan. In 
the words of an analyst: "It would not be shocking if the average American thought 
Pakistan was a lawless war zone filled with terrorist training camps" (Pervez 2008). 
While there is no denying that the growing strength of extremist groups in Pakistan is a 
major and immediate problem that needs to be analyzed seriously in order to find 
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solutions, one would hope that over all, the scholarly literature on Pakistan would be 
populated by that as well as analyses of social movements in country.   
This dearth of literature on social movements is probably, in part, due to the lack 
of knowledge (and interest) of movements such as the farmers’ land rights movement in 
Punjab, the fisherfolk movement against privatization in Sind, the movement for greater 
autonomy and political representation in Baluchistan, etc., and partly because of the fact 
that a lot of Pakistani history has for some reason been written with a focus on famous 
personalities rather than the ‘masses’ or society as a whole. One finds that much of the 
analysis of Pakistani politics has focused mainly on the personalities of Jinnah, General 
Ayub, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, General Zia, and the like.  “Few books or articles on Pakistan 
are concerned with the values and attitudes of its larger publics” (Weinbaum 1996: 640).  
One would be hard-pressed to find academic pieces about social movements in Pakistan 
in general and pro-democracy movements in particular.     
The Pakistani prodemocracy movement presents an interesting case study for 
students of collective action for a number of reasons.  While a lot of work has been done 
on social movements in Europe, the United States and Latin America, the same cannot be 
said about South Asia (India probably being an exception).  Analysts have discovered 
that frameworks based on research in one region cannot be applied, as is, to other areas. It 
is thus important that social movement research expand its boundaries to include less-
analyzed areas.   
Another reason why this specific case should be of interest is the peculiarity of the 
nature of the transition to democracy in the country.  Rather than having a long (or short) 
period of transition, Pakistan has experienced a back and forth between dictatorship and 
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democratic rule in its short period of existence. Turkey is probably the only other similar 
case.  Whether one treats the pro-democracy movements of the 1960s and 2000s as two 
different movements or the continuation of the same movement, I argue that the nature of 
the movement can be understood only by looking at how civil society in the country has 
evolved over time. An historical analysis of the evolution of civil society in Pakistan also 
provides the opportunity to make contributions to the literature on civil society. For 
example, while looking at how different groups have reacted to military dictatorships and 
or democratic regimes, one observes ‘civil society’ in Pakistan acting in ways that one 
would generally not expect. To take one example, you saw NGOs support Musharraf’s 
coup but then you also saw religious parties standing alongside the very same NGOs 
protesting to get rid of Musharraf in 2007-2008. To understand why this is the case, one 
needs to look at the history of the evolution of civil society in Pakistan. This study does 
so in the context of major national and international events taking place during different 
time periods.  
This chapter begins with providing a brief summary of the Pakistani political scene 
to provide some context. It then goes on to discuss different definitions and conceptions of 
the term “Civil Society” and how it related to this study. That is followed by an analysis of 
the evolution of civil society in Pakistan, starting with a brief discussion of events taking 
place right after the birth of the country and how they helped shape civil society and other 
institutions in the country. The chapter then discusses the evolution of specific kinds of 
civil society organizations (labor unions, student organizations, etc.) over time as well as 
how certain events and practices affected the popular discourses on politics, politicians, 
and the military. The chapter ends with a few concluding remarks. 
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2.1.1 The Pakistani Political Scene – A Brief Overview 
“Governance in Pakistan is a delicate balancing act between the military 
chiefs and the elected civilian government. It is a power-sharing 
arrangement whereby the military has important influence over foreign, 
security and key domestic issues and mediates confrontations among 
feuding political leaders, parties or state institutions – if such confrontations 
are deemed threatening to political order and stability. Although the civilian 
government enjoys considerable autonomy for political and economic 
management and exercise of state authority, it is expected always to 
consider the military's sensibilities. The military has repeatedly 
demonstrated that it can and will influence the nature and direction of 
political change without necessarily assuming power” (Rizvi, 1998: 96). 
 
Democratic transitions in Pakistan have been quite unstable. A number of Martial 
Laws and National Assembly dissolutions since its inception in 1947 “have greatly 
reinforced the sense that the democratic transition remains highly tenuous and sadly 
incomplete” (Rais 1994: 133) leading a large part of the population to lose confidence in 
democracy (Croissant 2004: 160).  The country’s first general elections weren’t held until 
the year 1970. Pakistan has experienced four periods of Martial Laws/military rule: 1958-
1969, 1969-1971, 1977-1988, and 1999-2008. Three of these, by General Ayub in 1958, 
General Zia in 1977 and by General Musharaff in 1999 were technically lifted a few 
years after they were implemented, but only after holding ‘elections’ that made sure that 
the generals remained in power as president.  Pakistan has experienced three periods of 
democratic governance, from 1971-1977, 1988-1999, and 2008-present. Even during 
these periods though, the military remains in control of the most important functions of 
the state.  Additionally, the military has also been behind the overthrow of a number of 
democratically elected governments, using the president as a means to topple the then 
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government.12 It was not until 2008-2013, that a democratically elected government was 
able to complete its tenure. Even to this day, no democratically elected Prime Minister 
(head of the government) has been able to continue his/her tenure. 
In the first two decades after the creation of Pakistan, politicians in Pakistan did 
not for the most part, have a mass following.13 Additionally, the country also inherited a 
strong military and bureaucracy from British colonial rule (Ahmad 1989, Ali 2003).14 For 
the first nine years after the creation of Pakistan, the government continued to operate 
under the colonial “Government of India Act of 1935” (Candland 2007: 46). During this 
time, politicians struggled with drafting the country’s constitution. The failure of 
politicians to do so coupled with the strong and meddling military and bureaucracy as 
well as a few dissolutions of assemblies and cabinets did not do much to strengthen 
political institutions or to bridge the disconnect between the public and the politicians. 
Slowly, the country experienced “a precipitous slide into military-bureaucratic 
authoritarianism” (Rais 1994: 133).15    
                                                 
12 In parliamentary forms of government, the president is considered the ceremonial head of the 
state without any meaningful powers, and the prime minister is considered the head of the 
government, but in Pakistan, a constitutional amendment was passed under a military ruler in 
the eighties, General Zia-ul-Haq, giving the president the power to dissolve the National 
Assembly and dismiss the democratically elected prime minister (Rais 1994: 133, Malik 1996: 
680).  These powers were removed by the last democratically elected government of the 
nineties but then reintroduced by Musharraf after he took power. In 2010, the then 
democratically elected government again got rid of these presidential powers. 
13  Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in the seventies, changed this trend somewhat through the Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP). 
14  These two institutions, headed by the viceroy under British rule were the “purveyors of the 
vice regal tradition; [an] authoritarian, centralizing, paternalistic tradition which had its origins 
in the colonial metropolis, derived its support in the colony primarily from the feudal class, and 
received its orders from abroad” (Ahmad 1989). 
15  “[Senior] bureaucrats and generals pulled strings behind the scenes, creating difficulties first 
for the Constituent Assembly and then for the premiers chosen by parliament under the 
Constitution promulgated in 1956. Governments fell and rose, and the new political groups 
waxed and waned as the state elites played them off against one another. A favorite stratagem 
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After a number of dismissed governments in the early years of the country, the 
military was finally “invited” to take over the reins. Ayub Khan governed the country 
from 1958-1969, eventually handing over power to another military ruler in the face of a 
popular uprising. The new military ruler announced elections and the reins of the country 
were handed over to the winner of the elections in West Pakistan (Bhutto), but only after 
losing the eastern part of the country in part because the military refused to accept the 
election results. Bhutto ruled the country until 1977 when another military dictator (Zia) 
overthrew his government after protests broke out against Bhutto over alleged rigging of 
the 1977 elections. Zia ruled the country until 1988, when he died in a mysterious plane 
crash.  
Zia’s death was followed by a somewhat unstable democratic period (1988-1999) 
during which four elections were held and the country saw 11 different governments 
come and go.  These included four democratically elected governments: the Pakistan 
People’s Party (under Benazir Bhutto) and Pakistan Muslim League (under Nawaz 
Sharif) each forming governments twice. None of these governments was allowed to 
finish its five-year term. Even when democratically elected governments were in power, 
they were not the ones calling the shots on the most important matters of state (Zaidi 
2008: 5). Between this time period, the country saw eight prime ministers dismissed16 
(Malik 1996: 680) three democratically elected governments were thrown out of office by 
the military working behind the scenes (through presidential decrees), and eventually, in 
                                                 
was to use charges of inefficiency, nepotism, or corruption as pretexts for driving civilian 
politicians out of power” (Rais 1994: 134). 
16 Three of them were interim appointees and five had been elected by Parliament (Malik 1996: 
680). 
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1999 the military “officially” overthrew PML-N’s government and took direct control of 
the country’s reigns. “Clearly, the power to decide who was worthy of being in 
government throughout the 1990s rested with groups and forces who had no tradition, 
experience or interest with democracy;” namely the Pakistani intelligence agencies and 
bureaus (Zaidi 2008: 5). The following passage provides a succinct, albeit depressing, 
summary of this era: 
Throughout the 1990s, the growing gap between public expectations of elective 
rule and the performance of civilian governments had fueled public 
disenchantment. Faced with a burgeoning debt burden and a shrinking revenue 
base, the country’s civilian managers had consistently failed to bridge the 
growing gap between the state’s military requirements and the economic needs 
of its populace. In May 1998, when growing public and political pressures (not 
least from the military and Islamist quarters) forced Sharif to test atomic 
weapons in response to India’s detonation of its own nuclear devices, Japan, 
the United States, and other Western donors slapped wide-ranging economic 
sanctions on Pakistan, exacerbating an already precarious situation. 
Widespread allegations of corruption at the highest levels of the state, violent 
sectarian conflict, a deteriorating law-and-order situation—all interacted in an 
overall milieu of political, economic, and social instability to undermine 
Sharif’s public credibility (Shah 2004: 376-77). 
 
Throughout the country’s history, the military has come to dominate (and in some 
cases completely overtake) public institutions such as utility corporations, civil service, 
educational institutions and the like with the excuse of uprooting corruption and 
espousing accountability (Shah 2002: 69, Wilke 2001: 27).  The same charges of 
corruption and inefficiency have been used against politicians to repeatedly topple 
democratically elected governments. Even when the military has not directly been in 
power, the military has controlled state affairs including foreign policy from backstage.  
Although the charges of corruption and inefficiency against politicians are far from 
unfounded, the military’s own “legal” looting of the country’s assets in the form of the 
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appropriation of a huge chunk of the country’s budget or their huge business enterprise is 
hardly ever mentioned by the generals or politicians alike. The military’s propaganda 
against politicians has, in fact, been so successful that when General Musharraf took 
power after overthrowing a democratically elected government in 1999, most people 
were either indifferent or welcomed the coup.17 
 
2.2 What is Civil Society 
Before getting into details about the changes in Pakistani civil society, the 
question about what exactly constitutes civil society needs to be answered. Scholars, 
pundits, and the general public have used the term in many different ways and it 
sometimes obscures more than it illuminates.  By some, civil society is seen as more of a 
structure (consisting of different groups and organizations), while by others, it is seen 
more as a combination of a structure and process (the interactions between these groups 
and the state). One example of civil society being treated as a structure would be 
Sachikonye (1995) who defined it as: “the aggregate of institutions whose members are 
engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities – economic and cultural 
production, voluntary associations and household life – and who in this way preserve and 
transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state 
institutions” (Sachikonye 1995). Civil society, in this broad conception includes 
                                                 
17 After taking power Musharraf appointed himself 'Chief Executive' of the country, or the de 
facto head of the government. He abrogated the constitution and dismissed national and 
provincial assemblies. All judges were also to take a fresh oath under the Oath of Judges Order 
of 2000. Elections were held in October 2002.  Before elections were held though, Musharraf 
held a referendum and got 'elected' as president for the next five years. It was no secret that 
both the referendum and elections involved rigging and such planning that ensured Musharraf’s 
victory and that of his allied party. 
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“chambers of commerce, professional associations, independent communications media, 
universities, trade unions, cooperatives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)… 
[as well as the] church, its affiliate organizations, and human rights groups” (ibid) 
Amongst those who treat civil society as a combination of structures and 
processes, Diamond defined civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is 
open, voluntary, self-generating, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order 
or set of shared rules. It is distinct from ‘society’ in general in that it involves citizens 
acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and 
ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, 
to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state officials 
accountable” (Diamond 1999: 221). Civil society is thus “an intermediary phenomenon, 
standing between the private sphere and the state” (ibid). Qadeer (1997) provides a 
similar definition, but with more of an emphasis on the process as compared to Diamond.  
He conceives of civil society as consisting not just of the different groups and 
organizations that express people’s collective interests, but also the norms and actions 
related to that expression (p. 745). Civil society, in this conception, is considered as the 
“mediating space” between society and the state. Qadeer’s definition is more restrictive 
in that unlike other conceptions of civil society that encompass all non-state organizations 
into its fold, Qadeer includes only those institutions “whose primary function is to 
organise people's relationship with the state” (Qadeer 1997: 745).  
Bari and Khattak’s (2001) definition focuses even more on the process, describing 
civil society as “the formal expression of mediation and interpenetration between the 
state on the one hand and the individual on the other” (p. 220). Civil society, according to 
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them “helps to attain collective action through institutionalized, organized forms of 
interaction between the state and the individual. In a sense then, it provides a zone of 
engagement between the state and the individual” (Bari and Khattak 2001: 220).  
Chandhoke (1995) begins her description of civil society by discussing how the state 
constantly tries to control political discourse and define the boundaries of the political yet 
these attempts are always being disputed.  “The site at which these mediations and 
contestations take place, the site at which society enters into a relationship with the state,” 
according to her is what constitutes civil society (p. 9). While this definition is more 
abstract than the previous ones, she makes it a little more concrete by stating that “the 
institutions of civil society are associational and representational forums, a free press and 
social associations” (ibid). It must be noted that these are considered the “institutions of 
civil society” and not civil society in and of themselves. 
One definition that encompasses most aspects of civil society described so far and 
is used to guide this research is that conceptualized by Alagappa (2004), who defines 
civil society as a combination of four factors: “first, a realm in the interstices of the state, 
political society, the market, and the society at large for organization by nonstate, 
nonmarket groups that take collective action in the pursuit of the public good; second, a 
distinct sphere for discourse and construction of normative ideals through interaction 
among nonstate groups on the basis of ideas and arguments; third, an autonomous arena 
of self-governance by nonstate actors in certain issue areas; and, fourth, an instrument for 
collective action to protect the autonomy of the nonstate public realm, affect regime type, 
and influence the politics and policies of the state, political society, and the market. 
Although distinct, the four aspects are interrelated and affect one another… [and] 
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influence society’s relations with the state, political society, and the market, and the rules 
of the games in these arenas” (Alagappa 2004: 32).  
Two aspects of defining civil society that analysts and theorists don’t always 
agree upon need to be highlighted here as they are central to this study. The first is that, 
civil society cannot be conceived (or understood) without looking at the state. While the 
state and civil society should not be conceptualized as “oppositional categories operating 
at each other's expense” (Chandhoke 1995: 9), nonetheless, civil society acquires 
relevance only in relation to the state.18 It is thus impossible to analyze civil society 
without including the interactions with the state.  In Chandhoke’s words: “[n]ot only are 
the state and civil society a precondition each for the other, but the logic of one actually 
constitutes the other” (Chandhoke 2010: 177). The second aspect is that rather than a 
Tocquevillian viewpoint of civil society i.e. civil society is inherently good (so for 
example, all NGOs are good for society), this study adopts more of a Gramscian 
perspective (Mercer 2002:11) in that civil society is a “contested space,” and so NGOs, 
rather than being inherently good for society, reflect the struggles within the wider 
society. 
                                                 
18 “Nowhere in the history of civil society has it been conceptualised as an alternative to or as 
independent of the state. For de Tocqueville (1835, 1840), civil society limits the state; for 
Hegel (1821), civil society is a necessary stage in the formation of the state; for Marx, civil 
society is the source of the power of the state; and for Gramsci (1929–1935), civil society is the 
space where the state constructs its hegemony in alliance with the dominant classes. Not only 
are the state and civil society a precondition each for the other, but the logic of one actually 
constitutes the other. Today, however, the two have been uncoupled. Whatever the reason for 
this uncoupling, the moment that we think of civil society as a welcome alternative to the state, 
we conveniently forget that the concept has always been problematic for political theory. 
Anxious questions about the sphere have almost always outstripped the answers to these 
questions. Today, however, civil society is readily and smoothly presented as an answer to the 
malaise of the contemporary world” (Chandhoke 2010: 177).  
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Additionally, as pointed out by Alagappa (2004), one should avoid using civil 
society as “a single collective actor” (p. 33). “Like the society at large, civil society is a 
realm of power, inequality, struggle, and conflict among competing interests. It is 
populated by diverse formal and informal groups and organizations, and although these 
may choose to cooperate on certain issues or reach accommodation of their conflicting 
interests, there is no necessary consensus among them. Civil society is invariably 
competitive and heterogeneous. Agency applies to organizations that populate the civil 
society space, not to civil society as a single entity. The tendency to use civil society in a 
shorthand fashion may mask the diversity, inequality, and struggle within the realm. 
Analytically, it is more useful to speak in terms of specific actors or groups of actors in 
civil society” (Alagappa 2004: 33). This is the reason why the analysis of the Pakistani 
civil society conducted in this study has been broken up into different sections such as: 
student organizations, workers unions, NGOs, etc., because civil society cannot be treated 
as one homogenous unit. On the other hand, as discussed above, civil society is more than 
just the organizations that represent the collective interests of different groups; it is also a 
process; the interactions between the people and the state and the contestations over 
political discourses and the like. It is for this reason that the analysis that follows also 
includes discussions about the changes in the use of religion in the public and political 
realm, the military’s efforts to shape the public’s views about politics and politicians, etc. 
Just like Qadeer (1997), this analysis is undertaken with the view that civil society can 
change a country’s social and economic development, and concurrently, changes in the 
state will affect the nature of civil society (p. 746).  
  
  37 
2.2.1 Need Civil Society be Liberal and Democratic? – The Case of Pakistan  
Many theorists view civil society as inherently beneficial for society. For 
Diamond (1994), for example, a strong civil society is essential to guard against the 
excesses of state power. Similarly, Putnam (1996) argues that participating in civic 
associations produces social capital which is essential for healthy democracies. For 
Alagappa (2004), even though civil society is not viewed intrinsically as a “virtue” or 
“solution,” it nonetheless influences “the rule of the political game, in the direction of 
open, participatory, accountable politics” (p. 32). He does go on to argue though that 
there is “no necessary connection between civil society and democracy” and that while 
some organizations have a democratic effect, others may have an anti-democratic effect 
(Alagappa 2004: 49). The democratic effect of civil society organizations, it is argued, 
depends on the national and international circumstances. “[S]uccessful democratic 
transition and consolidation require civil and political societies to have strong democratic 
forces; these forces are more consequential when they complement one another and act in 
mutually supporting ways” (Alagappa 2004: 49-50).  In terms of the consolidation of 
democracy, Diamond et al (1997) similarly argue that while a strong civil society helps in 
the consolidation of democracy, in places where civil society is weak or fragmented or 
places with rampant corruption, a weak democratic culture, ethnic divides, or severe 
socio-economic divides the consolidation of democracy is considered vulnerable. 
Additionally, Diamond claims that “actors in civil society recognize the principles 
of state authority and the rule of law and need the protection of an institutionalized legal 
order to prosper and be secure. Thus, civil society not only restricts state power but 
legitimates state authority when that authority is based on the rule of law” (Diamond 
  38 
1999: 221). What makes Pakistan an interesting case study is that it seems like civil 
society in Pakistan has been willing to accept a redefinition of what constitutes the “rule 
of law.” For example, in 1998-99, many NGOs in Pakistan were under attack from the 
then democratically elected government for a number of reasons, the main one being that 
they were opposing the government’s efforts to introduce Islamic laws. So, when General 
Musharraf overthrew the government and took over the reins of the country, many of 
these NGOs welcomed the coup as Musharraf presented himself as a liberal alternative to 
the more religious party that was in power. Even though the constitution of the country 
was suspended, the law of the land was broken, if one is to agree with Diamond’s 
conception of civil society, one could argue that the PCO (Provisional Constitutional 
Order) issued by the General was now the new law and hence civil society organizations 
went along with it. 
It should be mentioned though that civil society in Pakistan, while credited with 
bringing down two dictatorships, fought a third one despite facing extreme violence and 
brutality, and bringing down a democratically elected government, can by no means be 
considered a “strong” civil society by traditional understanding of the term. Repeated 
military coups followed by the suspension of the political process “and the concomitant 
weakness of democratic institutions and norms have distorted the development of civil 
society in Pakistan” (Shah 2004: 357).  
Another aspect of the way civil society is generally conceived of which does not 
neatly fit the case of Pakistan is that of civil society being liberal. “The classic, 
overwhelmingly Western literature on civil society suggests that by virtue of being 
‘against’ the state (by which is often implicitly meant the state at its most autocratic and 
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undemocratic) civil society must necessarily favor some form of democratic disposition. 
Such was not the case in Pakistan for most of Musharraf’s reign, however, when what 
constitutes ‘civil society’ by most definitions of the term laid aside aggressive support for 
democracy in favor of support for liberalism (or at least its image) in the person of the 
seemingly forward-looking General” (Zaidi 2008b: 38). So not only do you have civil 
society associations welcoming the overthrow of a democratically elected government, you 
also have many civil society organizations in Pakistan that are religious in nature. Some of 
these organizations work against the welfare or rights of women or non-Muslims in the 
country, which goes against popularly held beliefs of what civil society is all about. 
According to Qadeer (1997), civil society in Pakistan operates on two tracks. The first is 
the “urban and modern, which is visible in conferences, seminars and meetings of NGOs, 
bar councils, professional associations and literary clubs” (Qadeer 1997: 754). These 
groups “espouse modern liberal values, e.g., international human rights, freedom of 
expression, independent judiciary, etc.,” (ibid). The second track is “made up of ethnic, 
denominational, sectarian and clan organisations that espouse traditional religious values. 
This track is made up of mosques, seminaries, Islamic/ethnic/territorial segments of 
student19 and labour unions [as well as groups of market traders, small town industrialists, 
and non-secular NGOs]20... The Urdu press is its forum and public meetings, marches, 
protests, and occasional violence are its instruments” (ibid). It is the organizations on the 
“modern track,” namely secular NGOs that have been, over time, the subject of government 
                                                 
19 While until the 80s, the country had a mix of student organizations: liberal, leftist, and 
religious, state repression got rid of the more liberal and leftist organizations so for the next 20+ 
years the country only saw student organizations along religious and ethnic lines. 
20 “Parts of the apparently 'modern' institutions also operate in this track, for example, sections of 
bar councils, traders and professional associations, universities and the Shariat (Islamic) courts” 
(Qadeer 1997: 754). 
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censorship. These organizations, according to Qadeer, are no match for religious or ethnic 
groups. Secular NGOs “may be effective in initiating local development or carry out 
welfare activities, but they have limited 'street power' and poor capacity to mobilise people” 
(Qadeer 1997: 754).  
 
2.3 Evolution of Pakistani Civil Society  
Pakistan’s civil society is characterised by hybrid forms, multiple 
inheritances and the unresolved struggle between the practices and values of 
pre-capitalist society and new modes of social life, between authoritarian 
legacies and democratic aspirations. Its cultural manifestations appear as a 
collection of incoherent voices, conflicting worldviews and opposing 
interests. While some social forms such as councils of elders, neighbourhood 
associations and shrines continue from previous phases of society, many new 
groups have been created ‘organically,’ to borrow a Gramscian term, through 
the development of capitalism. Such are the dynamics of an evolving civil 
society, caught between the throes of a dying social order and the birth pangs 
of a new one (Sattar and Baig, 2001: 1). 
 
Civil Society in Pakistan, like any other civil society, has been influenced and 
shaped by the national and international conditions under which it has existed. Pakistani 
Civil Society has gone from being populated by what one would call more 'traditional' 
groups and organizations that were considered characteristic of such spaces including 
workers unions, farmers groups, student unions to more apolitical NGOs and the like. 
Pakistan started off as a country with rather weak workers' unions or peasant organizing 
(unlike India or its then Eastern wing, now Bangladesh).  At the time of partition, hardly 
any industries existed in what now constitutes Pakistan (most were in what became 
India).  Peasant mobilization too was much more prominent in now India and 
Bangladesh.  Despite many obstacles though, unionism did gain strength in the first 25 
years or so of the country's existence. The 'traditional' left, aligned mostly with the 
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Communist Party in USSR or China (organizationally or ideologically), also had a 
noticeable presence.  Over time though, repeated military rule in the country as well as 
other national and international circumstances including (but not limited to) the problems 
the country faced during the initial years of its birth, the Cold War, the worldwide student 
and workers movements in the sixties, the worldwide rise of neo-liberalism, 
globalization, the Afghan wars, the War on terror, and the expanding middle class in the 
country changed the nature of civil society. Internal repression (mostly by military juntas 
but also by democratic governments to a much lesser degree) led to the weakening or 
disappearance of these more traditional groups.   
At the same time NGOs were mushrooming all around the world in most cases as 
an alternative or additive to provide social services that governments were no longer able 
or willing to provide. In the 1980s, when resistance against the then military government 
was growing in Pakistan and none of the earlier kinds of groups (workers’ and student 
etc.) were available as a space for organizing against the regime, many people in urban 
areas who wanted to oppose the military either formed NGOs focusing on specific areas 
(women’s rights, minority rights) or formed informal groups many of which later became 
formal NGOs.  Given that the NGO phenomena was taking place the world over with 
donor funding funneling into many third world countries in particular, it was no surprise 
that the same happened in Pakistan as well.  What we see now in the country is a very 
weak or almost nonexistent labor, no student unions, very little peasant mobilization, and 
a sprinkling of other leftist/progressive citizen groups along with an increasing number of 
NGOs. One could argue that Pakistani civil society has gone from being populated by 
groups where people advocated for their own rights to groups that advocate for the rights 
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of others and are dependent on external funds. In this section I try to describe some of the 
more significant of these influences and changes. The section is divided into sub-sections 
based on events and processes that affected the nature of Pakistani civil society as well as 
some of the major kinds of civil society organizations that have been prominent 
throughout the country’s history.  
  
2.3.1 Unions 
Candland argues that “Pakistan’s traumatic creation… unleashed ruling class 
insecurities that were unfavorable to workers’ organizations” (2007: 35).  The new 
“managers” of the state used the pre-existing colonial institutions in order to centralize 
and solidify their power (ibid). To begin with, Pakistan lost many union leaders and rank-
and-file activists in the displacement and migration of people that ensued at the time of 
the birth of the country (ibid: 43). Most urban workers belonged to areas that became part 
of India.21 By the year 1951, many of the major Pakistani cities had become immigrant 
majority cities,22 and industrial workers consisting mostly of immigrants from India or 
other parts of the country. In the year 1959, almost 60% of the labor force of Karachi – 
the country’s biggest industrial city – was immigrants (ibid: 44). This huge dislocation of 
people, especially right after partition meant that workers’ working-class identity was 
easily weakened as compared to religious and ethnic identities (ibid: 45). Residential 
colonies in major cities were organized by ethnicity (Baloch, Pathan, etc.). Employers 
exploited these divisions for their own benefit. “Coal miners in rural Sindh, for example, 
                                                 
21 These included eastern Punjab, the United Province, and other Muslim minority areas that 
would become part of independent India (Candland 2007: 43). 
22 These included Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Karachi, Lahore, Llyalpur, and Hyderabad (ibid: 44). 
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are Pathan migrants from the Northwest Frontier Province [now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa], 
who speak neither Urdu nor Sindhi, the languages of the region where they work. 
Therefore, none have access to local social networks. The workers live in barracks near 
the pits, far away from the nearest human settlements.” (Candland 2007: 45) 
Nonetheless, the early 1950s also experienced a marked increase in workers’ 
strikes, especially in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) (Candland 2007: 46) where unions 
were much stronger than West Pakistan. While, on the one hand, announcing its 
“intention to meet workers’ demands for better rights to organize [the Pakistani 
government at the same time was] enacting legislation to control workers and to make 
unionization impossible” (ibid). In the year 1952, for example, it ratified two of ILO’s 
most important conventions,23 but also passed the Essential Services Maintenance Act 
(ESMA) which denied many categories of workers the right to unionize (ibid). This act 
provided the government with the authority to ban trade unions or restrict their activities 
in industries that are deemed “essential” (ibid: 46). ESMA, which is still in affect even 
today, denies the rights of unionization to agricultural workers, workers in the 
educational sector and the like. (ibid: 47).24  
The Pakistani government’s decision to align itself with the United States 
(economically and militarily) was also a cause of the suppression of the Left, specifically 
the left-leaning trade unions that were associated with the Pakistan Trade Union 
Federation (PTUF) (Candland 2007: 47).  To counter the popularity of left-leaning trade 
unions, a more depoliticized, anti-communist All Pakistan Confederation of Labor 
                                                 
23 The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (1948) and 
the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949). 
24 Absence from work or work stoppage is treated as a penal offense and no court can listen to 
complaints filed by workers affected by this ESMA (Candland 2007: 47).   
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(APCOL) was created in 1951, which received the support (financial and otherwise) of 
the Brussels-based International Confederation for Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The 
ICFTU funded trips for Pakistani trade unionists to visit the U.S. “to encourage them to 
emulate U.S.-styled ‘independent’ (i.e., apolitical) trade unionism” (ibid: 48). The 
purpose for the creation of this federation is obvious from the fact that the then Federal 
Minister of Labor was in charge of running it. To this day, Pakistan remains the only 
South Asian country where workers have almost no influence on the state or political 
parties. In all other South Asian countries including India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Afghanistan, and Nepal, representatives of workers’ organizations or unions have become 
cabinet members or members of parliament and/or have at some point or another had 
significant influence in formal politics (ibid: 35). Despite these obstacles, the number of 
unions and union membership grew at an annual rate of 10 percent between 1948 and 
1955 (ibid: 41).  
After taking power in a coup in 1958, Ayub Khan’s martial law government 
passed a few labor-related laws to “formalize industrial relations and to control the labor 
movement through government regulation” (Candland 2007: 47). The Industrial Disputes 
Act of 1959 for example “made conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication compulsory, 
limited nonworkers (so-called outsiders) to no more than 25 percent of trade union 
offices, and banned unions from collecting funds for political activities” (ibid). 
Nonetheless labor activity continued, and workers grew increasingly militant in a number 
of communities in the early 1960s. Communist Party workers and other leftists further 
helped mobilize in these communities (ibid: 47). The war with India in 1965 resulted in a 
decrease in labor militancy but Ayub’s “Decade of Development” celebrations in 1968 
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again sparked protests all over the country.  Workers (and students) were the backbone of 
the pro-democracy/anti-Ayub movement of 1968-69. The junta tried its best to control 
the movement through violence and banning rallies and demonstrations and the like but 
Ayub finally had to give in by announcing elections and handing over power to his Army 
Chief of Staff Yahya Khan. There were a number of associations that grew out of union 
activities during this time including the Bonded Labour Liberation Front formed with the 
help of student activists with the aim to free bonded brick kiln workers and their 
families” (Whaites 1995: 243). 
After being forced to resign and hand over power to the Army Chief of Staff 
Yahya Khan, general elections were held in 1970 but before elections were held, the 
military government introduced a new labor law called the Industrial Relations Ordinance 
(IRO) to try to “mollify and depoliticize” workers (Candland 2007: 41). While, in 
principle, providing workers the right to unionize and bargain collectively it was an 
attempt to depoliticize the labor movement by requiring “that trade union leaders be 
workers, currently employed, and elected by fellow workers. This stipulation ensured that 
Pakistan’s trade union representatives would be ill equipped to negotiate labor law and 
labor courts (where English is still used). The IRO also instituted enterprise unionism in 
Pakistan, permitting trade unionism only at the factory level” (Candland 2007: 49). 
Bhutto, who won the elections at the behest of the labor unions, announced the 
Economic Reform Ordinance of 1972 within few weeks of taking office. This ordinance 
nationalized more than thirty private businesses, making good on his campaign promise 
to nationalize basic industries (Candland 2007: 50). His government improved working 
conditions for workers in a number of ways including “programs for workplace injury 
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compensation, workers’ profit sharing, and workers’ participation on management 
boards” as well as the introduction of the country’s first pension program (ibid 52). 
Bhutto’s era was good for trade unions and unionism in general (Iqbal, Khan, and Javed, 
2004: 28). A number of umbrella organizations were formed during this period, including 
the Pakistan Trade Union Federation, Pakistan National Worker’s Trade Union 
Federation, National Progressive Workers’ Federation, and Pakistan Workers’ Federation 
(ibid). The number of registered trade unions and union membership increased from 209 
and 393,000 respectively in 1951 to 8,332 unions and 1,050,000 members in 1977 (FES 
1991). 
While overall Bhutto’s era was good for labor and trade unionism, towards the 
end of his term, Bhutto, who had been growing increasingly intolerant of criticism 
against him, got many of the trade union activists who had led the movement in 1968-69 
arrested and jailed. Some have suggested though that the repression faced by labor 
towards the end of Bhutto’s tenure was not because Bhutto had turned against the 
workers, “but the bureaucracy and the owners of industry who turned against Bhutto” 
(Candland 2007: 50-52).25 At around the same time the country experienced large 
protests against Bhutto, starting with allegations of rigging in the 1977 elections. An 
alliance of religious parties, opposition parties, and small market traders backed by big 
industrialists were able to create enough disturbance on the streets that the military 
decided they had to move in and overthrow the government to maintain order in the 
country. 
                                                 
25 While this may be hard to settle, it is a fact that the anti-Bhutto protests that erupted at the end 
of his tenure and led to the military takeover were backed by industrialists who had been upset 
at Bhutto for his nationalization scheme and his support for labor militancy. 
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Zia’s dictatorship was the worst period for workers unions; labor unionism has 
not yet been able to recover. While the average union membership was 1,880 in 1951, it 
had gone down to 135 in 1990 (Ghayur 1996: 799).  The military regime censured and 
suppressed unions and union activity and jailed union leaders (Whaites 1995: 245, 
Candland 2007: 41). Severe restrictions were placed on union activities and any 
resistance was met by violence. Zia’s rule finally came to an end when he died in a plane 
crash.  In late 1988, the military appointed interim government adopted the IMF’s 
structural adjustment program as the country was about to welcome its newly elected 
civilian government after 11 years of military rule. “Many Pakistanis saw cruel irony in 
the state's rapid withdrawal from the economy and from the provision of good jobs and 
affordable public services under internationa1 pressure just as democracy, after more than 
a decade of authoritarian government, was given another opportunity to survive” 
(Candland 2007: 6). The next decade, as governments were elected and removed from 
power, almost the entire manufacturing and financial sectors in the country were 
privatized (ibid). As has been the experience the world over, the privatization of 
industries is not good for unionization. By the year 2000, Pakistan’s union membership 
was 0.7 percent of the economically active population (ibid: 47). 
Musharraf’s regime was no better for trade unions which continued to face 
repressive laws. The Industrial Relations Ordinance of 2002 restricted the rights of 
workers to form unions, to organize collective bargaining and to strike (NGORC 2002). 
Continued privatization and the downsizing of the public sector further led to falling 
trade union membership (ibid). The privatization of the Pakistan Telecommunication 
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Corporation Limited as well as the Pakistan Steel Mills faced some resistance but 
nowhere close to the kind of union activity observed during the 50s, 60s, and 70s.  
 
Figure 2.1: Number of Registered Trade Unions & Union 
Membership since Partition26 
These two graphs show trends in the number of unions, union membership (Graph 
1), industrial disputes, the number of workers involved in these disputes as well as the 
number of workdays lost (Graph 2) since the time of the country’s creation, based on data 
collected from the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. As is obvious from the graphs, the best 
time for unions and labor activism in the country was under Bhutto in the seventies and 
the decade preceding it.27  
                                                 
26 Based on data from the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (2008 & 2011 Statistical Year 
Books and 50 Years of Pakistan report) 
27 I have not been able to find an explanation for the dramatic increase in the number of unions 
and union membership in 2003 followed by as dramatic a decrease in 2007. Since the increase 
and decrease are almost the same, I am guessing this was due to some error in reporting the 
data. Unfortunately, no other data is available to confirm or repudiate this assumption. 
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Figure 2.2: Stacked Area Graph of Union Disputes since Partition28 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Student Organizations 
At the time of Pakistan’s creation, the Muslim Students Federation (MSF) – 
student wing of the ruling Muslim League – was the only established student 
organization in the country. The conservative Islamic student group IJT (Islami Jamiat 
Taleba)29 also existed at this time but was not as established. As the Muslim League 
started to disintegrate at the national level, the MSF followed the same pattern. The 
country experienced a number of changes in the early 1950s which were to influence the 
shape of civil society in coming years (Iqbal et al 2004: 23).  
This decade saw the emergence of a number of student groups, the two most 
prominent being the progressive30 Democratic Students Federation (DSF) and National 
                                                 
28 Based on data from the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics (2008 & 2011 Statistical Year 
Books and 50 Years of Pakistan report) 
29 This was the student wing of the mainstream political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami. 
30 Both these groups, the Democratic Students Federation (DSF) formed in 1950 and National 
Students Federation (NSF) in 1956, were Marxist in their original orientation but became more 
progressive than Marxist by the 1980s (Paracha 2010). 
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Students Federation (NSF). It was student activists from these groups that formed the 
backbone of the anti-Ayub movement of the 1960s. The DSF, formed in 1950, became 
very popular on campuses in the major urban areas, and was behind what is called the 
first student movement in Pakistan (in 1953). DSF activists focused on different issues 
facing students including tuition fees, lack of appropriate library facilities and 
classrooms, shortage of hostels, and the need for a proper university campus in Karachi31 
(Iqbal et al 2004: 23, Paracha 2010, Paracha 2014). After a lot of protesting, agitation, 
and the death of six students, student leaders were invited to meet with the country’s 
Prime Minister leading to the construction of a new campus in Karachi as well as other 
concessions (Paracha 2014). A year later, the DSF was banned by the government, 
accusing it of being the front organization of the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP)32 
(Paracha 2010). The DSF was reincarnated as the National Students Federation (NSF) in 
1956 and by the following year was winning student union elections in all major urban 
areas (Paracha 2014).  
In 1958 when Ayub Khan imposed Martial law, political parties, student politics, 
and student unions were all banned. This ban was lifted partially in 1960, allowing 
student organizations to continue their activities. The NSF, although independent, 
developed strong ties with a number of workers unions. In 1962 the worsening Sino-
Soviet split led to factions and splits within the NSF, allowing the conservative-Islamist 
IJT, the only other major student organization at the time, to gain strength on campuses 
(Paracha 2014). But the NSF was to regain its strength in the next few years and become 
                                                 
31 This movement was mainly concentrated in Karachi. 
32 The CPP was implicated for being part of a leftwing coup attempt in 1951 by an army Major 
General against the then government. 
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the country’s leading student organization by the mid-60s (Paracha 2010). “Paralleling 
the start of the celebrated students’ movement in the United States and Europe that began 
taking shape in 1964-65, the spark in Pakistan in this respect was set alight by the 
aftermath of the country’s 1965 war with India” (Paracha 2014). Even though Pakistan 
was defeated on the battleground, the official media portrayed the war as a victory, so the 
internationally brokered peace treaty seemed like a loss for Pakistan. Opposition parties 
and student groups started protesting against the military regime, claiming that the 
country had lost at the negotiation table. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was the Foreign 
Minister at the time (under Ayub) was also opposed to the treaty and eventually resigned 
from his position. Already popular amongst some student groups and leftist circles, the 
next few years saw a rise in his popularity amongst (West) Pakistanis. The formation of 
the Pakistan People’s Party (by Bhutto and other Marxist ideologues), with a focus on the 
hardships faced by the economically disadvantaged owing to the economic policies of 
Ayub’s government, was able to ride on the popular uprising led by student and labor 
activists against the military regime, forcing the military dictator to resign in 1969, 
handing power to another military general who then announced elections. Student 
activists played a major role in this movement and in the subsequent victory of PPP in 
West Pakistan in the national elections. 
Interestingly, the three major student groups to have emerged during the last three 
years of the sixties were ethno-nationalist or Islamist, although the ethno-nationalist 
groups were progressive/Marxist in nature (Paracha 2010).33  Once Bhutto took over 
                                                 
33 These were the Marxist-Baloch nationalist Baloch Students Organisation (BSO), the Islamist 
Anjuman Taliba Islam (ATI), and the Progressive-Pakhtun-nationalist Pushtun Students 
Federation (PkSF). 
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power34, student groups became increasingly active in colleges throughout the country 
(Iqbal et al 2004: 28-29).  The nationalization of schools and colleges as well as the 
educational reforms of 1972 were welcomed by most student groups. The most 
prominent student groups of the time included progressive groups like the National 
Students Federation (NSF) and newly formed progressive People’s Students Federation 
(PSF) (student wing of PPP) which rallied around demands related to social and 
economic justice and access to education; others such as the Islami Jamiat Talba (IJT) 
and Anjuman-e-Talba-e-Islam (ATI), which were student wings of the religious political 
parties35  made demands about establishing a system of Islamic government (ibid).  
“The 1970s witnessed one of the most democratic periods in the history of student 
politics in Pakistan. Bhutto's party openly promoted and patronised student bodies in 
universities and colleges, culminating in a phenomenon that remains the most reassuring 
symbol of symbiosis between the establishment and fledgling political minds - the 
Student Union Ordinance of 1974” (Bhattacharya 2012) which encouraged political 
activity amongst students on college campuses. Even though student union elections had 
been the norm in many college campuses since the 1950s, the Student Union Ordinance 
made the process more official, according to which student union elections were to be 
held in all public colleges and universities on the same day of the year. The elections 
received funding and dates and other dynamics of the elections were decided by the 
government and not by college administrators (Paracha 2013).  
Ironically, the 1970s, while really good for student politics in general, slowly saw 
a decline in the strength of progressive groups and the strengthening of the more 
                                                 
34 As President in 1971, then as Prime Minister in 1973 after the new constitution was introduced. 
35 Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Ulma-e-Pakistan, respectively. 
  53 
conservative Islamist groups. As Bhutto attempted to mainstream the PPP, ridding the 
party of some of the leftist ideologues, splits started to appear within the progressive 
student groups who had initially supported Bhutto. Additionally, the presence of many 
progressive student groups divided the votes of progressive students providing the main 
Islamist student group (IJT) an advantage in student union elections. Lastly, the main 
Islamist political parties who had been badly defeated in the elections against Bhutto 
increased their efforts to reach out to students on different campuses through their student 
groups (Bhattacharya 2012, Paracha 2010, Paracha 2014).36 By 1977, the IJT was in 
control of most of the student unions across the country (Paracha 2010). This helped 
provide momentum to the street protests against Bhutto after the 1977 elections. The PPP 
won in a landslide, but opposition parties accused the PPP of rigging the elections. Apart 
from the Islamist and other opposition political parties, traders and shop keepers, the 
Islamist student groups as well as some of the progressive student groups participated in 
these protests that eventually led to a military takeover by General Zia. The Islamists 
hated Bhutto for his “western lifestyle, socialist policies, and disregard for Islamist ideas” 
(Mullick 2008: 7) while the leftists accused Bhutto “of rolling back PPP’s original 
socialist manifesto and alienating the leftists by inducting prominent feudal lords and 
capitalists in his post-’74 cabinet,” purging the PPP of more hardline leftists, having sent 
                                                 
36 Paracha (2014) claims that migration from more conservative rural areas during this time also 
helped bolster IJT’s strength. According to him, starting in 1970-71, the “IJT began holding 
‘study circles’ in which it offered help and books to the new students and then slip in lectures 
and writings by JI [Jamat-e-Islami] chief and Islamic scholar, Abul Ala Maududi, to the 
students. Most of the men and women who became part of these study circles were students 
arriving from the country’s conservative rural areas and who had found NSF’s aggressive 
Maoist/Marxist posturing alienating. An increase in numbers of young people moving to the 
cities’ from rural towns for higher education in this period also helped bolster IJT’s vote bank” 
(Paracha 2014). It would be ironic if this increase in migration was partly due to the increase in 
accessibility to higher education owing to the policies of Bhutto’s government. 
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the army to fight against Baloch insurgents, and cozying up to Islamists towards the end 
of his regime in order to regain some of his lost popularity (Paracha 2014).37  
Once Zia took over, progressive and leftist groups were constantly under attack. 
Many student activists were jailed, others had to endure torture and public lashings, and 
some were even given death sentences and hanged for resisting Zia’s rule. Some of these 
activists fled to Afghanistan to join the armed guerilla anti-Zia group made up of 
supporters and some family members of Bhutto. Zia’s regime actively supported the 
Islamist student group, the IJT, as its parent party was a big supporter of Zia. The IJT did 
the military regime’s bidding by harassing progressive and leftist student activists in a bid 
to free campuses of their influence. As the Afghan war was underway, the US and 
Pakistani support for the Mujahedeen resulted in easy accessibility to weapons in the 
streets of Pakistan. Student groups also became armed either in order to harass other 
groups or for the purpose of protection. Many groups formed militant arm wings for these 
purposes (Paracha 2010, 2014). 
Given the challenges faced by progressive and leftist groups, they regrouped and 
formed new alliances.38 It was because of this and the constant harassment and thuggery 
of IJT members on campus that the group slowly lost popularity in the eighties until 1983 
when they lost in almost all union elections. When it seemed like the IJT would face 
another humiliating defeat in the 1984 elections by progressive, anti-Zia student groups, 
                                                 
37 There were huge street protests and violent riots by Islamists in 1974 to declare a minority sect 
(the Ahmedis) non-Muslims.  Bhutto’s government eventually caved in and passed a 
constitutional amendment to appease the protestors. 
38 Another important student group formed during this time was the All Pakistan Mutahidda 
Students Organization (APMSO). Claiming to be progressive-secular, it wanted to work for the 
Urdu speaking students (Mohajirs) in Karachi. The mainstream, Karachi-based political party 
MQM was later formed by members of APMSO in 1984 and was central to a lot of the ethnic 
strife in Karachi during the nineties. 
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the Zia regime scrapped the 1974 Student Union Ordinance and banned student unions. 
Colleges could still hold union elections, but they were not recognized or funded by the 
government anymore. This led to lots of protests on college campuses (by both 
progressive and Islamist groups). The protestors faced a lot of violence and just when the 
movement seemed like it was at its peak, the IJT decided to pull out (on the insistence of 
its parent party).39 Hundreds of student activists belonging to different progressive groups 
were jailed for long terms (Mullick 2008: 7, Mufti 2007b, Paracha 2010, Paracha 2014). 
After the ban on student unions and the state repression against activists 
protesting this ban, college campuses saw much violence between student groups 
(Paracha 2010, 2013). Although facing extreme harassment and repression, student 
activism had been alive on campuses during most of Zia’s time, be it in the form of direct 
opposition to Zia’s rule or to his policies, but by the end of his regime, “the ban on 
student unions, fear of arrest and torture, political apathy, and academic and occupational 
obligations took the steam out of student activism” (Mullick 2008: 6). The Islamist IJT 
was the only group that had been allowed to function without any form of harassment or 
repression from the government. It should be mentioned that while it was students who 
faced the most repression on campuses, faculty members were not immune. Many who 
spoke out against Zia lost their jobs, were jailed, or were intimidated into silence for fear 
of losing their livelihoods. By the time Zia’s rule came to an end, student groups still 
functioning on college campuses were mostly organized along religious or 
ethnic/sectarian lines (Qadeer 1997: 756) 
                                                 
39 “Zia had been close to the IJT’s mother party, the JI. He asked the JI to ‘discipline its student 
wing’ otherwise the student outfits with whom the IJT had joined hands during the movement 
would damage Pakistan’s role in the anti-Soviet ‘Afghan jihad’ and slow down his regime’s 
Islamisation process” (Paracha 2013). 
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One trend that remained constant throughout Pakistani student politics were 
groups formed along ethnic lines. “Ethnic-nationalists, fighting for autonomy and equal 
citizenship from Islamabad, formed student unions [groups] in the provinces such as the 
All Pakistan Muttahida Students Organization (APMSO) in Sind; the Baloch Students 
Organization (BSO) in Baluchistan; and the Pashtun Student Organization (PSO) in the 
North-West Frontier Province” (Mullick 2008: 7). These groups vacillated between 
“peaceful campaigns for equal citizenship and provincial rights from a Punjab dominated 
federal government to actively supporting militant secessionist groups” (ibid). 
Throughout Zia’s rule, Islamist groups had acted as “incubators” for sectarian and 
populist student groups40 which along with the IJT became even more militant against 
progressives, nationalists, and Shias during the 1990s (ibid). Lots of these groups also 
took it upon themselves to be the enforcers of “the writ of Allah in educational 
institutions" (ibid). Student politics in the nineties was thus limited to sectarianism and 
religious moralizing.  
It was not until Musharraf imposed emergency in November 2007 that more 
mainstream and liberal student activism saw a revival on campuses. The anti-Musharraf 
movement was populated by Islamist, ethno-nationalist, and newly formed mainstream 
and/or liberal/progressive student groups. While students at private universities were the 
first to protest, students from public universities also joined the movement. The year after 
the imposition of emergency saw the emergence of a number of student groups that 
                                                 
40 Such as the Shia Imamia Student Organization (ISO), the Sunni Anjuman-e-Taleba-e-Islam 
(ATI), and the Muslim Students Federation (MSF) (student wing of the Pakistan Muslim 
League) (Mullick 2008: 7). 
  57 
shunned religious and ethnic politics as well as the revival of the National Students 
Federation (NSF). 
 
2.3.3 NGOs and CBOs 
It is hard to estimate the exact number of NGOs in Pakistan mainly because 
NGOs can be registered under 5 different laws, the registration offices operate in 
different localities, and the offices are not very good at keeping or updating records 
(ADB 1999: 3, Sattar and Baig 2001: 7).  This is evident from the different estimates 
about the number of non-profit organizations in Pakistan given by different reports. A 
1999 Asian Development Bank (ADB) study, for example, estimated that the number of 
NGOs and Community Based Organizations ranged from 25,000 to 35,000 (1999:4). 
Sattar and Baig on the other hand estimated the number of registered and non-registered 
NGOs to be about 60,000, out of which 10,000 to 12,000 are registered and active (2001: 
6).  The study conducted by the Social Policy and Development Centre (SDP) in 2002, 
probably the most comprehensive of the kind, estimated the number of active nonprofit 
organizations (NPOs)41 in June 2000 to be about 45,000 (Pasha et al 2002). The number 
of registered NPOs, or what one may call NGOs, according to this report, is 56,219 but 
approximately 53% of those are “inactive, closed, or untraceable” (ibid: 8, 12). The 
number of functional registered organizations should thus be around 29,800. 
                                                 
41 Their definition of NPOs includes both registered and non-registered organizations. They 
define NPOs as organizations with the following characteristics: having an institutional 
structure, private (i.e. separate from the state), self-governing, non-profit distributing, and 
attracting voluntary contributions (time, money, or both) (Pasha et al 2002: 2). Their estimates 
do not include political parties, religious worship organizations, trade unions, professional 
organizations, and housing associations (Pasha et al 2002: 3). 
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Since data about the number of NGOs over time is not readily available, rather 
than simply looking at the change in the number of NGOs over time, this analysis will 
instead focus on the nature of NGOs and any major changes that may have occurred over 
the course of the country’s history that speaks to the change in the nature of the Pakistani 
civil society. 
The first few years of the country’s existence saw the emergence of a number of 
groups and voluntary organizations concerned primarily with helping the millions of 
refugees arriving from India as a result of Partition (ADB 1999; Iqbal et al 2004). Some 
other groups dealt mainly with service delivery, education, healthcare, population control 
and women’s issues (Iqbal et al 2004). Most of these organizations were created and led 
by educated, well-to-do, urban women, many of whom were married to influential 
politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen (ADB 1999; Iqbal et al 2004). Iqbal et al 
describe how many of these women were “frequently criticized by reactionary sections of 
society and derided as ‘Begamat’ (rich women)42 who had found a pastime in welfare 
work. They were accused of being ‘Westernized’ and even ‘character-less’ and of 
conspiring to destroy the moral values of an Islamic society” (2004: 20).43 Apart from 
these groups, religious schools were also set up across the country, mostly in urban areas, 
by renowned religious scholars (ibid). Given the circumstances of this period, it is not 
surprising that apart from the workers’ unions most other groups that were formed during 
this period were concerned mostly with providing help and services to immigrants, 
                                                 
42 The literal translation for Begamat is ‘wives’ but it is also used as a somewhat derogatory term 
referring to wives of rich men. 
43 Even to this day, similar accusations are heralded towards NGO workers. Islamist groups in 
particular blame NGOs of ‘westernizing’ Pakistani women and encouraging un-Islamic ways of 
life, particularly towards NGOs involved in family planning, girls’ education, women’s rights, 
and similar issues. 
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women, etc. Some of the women’s advocacy groups formed during this time helped 
women make strides in a number of areas including protections against violence, reserved 
seat in the parliament, etc.44 
After Ayub Khan took power in 1958, lots of groups called “local bodies” were 
created through his “Basic Democracy” devolution scheme, which were assigned 
different social welfare responsibilities. The regime also actively encouraged already 
existing non-political nonprofit organizations to play supplementary roles in welfare 
service delivery while marginalizing the more political organizations, and keeping a close 
eye on the activities of all these organizations (Iqbal et al 2004: 25-26, Bano 2012: 45).45  
While the regime generally supported organizations involved in service delivery and 
social welfare, it was quite hostile towards those involved in human rights and advocacy. 
The United Front for Women’s Rights, to take one example, the first organization 
exclusively advocating women’s rights, was banned by Ayub (ibid: 27). 
In 1971, after Ayub’s regime had been overthrown, Pakistan People’s Party, with 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as its head, formed the first democratically elected government of the 
country. The party had won the elections with a very socialist agenda. As the state took 
up more responsibility to provide its citizens with basic services, the service-delivery 
section of the non-profit sector experienced a bit of a decline. So while trade unions grew 
                                                 
44 Amongst the more well-known groups that emerged during the first few years are: the 
Women’s Volunteer Service (WVS), All Pakistan Women’s Association (APWA), Family 
Welfare Cooperative Society of Lahore, Women’s Refugees Rehabilitation Society Karachi, 
Pakistan Red Cross Society, Pakistan Cottage Industry Association, Rana Liaqat Craftsman 
Colony in Karachi, Gul-e-Rana Nusrat Industrial home, Milli Takniki Idara (National Technical 
Institute), Pakistan Women’s National Guides, Pakistan Women’s Naval Reserves, United 
Front for Women’s Rights and the Pakistan Family Planning Association.  
45  This was done primarily through the Voluntary Welfare Agencies (Registration and Control) 
Ordinance of 1961 (Iqbal et al 2004: 25-26). 
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in both size and strength, the same cannot be said for voluntary non-profit organizations 
(Iqbal et al 2004: 28), as for example was the case for the trusts and foundations that were 
running the educational institutions that were nationalized and brought under the 
government’s control under Bhutto’s rule (Iqbal et al 2004: 28, ADB 2009: 2).  It is no 
surprise that the government’s willingness to take up more responsibilities related to 
service delivery is described as detrimental to the non-profit sector by the authors of this 
report written for the Social Policy and Development Centre, one of the biggest NGOs in 
the country: “The overall attitude of the government in the 1950’s and the 1960’s implied 
a partnership between the state and the NPS [nonprofit sector] in welfare and social work. 
In the 1970’s this model was altered to denote the state’s dominant responsibility to 
provide essential services to its citizens” (Iqbal et al 2004: 27-28).  
Another feature of civil society under Bhutto’s rule is that women’s rights groups 
became more active. According to Iqbal et al this was owing to the 1973 constitution 
which provided increased safeguards and rights to women as well as the declaration of 
1975 as the International Year for Women by the UN (2004: 29). A number of women’s 
groups which continue to be strong until this day were formed during this period, 
including Shirkatgah and Aurat.46  The United Front for Women’s Rights, which Ayub 
had banned, also became active again (ibid). Other major organizations that came into 
being during this time and continue to function to this day include the SOS Children’s 
Village (for orphans) and the Adult Basic Education Society (ADB 2009: 2). 
As has been mentioned earlier, Bhutto’s government was overthrown by General 
Zia who ruled the country with an iron fist for eleven years (1977-1988). Ironically, it 
                                                 
46 Shirkatgah (meaning place of participation) was formed in 1975 and Aurat (meaning woman) 
in 1976. 
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was under his rule (and the years that followed) that the country experienced a 
burgeoning of different NGOs; these included advocacy NGOS as well as NGOs working 
in the social welfare sector many of which, as is the case in other developing countries, 
provide social services to citizens that the government fails to provide (Talbot 2002: 321-
22, Jafar 2007). It was under severe oppressive conditions where the rights of the 
citizens, particularly those of women and religious minorities, were under threat that 
many advocacy-based organizations came into being. “It is interesting to note that a 
significant growth of advocacy oriented NPOs came about during a period when civil 
liberties were non-existent” (Iqbal et al 2004: 32). Since the more traditional forms of 
civil society such as student and trade unions, the media and the arts were not allowed to 
function freely, or even to exist in some cases, citizens interested in fighting the 
dictatorship or some of its specific policies sought alternative ways to do so (Khan 2001, 
Khan and Khan 2004, Jafar 2007).  
Lots of women activists belonging to the advocacy groups formed during this 
time faced harassment, police brutality, and jail time in their efforts to fight Zia’s 
Islamization policies which targeted women and minorities in particular.47 “Never 
before,” argues Jafar, “had the rights of minorities and women been threatened so overtly 
as under Zia ul-Huq’s rule” (Jafar 2007: 257-58). Women activists organized around 
different issues affecting women including constitutional and legal rights, violence, and 
political representation” (Malik 1996: 678-79, Khan and Khan 2004: iv). Other human 
rights groups also played an active role in resisting Zia’s draconian policies. Amongst the 
leaders of some of the more well-known NGOs were former labor activists with ties to 
                                                 
47 These included (but were not limited to) the Hudood Ordinances, the Qanun-e-Shahdat (Khan 
and Khan 2004:24), and Blasphemy Clauses. 
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the Left (Akhtar 2006: 92). “To the people from the left who were tired of internal 
political repression and slightly disillusioned with the socialist ideology, the idea of 
getting funds to set up organizations through which they could do the work they wanted 
to do was very tempting” (Bano 2012: 51). Many of the advocacy groups that were 
formed during this time continue to be very active and well-respected up to this day.48 
Another group of non-profit organizations that experienced growth during this 
time period were service delivery organizations. Countries around the world during the 
1980s were experiencing a burgeoning of NGOs owing to increased privatization, a 
change in development thinking, the expansion of free market ideology, the real or 
perceived failure of governments to provide basic services, and the rise of fundamentalist 
movements (Bano 2012, Jafar 2005; Moghadam 1997; Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987; Weiss 
1993).  Pakistan went through a similar phase witnessing a rapid growth in the number of 
NGOs involved in service delivery (Iqbal et al 2004: 33, Akhtar 2006:94).  The Pakistani 
“state’s failure to provide adequate basic social services to the masses, [the] availability 
of public grants and international aid… [as well as] a change in development thinking 
globally that the state alone cannot deliver” all led to the growth of “special purpose and 
interest based development NGOs in the modern-urban sector” (ibid: 33-34).49 It was in 
this time period, according to Bano, that the country saw the emergence of a new kind of 
NGO – one funded by international donors (Bano 2012: 50-51). Before then, the term 
NGO was not even part of the ordinary parlance (ibid). While many of the advocacy 
                                                 
48 These include NGOs like the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Pakistan 
Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Women’s Action Forum (WAF), Pakistan 
Women’s Lawyers Association (PWLA), Shirkat Gah, AGHS Legal Aid Cell, Ajoka Theater 
Group, and the Ansar Burney Trust (for the humane treatment of prisoners) among others. 
49 Organizations such as the Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP) and the Orangi Pilot 
Project (OPP) are amongst the better-known organizations that emerged during this time. 
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groups were political in nature, most of the service-delivery NGOs were extremely 
apolitical in nature. 
Another interesting feature of this time, owing to the international context, was 
the emergence and strengthening of many formal and informal organizations with a 
religious bent. Pakistan was receiving millions of Afghan refugees because of the Soviet 
invasion of the country and the subsequent war. In the late seventies alone, over 200 
organizations were established in the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
to help settle these refugees (ADB 2009: 2). Other radical groups also came about as a 
result of all the funding received from the United States and Saudi Arabia to fight the 
Soviets in Afghanistan. Many seminaries and religious schools were established to 
provide training to people to go fight in Afghanistan, many of which still exist to this day.  
Zia also used already established religious groups and parties to enforce his Islamization 
project. In terms of the non-governmental sector, Zia’s time in power resulted in the 
strengthening of religious groups and parties and their student and women’s wings in 
educational institutions and the like (Iqbal et al 2004).  
The non-profit sector continued to grow during the period of democratic rule from 
1988-1999 (Iqbal et al 2004). As was the trend in developing countries the world over, 
economic liberalization policies that governments chose to/were forced to implement 
helped the growth of the nonprofit sector, in particular NGOs specializing in service 
delivery. In Pakistan (as in other places), this time period was marked by “increased 
government support for service delivery NPOs [non-profit organizations], increased 
international funding for NPOs and emphasis of donor agencies in promoting the role of 
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the NPS [nonprofit sector], and internal changes in the NPS such as emergence of NGO 
coalitions” (Iqbal et al 2004: 35).  
This era saw a number of governmental experiments with NGOs and the 
establishment of autonomous or semi-autonomous nonprofit entities by the government at 
the national and provincial levels (Bano 2012: 52, Iqbal et al 2004: 36).  Many semi-
autonomous bodies, such as a provincial and national Rural Support Programs (RSPs)50, 
were formed with the said goal of reducing poverty and improving the quality of life by 
fostering organizations at the grassroots level that could implement development 
initiatives, establishing microcredit programs, etc. (ADB 2009: 3, Bano 2012: 52, Iqbal et 
al 2004: 36)51 and were run using grants from bilateral and multilateral donors (Bano 
2012: 52).  In 1992 the government started its Social Action Program meant to improve 
service delivery, employing a number of community-based organizations (ADB 2009: 3). 
It is thus no surprise that “[f]rom a few hundred in the early 1980s, the number of 
registered NGOs increased to 8,500 by 1991” (Qadeer 1997: 756). 
This period also saw the emergence of NGO coalitions or Apex bodies, which 
was a result of two happenings during this time-period (ADB 1999, Iqbal et al 2004). The 
first was that USAID, in the early 1990s, pushed for the formation of a trust for Pakistani 
NGOs where the government as well as all bilateral funders would deposit their funds. 
This trust would then oversee the distribution of funds to all NGOs.52 Secondly, the 
                                                 
50 The Aga Khan Foundation’s successful Rural Support Program in Pakistan’s northern areas 
was the model for these programs. 
51 These included the National Rural Support Program (NRSP) established in 1991, the Pakistan 
Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) established in 1997, the provincial Rural Support Programs 
and the like. 
52 While NGOs were successful in stopping the creation of this trust, a trust was finally formed 
called the Trust for Voluntary Organizations – TVO – but it was meant for US and Pakistani 
funds only, not all bilateral funding agencies (ADB 1999). 
  65 
government introduced what came to be known as the NGO Bill in parliament in 1995 
which was meant to deal with the registration and workings of NGOs and was seen by 
NGOs primarily as a means to “acquire greater control over nonprofits” (Iqbal et al 2004: 
37). It was under these conditions that many NGOs got together and formed a few NGO 
apex bodies including the Pakistan NGO Forum (PNF) (ibid). According to the ADB 
report, the opposition to the NGO bill was led mainly by local branches of foreign NGOs 
and they were central to the formation of NGO coalition bodies (1999: 8).  
Despite the government’s efforts to tighten control/oversight over the activities of 
NGOs from time to time, overall the democratic governments encouraged their 
participation in the area of service delivery. The same cannot be said for their attitudes 
towards advocacy-based organizations though, which remained hostile for the most part 
(Iqbal et al 2004: 35). This was particularly true during Nawaz Sharif’s second tenure as 
prime minister when human rights organizations and women’s rights organizations 
opposed a proposed constitutional amendment which would have declared Islamic law as 
the supreme law of the land.53 Many of these NGOs faced harassment from the 
government as well as from religious groups. Sharif’s government “responded to Islamic 
groups’ criticism of western-financed NGOs bringing ‘moral corruption’” to the country 
and the government of Punjab (which has the greatest number of registered NGOs) 
dissolved more than 30% of the NGOs working in the province on grounds of “misuse of 
                                                 
53 “Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif addressing religious leaders at the National Consultative 
Convention on the Implementation of Islamic Shariah said: ‘You should spread all over the 
country and stand against all the forces which are opposing the Bill (proposed Islamic law). 
You have been asking me to implement the Islamic system, I have done my job and now it is 
your turn to play your part … My entire government and its machinery is now at your disposal 
… you should launch a movement to force those opposing it to retreat and repent for their 
mistakes.” (The News, Sept 6, 1998). 
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funds” (Talbot 2002: 322). The government also required new NGOs to undergo an 
Intelligence Bureau clearance before meeting other requirements to register with the 
government (ibid). This development would explain why many of these NGOs welcomed 
Musharraf’s coup and why some of the people belonging to these NGOs joined 
Musharraf’s government. 
Another feature of this era that saw its beginnings in the last years of Zia’s regime 
was the professionalization of informal groups and coalitions that had formed to oppose 
Zia’s regime or some of his policies. The Women Action Forum (WAF), for example, the 
informal coalition of women’s rights activists that was in the forefront of the anti-Zia 
movement saw its “momentum… decreasing since the end of General Zia’s military rule 
and the onset of the first civilian government led by Benazir Bhutto in 1989. Parallel to 
this, WAF evolved an institutional face. That is, many of the original activists channeled 
their women’s rights agenda into the work of the development or research NGOs that 
they have founded and run” (Khan and Khan 2004:22).54  The same happened to many 
other groups/activists. Masooda Bano in her book ‘Breakdown in Pakistan: How Aid Is 
Eroding Institutions for Collective Action’ details how many human rights activists who 
had fought against Ayub and Zia lament the professionalization of the voluntary groups 
and organizations (2012: 47-51).  
As the number of NGOs has increased manifold, so has distrust of these 
organizations amongst the general population, especially towards foreign funded NGOs. 
“The high salaries, perks, and visibly ostentatious lifestyles of many employees and 
volunteers of international NGOs adds to the impression that all NGOs are fronts for 
                                                 
54 Including Shirkat Gah, Aurat Foundation, Applied Socio-Economic Research (ASR), AGHS 
Legal Aid Services, Simorgh, Rozan, Bedari, War Against Rape, etc  
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earning money and evading taxes while claiming to be working for the people”  (ADB 
1999: 14).55 While some of the criticism is based on the logic that an organization that 
receives funds from abroad will be more accountable and likely to follow the agendas of 
their foreign funders rather than the interests of the locals that they claim to work for 
(Bano 2012, Shah 2016), other criticism (especially that coming from the more 
conservative sections of the society) is based on the fact that these organizations are 
receiving funds from Western countries and organizations and thus aim to westernize 
Pakistan and make it immoral and hence lose its (real or imagined) religious character. 
Some critiques seem a little more muddled, like the ADB report on Civil Society in Asia 
(1999). “Much of the alarm of Government about NGOs is recent and a direct result of 
the activities of the new breed of NGOs that appear less interested in delivering services 
or implementing development projects than in lobbying and advocacy. Many of these 
NGOs have sprung up overnight, and many appear to have huge funds and international 
support at their command, even though they lack a track record. They are often perceived 
as agents of outsiders with agendas that may be detrimental to Pakistan (ADB, 1999: 15). 
While there is no doubt a history of NGOs following the agendas of their international 
funders rather than the local population, and indeed the introduction of foreign aid has 
adversely affected movements or volunteer organizations, as was the case for example in 
the Okara farmers movements for lands rights56 it is also the case that in Pakistan being 
affiliated with a well-known foreign organization can sometimes provide you with a layer 
of extra security that you may not have otherwise; and given that advocacy organizations 
                                                 
55 “Many of [the Advocacy and lobbying NGOs] … are favored by funding agencies because 
their founders and managers are usually very articulate and espouse causes of such interest to 
such agencies” (ADB, 1999: 4). 
56 Read Bano (2012) and Shah (2016) for details. 
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have had to face harassment at the hands of military regimes in particular but at times, 
also at the hands of democratic governments as well as religious groups, saying that an 
organization is “less interested in delivering services or implementing development 
projects than in lobbying and advocacy” (ADB, 1999: 15) in itself is not a sound 
argument in the case of Pakistan.  
When Musharraf took over after overthrowing Sharif’s government, many NGOs 
that had been under attack or appalled by Sharif’s attempts to further Islamize the laws of 
the country welcomed the coup. His tenure saw the strengthening of NGOs, increased 
cooperativeness between the government and NGO sector at least in the beginning of his 
tenure (except for NGOs working on Human Rights issues), as well as increased 
international funds flowing into the sector, mostly after September 2001. Two of the 
larger NGOs in the country57 helped distribute “funds for activities related to Musharraf 
government’s devolution of power program… [They argued] that a military government 
could successfully devolve power to the local level, thereby dismantling the age-old 
system of bureaucratic government that has persisted well beyond the presence of its 
creators, the British” (Akhtar 2006:94-5).  
The census of the Non Profit Sector conducted by the SDPC (Social Policy and 
Development Centre) in the initial years of Musharraf’s rule (2000-2001) found that 
about 46% of the approximately 45,000 nonprofit organizations reported Education and 
Research as their main activity (this includes primary, secondary, and religious 
education), 18% reported Civil Rights and Advocacy as their main activity, 21% Social 
Services, Development and Housing, or Health, and 5% Religion (Pasha et al 2002: 12). 
                                                 
57 The Social Action Program (SAP) and Pakistan Institute of Labor Education and Research 
(PILER). 
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Major Non-Profit Organizations* No. of 
Organizations 
Percentage 
Culture and Recreation 2452 5.5 
Education and Research 20699 46.4 
Health 2700 6.1 
Social Services 3704 8.3 
Environment 103 0.2 
Development and Housing 3264 7.3 
Civil Rights and Advocacy 7815 17.5 
Business and Professional Associations 1705 3.8 
Religion 2184 4.9 
Total 44626 100 
*As per the International Classification of Non-Profit Organizations 
Table from: Khan and Khan (2004:3), Data from Pasha et al (2002). 
Table 2.1 Composition of the Non-Profit Sector 
 
While categorizing the organizations even further though, the report found that 
“Religious Education” was the leading activity amongst not just the “Education and 
Research” category but amongst the nonprofit sector as a whole with 29.5% of the 
organizations reporting that as their primary activity (Pasha et al 2002: 13). This is 
despite the fact that many madrassas (religious schools) are not included in this category 
due to definitional issues (ibid). “[T]herefore the category of ‘Religion’ alone does not 
reflect the full extent of religious activity in the NPO sector… This has implications for 
our understanding of how extensive religious activity really is in Pakistan, and also how 
much foreign funding is being channeled into that work that may not have been 
documented by the table above” (Khan and Khan 2004:4).58   
 
                                                 
58 Additionally, amongst all the sectors mentioned above 60-100% of the organizations in each 
category function in urban areas of the country (Pasha et al 2002: 13). Organizations that have a 
relatively bigger presence in rural areas include those working primarily on Religious 
Education (31%), Community and Neighborhood and Improvement (33%) and 
Vocational/Technical Education (37%) (ibid: 14). 
  70 
2.3.4 Press and Judiciary 
One of the most fascinating aspects about Pakistani civil society is its press. 
Newspapers for example, range from the most liberal, secular, anti-military views to the 
most conservative, religious, pro-military ones. You can read the most damning reports 
against the military but also ones that blame the politicians for every ill in the country, 
without ever mentioning the military, or opinion pieces discussing the importance of 
democracy and others discussing how democracy is a western ideal that is not suitable for 
an Islamic country such as Pakistan. Even under dictatorships, the press has been allowed 
to function quite freely and newspapers have openly criticized dictators and dictatorships. 
This is not to say that there are no economic costs or that journalists have not been jailed, 
beaten up, or even killed. When Ayub Khan took over, for example, the print media was 
quite independent. But Ayub’s regime, using the 1959 Martial Law Ordinance, took over 
and nationalized a number of papers including the progressive Pakistan Times and Imroz. 
The Press and Publication Ordinance of 1960 was also amended to gain “control over the 
inner workings of newspapers and periodicals” (Shah 2004: 361). 
Things were much worse under Zia’s rule when journalists were harassed, 
imprisoned, tortured and even killed. But the last few years of Zia's rule saw a lot of 
activity because of the growing number of groups including journalists and lawyers 
willing to openly fight the oppressive policies of the military dictatorship. During the 
1980s (and since then) “the press, the judiciary, and numerous voluntary organizations 
have begun to assert themselves forcefully, challenging the earlier conformist traditions... 
While the judiciary has mostly functioned under a vetoing executive, the press since 1985 
has been comparatively free” (Malik 1996: 679-80). Even when the print press was 
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facing censorship under Zia though, there were times when certain publications printed 
blank or blacked out pages in protest, rather than printing regime friendly material or not 
print at all. Of course, there are still certain lines that, if crossed, can be very dangerous 
like challenging the intelligence agencies by, for example, discussing the extrajudicial 
abductions (referred to as disappeared people), or discussing the war being waged by the 
intelligence agencies against the Baloch nationalists.  
While media crackdowns have been characteristic mostly of military regimes, 
civilian governments too, for their part, have occasionally tried to restrict the freedom of 
the press. The governments of both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif tried to curtail 
press freedom by either bringing dubious charges against certain journalists or 
temporarily imposing restrictions on specific newspapers (Malik 1996: 679-80, Talbot 
2002: 322). An interesting aspect of Musharraf’s rule was the liberalization of the 
airwaves that led to the mushrooming of cable channels. Many of these news channels 
initially helped provide him legitimacy, ironically, in the end also played a crucial part in 
getting him out of office. And while Musharraf was initially credited for opening up the 
airwaves and letting the press function freely, when push came to shove, he too cracked 
down on the media, blocking channels, having their offices attacked, etc. for being too 
sympathetic to the Lawyers’ movement, and introducing new laws dictating what the 
channels could and could not discuss. The lawyers’ groups and media organizations 
worked closely during the Lawyers’ movement and when Chaudury Iftikhar, the deposed 
Chief Justice, was eventually reinstated he thanked the media in particular for their role 
in the movement. 
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Another interesting aspect about the Pakistani press is the difference in the Urdu 
and English press. The English press, with a very small audience is much more liberal 
and openly critical of the army and intelligence agencies while the Urdu counterpart 
newspaper belonging to the same owner happens to be much more conservative, full of 
conspiracy theories involving Israeli and Indian intelligence agencies, and the like. This 
goes along with the two-tracks of civic organizations described earlier: one liberal, 
secular, populated by English speaking professional urbanites and the other more 
religious and conservative groups.  
Another institution that has played an important role in Pakistani civil society has 
been the network of Bar Associations. It is very interesting that even though lawyers, as a 
body, have a history of opposing dictatorships, the same cannot be said for the judges. 
While the lawyer’s took an active part in the Movement for Restoration of Democracy 
(MRD) against Zia and then the movement against Musharraf (Malik 2008: 2-15), in the 
words of Muneer Malik, one of the leaders of the Lawyers’ movement of 2007, “[w]hat 
especially pained the legal fraternity was that in all the years since the birth of Pakistan, 
the superior courts of this country continued to abide by their colonial mindset: they were 
there firstly to preserve law and order – even at the cost of liberty” (Malik 2008: 4). Each 
dictator after taking power has used the judiciary to seek legitimacy; and each time the 
courts granted them a couple of years before they needed to hold “elections.”  Each 
imposition of martial law was also challenged in the courts, and while sometimes deemed 
unconstitutional by the lower courts, it was always ruled constitutional by the Supreme 
court, usually under the “Doctrine of State Necessity” (ibid: 5).  Of course each dictator 
made sure they only had “friendly” judges on the bench by having the judges take a new 
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oath. With each subsequent dictator, the number of judges who refused to take new oath 
slowly increased. It is interesting that dictators in Pakistan feel the need to get legitimacy 
through the courts and to hold elections, however flawed and manipulated. This is 
probably unique among other countries that have undergone dictatorships, and may be a 
function of the alive, albeit fractured, civil society in the country. 
 
2.3.5 Religious Groups and the Role of Religion in Pakistan 
Pakistan’s military rulers, as well as their civilian counterparts, have 
traditionally appealed both to Islamic ideology and to the long-standing 
enmity with India to manipulate/manage ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic 
fissures in society. The military has continuously disrupted the political 
process (citing threats to national security posed by political corruption) to 
thwart any democratic or civil challenge to its dominance of state and 
society. In the process, extremist religious groups emboldened by the state’s 
ideological posturing have gradually filled the resulting political vacuum. 
Since these groups share the military’s hostility towards Indian as well as 
it’s aversion to moderate, secular political parties, they remain its closest 
allies in sustaining the antidemocratic status quo. Unsurprisingly, the 
military often uses the instability created by military violence to pressure 
and destabilize noncompliant civilian governments. Shielded by their 
alliance with the military, extremist groups openly preach and recruit for 
their parochial political agendas, breeding intolerance and extremism in the 
society at large (Shah 2004: 373). 
 
Islam has been a part of Pakistani politics since its inception. After all, the country 
was created in the name of Islam – as a homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. The 
Muslim League, the party in the forefront for the struggle for Pakistan, put forth the two-
nation theory according to which Muslims and Hindus were two separate nations that 
could never coexist in the same country. It is no surprise then that even though Jinnah, 
considered the founding father of the country, seemed to believe in the separation of 
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church and state and had no interest in making Pakistan into a theocratic sate,59 the 
country has not been able to live up to that ideal and the use of religion in politics has 
only increased over time. One of the first major indications of that was the Objectives 
Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949 which was meant to serve as a 
set of guiding principles on which the future constitution of the country was to be based. 
According to this document, the constitution of the country was to be modeled on Islamic 
doctrine.60  The document declared that “sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to 
Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, 
                                                 
59 “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any 
other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or 
creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State. As you know, history shows that in 
England, conditions, some time ago, were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The 
Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in 
existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. 
Thank God, we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days where there is no 
discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between 
one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all 
citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people of England in course of time had to face the 
realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them 
by the government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today, you 
might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist; what exists now is 
that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and they are all members of the 
Nation. Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in 
course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not 
in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political 
sense as citizens of the State.” Jinnah’s presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of 
Pakistan, August 11, 1947 
(http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html) 
60 The Objectives Resolution was opposed by all non-Muslim members of the Constituent 
Assembly. “The Objectives Resolution was instrumental in giving a religious orientation to the 
state. Its first clause, ‘Sovereignty lies with Allah’, raised fears among the Constituent 
Assembly’s Hindu representatives from East Bengal that they would be treated as second-class 
citizens and also alienated the large Hindu minority in East Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution 
was presented and passed in a hurried manner, with any reservations being brushed aside. 
Joginder Nath Mandal, the Hindu president of the first Constituent Assembly and Pakistan’s 
first law minister, was so disgusted by the absolute lack of reverence for the rights of minorities 
exhibited by his colleagues that he resigned and left Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution, he 
declared, indicated that Pakistan after Jinnah was not the nation Jinnah envisaged” (Kamran 
2017: 29). 
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through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred 
trust.”  It goes on to state that “the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance 
and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed” by the state.61 The 
Objectives Resolution served as the preamble to the different versions of the constitutions 
until 1985 when, under Zia’s rule, it was made a part of the substantive provisions of the 
Constitution.62 Until then, according to Hasan (2010), “the Objectives Resolution was 
viewed as a major symbolic element of the constitution but remained legally marginal. 
Legally, a preamble cannot be regarded as law but is used as a tool of interpretation.” 
Some have argued that given the country’s ethnic and religious diversity, the powers that 
be feared that “unlike other Muslim-majority countries, [Pakistan] could not survive with 
‘normal’ territorial nationalism” and thus “called for an Islamic ideology, manufactured 
and policed by the state” (Chacko 2016). 
Another development that occurred during the first decade of the country’s birth 
was the formation of the MTKN63 (the Assembly to Protect the End of Prophet-hood) in 
1949, which was a religious organization with the said objective of “protecting the belief 
in the finality of prophet-hood with Muhammad.” The group demanded legislation that 
would declare the Ahmadi sect as non-Muslims since Ahmadis believed in a prophet sent 
by God after Muhammad. Since Muhammad is supposed to be the last prophet according 
to Islamic teachings, most Muslims consider this sect to be heretical. This group launched 
a strong and violent anti-Ahmadiyya movement in 1953. While the movement was 
unsuccessful in achieving its goal, it led to the dismissal of the then government and 
                                                 
61 See Appendix B for complete text of the Objective Resolution.  
62 It should be noted that Jinnah’s 1947 speech mentioned above was banned by Zia throughout 
his rule (Rumi 2012) 
63 MTKN stands for Majlis-e-Tahafuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabuwwat. 
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helped “launch the political careers of several religious clergymen. Some had entered 
politics earlier, but had no prominence until this time. After 1953, clergy became 
mainstream political leaders” (Kamran 2017: 29). The second time the group launched a 
similar movement was in 1974, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave in to their demands to 
gain support of the religious right and declared the Ahmadis non-Muslim. To this day, the 
Ahmadi community in Pakistan faces discrimination and persecution.  The group’s 
success in 1974 “convinced the religious right that it could exert pressure over the elected 
parliament through extra-parliamentary tactics” (Kamran 2017: 30). Even though 
religious groups and parties still do not win many seats in the elections, they are 
considered the strongest in terms of street power and bringing cities to a halt with their 
street protests and riots. 
Ayub Khan, who portrayed himself as a staunch modernist was also willing to 
give in to the demands of the religious right in order to extend his tenure (Haider 2016). 
While some of his actions were meant to curb the role of the more conservative and 
traditionalist religious parties and scholars, they did not have that affect. For example, in 
order to limit the influence of the traditional ulema (religious scholars), the 1962 
constitution passed under Ayub had the provision for the formation of the Advisory 
Council of Islamic Ideology and the Central Institute of Islamic Research (Esposito 1998: 
121-122). The first was supposed to advise the government on legislation and the second 
was a research institute (ibid). These were supposed to be strictly advisory bodies and 
people appointed to these groups were those with a modernist perspective of Islam (ibid). 
Rather than limiting the influence of the more conservative scholars and groups, this gave 
them all the more reason to constantly protest the work of these organizations. While the 
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1962 constitution omitted the word “Islamic” from the name of the republic and left out 
the “divine sovereignty” phrase of the Objectives Resolution, Ayub gave in to the 
protests from the religious forces in 1963 changing to country’s name to the “Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan” and reinstating the more “restrictive” clauses of the Objectives 
Resolution that had originally been left out (Haider 2016).  The Council of Islamic 
Ideology exists to this day and makes recommendations to the government that are rooted 
in the most conservative interpretations of religion. To list a few: it declared the 
prohibition of child-marriage as un-Islamic claiming that girls as young as nine are 
“eligible” for marriage; it considers DNA testing to be impermissible in rape cases and 
instead insists on the testimony of four male witnesses; it considers husbands “lightly” 
beating their wives to be permissible; it is against the existing law that requires written 
permission from the first wife if her husband wants to marry a second time; it is against 
laws that protect women from domestic violence, and so on.  
General Yahya Khan, who replaced Ayub, used religious groups in the army’s 
attempt to fight Bangladeshi nationalists (Malik 1996: 683). Even Bhutto, without doubt 
the most secular leader the country has ever seen, was not immune to these tendencies. 
Whether it was to mask his secularism or to broaden his support base, Bhutto did not shy 
away from using religion when necessary.64 As mentioned earlier, he was the one gave in 
to the demand of declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims in 1974. “This was the first time in 
the history of a Muslim country that a regime, through Parliament, assumed the role of 
arbiter on faith (ibid). In 1977, just weeks before he was deposed as Prime Minister, he 
                                                 
64 “[I]n a March 1972 address, [Bhutto] asked his people to ‘make this beautiful country an 
Islamic state, the biggest Islamic state, the bravest Islamic state and the most solid Islamic 
state’” (Chacko 2016). 
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also banned the sale of alcoholic beverages and bars in order to appease the religious 
groups protesting in the streets. None of this helped him stay in power. 
The anti-Bhutto political alliance in 1977 cashed in on Bhutto's "un-
Islamic" lifestyle and demanded the implementation of Islamization 
(Nizam-i-Mustafa) in the country. Like the regimes that manipulated Islam 
for self-justification, the opposition in 1977 appropriated similar demands 
and strategies that gave a wider and more effective constituency to the 
religio-political parties. With a crisis in the country, the military under 
General Zia ul-Haq struck on July 5, 1977, and imposed Pakistan's longest 
martial law regime. By then, the religio-political parties had discovered 
their own capacity to bring down a populist regime through street agitation, 
and several of these parties, which could not bag more than a handful of 
seats in the elected assemblies, found it more convenient to work in league 
with the non-representative regime (Malik 1996: 683-84). 
 
One aspect of General Zia’s rule that is particularly relevant to the development 
of civil society in Pakistan during this era is his Islamization policies. The General had a 
sort of power-sharing deal with Islamic parties and groups where he put their demands 
for Islamization on the forefront and they, in return, provided support to his regime (Rais 
1997).  Religious parties were brought “into the political arena as members of his 
parliament” (Zaidi 2008:19).  
No doubt, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the ruling generals do not completely 
share each other's goals, but they realized that a cooperative relationship 
would be mutually beneficial. The Jamaat-i-Islami benefited by enjoying a 
relative freedom to engage in low-key political activity and extend its 
influence in the bureaucracy, the military, the mass media, and educational 
institutions. For the military government, the threat of political agitation by 
a political party with a well-organized cadre was temporarily removed. The 
Jamaat also helped the military government undercut the efforts of other 
political groups to launch a political agitation against the military 
government. The Jamaat's support to the military was quite crucial in the 
period immediately after Bhutto's execution in April 1979. A few hours 
before Bhutto was hanged, the chief of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Maulana Tufail 
Muhammad, met General Zia-ul-Huq. It is not known what transpired 
between them, but what the Jamaat chief said to correspondents after the 
meeting was quite revealing. He asserted that Bhutto's execution would not 
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lead to any deterioration of the political situation in Pakistan, but if that 
happened, his party would take care of that (Rizvi 1984: 544). 
 
As was mentioned earlier in the section about student groups, the student wing of 
the Jamaat was the only student group that could function on campuses without any 
harassment and played a major role in thwarting the influence of leftist and progressive 
student groups. Additionally, a couple of times when student groups were actively and 
vociferously agitating against certain government policies (for example the ban on 
student unions), the Zia regime made deals with religious parties awarding them certain 
favors in return for their student wings withdrawing from the student protests, bringing 
the movement to a sudden halt. 
But support for his Islamization policies did not just come from Islamic parties; it 
also came from a large section of the country’s middle class (Zaidi 2008:19); may it be in 
the form of active support or indifference.  One of the noted aspects of this Islamization 
was the severe curbs on the rights of women and minorities in particular.  During this 
period the country experienced the “Islamization” of not just the institutions but the 
whole society. Of the many steps taken by the Zia regime to Islamize the country, some 
are detailed here: 
 A Federal Shariat Court was created for enforcing religious laws, striking 
down laws it found repugnant to Islam, and with some power to make 
laws.65 The state assumed the power to collect zakat and ushr [religious 
taxes]. Ahmadis were barred from calling their prayer houses mosques, 
from possessing and reading the Quran or using the Muslim ways of 
greeting one another, using Islamic epithets or naming their daughters after 
women belonging to the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) family… The Penal Code 
                                                 
65 This included, but was not limited to, the Hudood Ordinance passed in 1979, which prescribed 
public flogging or stoning to death for “crimes” such as adultery and fornication. It also 
introduced punishment of amputation for certain kinds of thefts. During Zia’s time the Pakistani 
“state became an overbearing Orwellian Big Brother, keeping close tabs on the morality of its 
citizens” (Kamran 2017: 32). 
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was amended to provide for punishment for desecration of the Holy Quran 
and for punishing blasphemy with death or life imprisonment (later on the 
Shariat Court made death for blasphemy mandatory). The parliament was 
designated as the Majlis-e-Shura, and an arbitrarily amended Objectives 
Resolution — used hitherto as a preamble to the constitution — was made 
its substantive part… In addition, Zia amended the constitutional provisions 
relating to qualifications for membership of assemblies and disqualification 
of members to make them suggestive of respect for religious criteria. He 
also subverted the education system, firstly by facilitating the growth of 
religious seminaries (while extension and improvement of general 
education were neglected and books on rights and democracy were burnt) 
and increased religion-related lessons in textbooks at all grade levels… [He 
also unsuccessfully tried] to create morality brigades to enforce the system 
of prayers and puritanical regulations… That Pakistan today is what 
General Zia made it into cannot be denied (Rehman 2017). 
 
The US war in Afghanistan and US and Saudi funding of fundamentalist groups 
in the 1980s (carried out mostly through the Pakistani intelligence agencies) also had 
serious consequences for the country including the proliferation of weapons, drugs, 
religious extremism and sectarianism (Kamran 2017: 32). This will be discussed in more 
detail in the section on International Context. Throughout this time period, religious and 
sectarian groups, with the help and/or encouragement of the regime, opened up mosques, 
seminaries, and welfare organizations all over the country (Qadeer 1997: 756). This 
network of mosques and seminaries was developed and since sustained using public 
funds (Zakat), foreign aid and individual charity (ibid). 
Another feature of this era that impacted the Pakistani society was the migration 
of millions of unskilled, semi-skilled, and professional workers to the Middle East 
(Yusufzai 1997), especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE. While this trend started during 
Bhutto’s era as a result of his policies and the conditions in the Middle East,66 it reached 
its peak under Zia’s rule (Qadeer 1997: 751, Burki 2013). Unlike the US or European 
                                                 
66 Read Burki (2013) for more details. 
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countries, Middle Eastern countries only allowed for migration on the basis of short-term 
contracts and the workers were expected to return to Pakistan at the end of the contract 
(Burki 2013). This meant that a lot of people (mostly young men) went back and forth 
between the countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, about two million Pakistanis were 
working in the Middle East (that represented 10% of all the households and 7% of the 
total labor force) (Yousafzai 1997). Most of these workers were male, came from rural 
areas, and were under the age of 30 (ibid).67,68 While this had some economic advantages 
for the country as well as the families of the migrants, it is considered by many as one of 
the main reasons for the propagation, if not introduction, of Wahhabism in Pakistan. 
Wahhabism is the ultraconservative doctrine based on a very strict and literal 
interpretation of the Quran that is practiced in Saudi Arabia.  It is no surprise then that 
many of these youngsters (and in some cases their families) that were part of the 
migration scheme were supportive of Zia’s Islamization policies. 
The period between 1988 and 1999 saw two governments led by the more liberal 
PPP (with Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister) and the more conservative PML-N (with 
Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister), each one dismissed due to the military’s manipulations. 
Many religious leaders, having been defeated in the 1988 elections, “tried to turn public 
opinion against Benazir Bhutto by claiming that a woman could not head a Muslim state. 
                                                 
67 The percentage of migrant workers under the age of 30 was 75%, with 63% of the workers 
belonging to rural areas (Yusufzai 1997). 
67In the year 2013 there were about 7.6 million Pakistanis living overseas, out of which about 3.7 
million were in the Middle East (49%) (Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis & Human Resource 
Development 2013-2014 Year Book - 
http://ophrd.gov.pk/hrd/userfiles1/file/Final%20Year%20Book%202013-14%20(04-02-
2015)(1)%20-%20Copy.doc). 
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Her successor, Nawaz Sharif, was confronted with demands for the implementation of 
Sharia, as he had pledged to do during his electoral campaign. Finding himself in a 
constitutional cul-de-sac in 1992, he tried to legislate his own version of a very mild 
Sharia act that only enraged his religious allies” (Malik 1996: 684). While the PML-N 
was closer to religious groups, neither party shied away from making alliances with these 
parties whenever it was beneficial to them. Throughout this time the military/intelligence 
agencies continued working with extremist groups to maintain leverage in Kashmir, 
India, and Afghanistan.  
Despite their street power though, religious parties have never been able to win 
more than a handful of seats in the elections, let alone form a government (Malik 1996: 
677).  “Aware of their electoral weaknesses, these parties continue to opt for street 
agitation” (ibid). This decade of “political musical chairs” and “intense Bhutto-Sharif 
polarity” (Kamran 2017: 32, Malik 1996: 684) with inexperienced and politically 
immature party leaders conspiring with the military to overthrow the rivals and come to 
power gave the religious right an opportunity to establish itself (ibid). This period also 
saw a rise in sectarian tensions between Shia and Sunnis (Malik 1996: 674, 684). 
Towards the end of Sharif’s second tenure, as mentioned earlier, he was trying to impose 
a harsher version of Sharia than he did during his first tenure to appease the religious 
right. It was under these circumstances that Musharraf overthrew his government. 
While Musharraf's international image may be that of a 'secular' dictator who was 
trying to wage a war against religious fundamentalists, an important aspect of his rule is 
the role that he played in strengthening religious parties in the country.  Religious parties, 
“despite their social presence... [have never] been key players in Parliament. The 'liberal' 
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Musharraf [was] responsible for baptising these religious social and political groups by 
mainstreaming them, [and] making them Parliamentarians” (Zaidi 2008:12). Many well-
known politicians, including two former prime ministers, were banned from contesting 
elections (and remained in exile until the end of his tenure). While many politicians 
couldn't contest elections because of the new legislation requiring contestants to hold 
college degrees, many belonging to religious parties used degrees obtained from religious 
schools that were officially declared the equivalent of a college degree. Musharraf’s 
alliance with “Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, a political alliance of far-right, conservative 
religious parties… helped him forge an electorally feasible coalition [which]... ensured 
that he remained the real head of government, while appeasing international demands for 
the restoration of democracy with the October 2002 general election. This allowed … 
[religious parties to entrench] themselves even further into the body politic of the nation 
state’ (Kamran 2017: 33). It was interesting that, these groups used Musharraf's support 
for the War on Terror in order to gain support particularly in areas bordering Afghanistan 
(the two provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa ), where there was more 
discontent against the attacks on Afghanistan and the Taliban (Zaidi 2008:12). 
 
2.3.6 Initial Problems 
Pakistan had a rather tumultuous first few years of political existence. A number 
of factors influenced the nature of Pakistani civil society during the initial years of its 
existence. These included internal problems such as the exodus of refugees as a result of 
partition, the background of the politicians that came to dominate the political scene and 
ruling class insecurities.  These, along with the (British imposed) vice-regal system 
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inherited by the country as well as external security concerns in the initial years all led to 
strengthening of the military and the consolidation of its role in the country’s affairs 
(Ziring 1993, Malik 1996, Weinbaum 1996, Rizvi 2001, Faruqui and Schofield 2002), 
limiting the space for citizens to exercise their rights to organize and make demands of 
the state.   
Political parties in Pakistan did not have a huge support base in the country at the 
time of its birth. The leaders of the All India Muslim League, the party that was in the 
forefront of the struggle for the creation of Pakistan before the British left India, came 
mostly from Hindu majority provinces that ended up becoming part of India.  Unlike the 
Congress Party, the Muslim League never really turned into a mass movement. It did not 
have a strong support base in areas that eventually became part of Pakistan.  The segment 
of the population that actively supported partition consisted almost entirely of urban 
educated Muslim middle classes in the northern and western provinces – provinces that 
did not become part of Pakistan. Many of these people migrated to Pakistan after 
partition and came to be known as Muhajirs (migrants).  The politicians who initially 
came to dominate the political scene, to a large extent, came from this segment of society 
and in spite of their gains in the fields of public administration and business, “remained 
isolated as politicians” (Wilke 2001: 10-15).  Even after independence, political parties 
were unable to transform themselves into mass parties or gain mass popularity “capable 
of evolving a consensus on operational norms of polity” (ibid: 187).   
For the first nine years, the government continued to operate under the colonial 
“Government of India Act of 1935” (Candland 2007: 46), which “concentrated legal and 
administrative powers in an unelected governor-general and denied substantive autonomy 
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to the provinces” (Shah 2004: 359). The British had controlled India by strengthening the 
state civil bureaucracy and using the Indian army for its own security. After 
independence, while the Indian bureaucracy accepted the dominance of politicians, the 
Pakistani bureaucracy – using the political upheavals in the country as an excuse69 – 
chose to strengthen itself with the help of the military, undermining the political process. 
The first military coup in 1958 came at the behest of the civil bureaucracy (Siddiqa 
2007b: 67-70). This, in a way, was an extension of the role the military had played under 
British rule. And just like the Indian legislature under the British Raj,70 the Pakistani 
legislature too did not have the power to control the country’s defense affairs (Rizvi 
2001: 187). 
 Faced with the problems of the huge influx of refugees from India,71 maintaining 
law and order, and a war with India in 1948, the survival of the state became one of the 
primary concerns of the politicians. They thus sought to strengthen the military and 
apportioned a large percentage of the country’s resources to it.72  The issue of national 
security in the initial years of the country’s birth is very relevant to the evolution of civil 
society in the country and so deserves extra emphasis: 
                                                 
69 During 1947 and 1958, the country had seven prime ministers and either cabinets; none of 
which were elected through national elections and were all unable to provide the country with a 
constitution.  
70 It was the British government and Viceroy that had control over the Indian army, not the Indian 
legislature (Rizvi 2001: 187). 
71 More than 12 million people were displaced in the chaos that followed the partition of India. 
“After the Partition of the subcontinent, 20 percent of the population of West Pakistan [now 
Pakistan] consisted of refugees from the territory that made up independent India. India’s 
population after Partition, in contrast, was about 1 percent refugees from the new country of 
Pakistan. More than 7 million Muslim migrants left territories that, by 15 August 1947, had 
already become independent India” (Candland 2007: 44). 
72 This, in a way, was an extension of the role that the military played during British rule. Since 
the British Raj used the Indian military for its own security and the perpetuation of its rule, the 
Indian legislature was not granted the power to control defense affairs, which lay with the 
British government and Viceroy (Rizvi 2001: 187).    
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The centrality of the armed forces as the guardian of the state was intrinsic, 
and compensated for the deep sense of insecurity that infested the state after 
its birth in 1947. The prominence of external threat during the early years was 
crucial in defining the parameters of the future state–society relationship… 
[Protecting the] state from external and internal threat was essential. 
Achieving material development and modernization, and ensuring territorial 
cohesion, were paramount, and so these were defining parameters used for 
negotiating the relationships between the various players… This first war 
with the neighbouring state in 1947–8 established the primacy of the national 
security agenda. From then onwards, military security was given maximum 
priority, resulting in the government allocating about 70 per cent of the 
estimated budget in the first year for defence (Siddiqa 2007b: 62-63). 
 
It was probably owing to these reasons that the ruling elite consciously tried to 
depoliticize the public sphere during the initial years of the country (the practice was later 
continued by the multiple military rulers).  “National security” was a convenient excuse to 
curb “individual rights; state accountability to the citizenry; freedoms of expression, 
dissent, and critical thinking; provincial autonomy and decentralization” (Shah 2004: 360).  
Restrictive laws from colonial times such as article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which prohibited public assemblies, were used quite frequently during the country’s initial 
years (Candland 2007: 46). All this, obviously, affected what kinds of groups and activities 
citizens were or were not able to form or participate in during the first few years of its 
existence.  
 
2.3.7 Narratives and tactics used by military to undermine the political system  
The debasing of politicians by dictators has been a constant theme of military rule 
in Pakistan. Each military dictator justified their actions of overthrowing a civilian 
government by talking about the corrupt and selfish politicians who, instead of thinking 
about the country’s well-being, were only serving their own interests. All military 
dictators also talked about how the military was the only respected institution in the 
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country; the only institution that could fix the problems facing the country; and how the 
military would help bring real democracy to the country. In his first broadcast as Chief 
Martial Law Administrator for example, Ayub Khan said that the decision to overthrow 
the civilian government was:  
[A] drastic and extreme step taken with great reluctance, but with the fullest 
conviction that there was no alternative to it except the disintegration and 
complete ruination of the country. History would never have forgiven us if 
the present chaotic conditions were allowed to go on any further. These 
chaotic conditions, as you know, have been brought about by self-seekers 
who, in the garb of political leaders, have ravaged the country or tried to 
barter it away for personal gains… Their aim is nothing but self-
aggrandizement or thirst for power… They waged ceaseless and bitter war 
against each other, regardless of the ill-effects on the country; just to whet 
their appetites and satisfy their base motives. There has been no limit to the 
depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation. Having nothing 
constructive to offer, they used provincial feelings, sectarian, religious and 
racial differences to set a Pakistani against a Pakistani… In this mad rush 
for power and acquisition all that mattered was self-interest. The country 
and people could go to the dogs as far as they were concerned. There were 
a few honourable exceptions but their conscience was dead and they were 
rendered ineffective by hordes of their supporters in the Assemblies 
changing party affiliations from day to day… all ideals and the high sense 
of values inherent in our religion and culture have been destroyed. The 
result is total administrative, economic political and moral chaos in the 
country, which cannot be tolerated in these dangerous times (The News 
2011). 
 
After having demeaned civilian politicians, he then went on to talk about the military. He 
talked about how he felt that lately the Pakistani people were: 
[B]eginning to lose faith even in us [the military] for not saving them from 
the tyranny and mental and spiritual torture. I am sure they [the people] are 
sick and tired of the unscrupulous type of politicians who were busy tearing 
their dear country into pieces… Let me announce in unequivocal terms that 
our ultimate aim is to restore democracy but of the type that people can 
understand and work (The News 2011).73  
                                                 
73 He is also known to have said though that: “we must understand that democracy cannot work in 
a hot climate. To have democracy we must have a cold climate like Britain” (Ali 2007). 
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General Zia, who overthrew Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s elected government in 1977, 
was no different. He claimed that the military had stepped in to save the country from 
civil war. 
[W]hen the political leaders failed to steer the country out of a crisis, it is 
an inexcusable sin for the Armed forces to sit as silent spectators. It is, 
primarily, for this reason that the army had to intervene to save the 
country… It was feared that… the country [would be thrown] into chaos 
(Zia as quoted in Kapur 2006: 129). 
 
 
While he described Bhutto as the “worst cheat and cold-blooded murderer” who 
ran “a Gestapo style police in which kidnapping and political murders had become a 
routine affair” (as quoted in Rizvi 1984: 541), the military was the one that could save the 
country from these kinds of “thugs.” Of the military, he said: “[t]his country can be kept 
together by Armed forces and not by politicians” (Haqqani 2010: 128). 
Just like Ayub, he reaffirmed his commitment to democracy. In his first address to 
the nation he said that “the survival of this country [Pakistan] lies in democracy and 
democracy alone,” and that his “sole aim is to organize free and fair elections, which 
would be held in October this year,” or within 90 days of the coup. “Soon after the polls” 
he said, “power will be transferred to the elected representatives of the people. I give my 
solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule” (Rizvi 1986: 289). Elections 
were finally held after eight years in 1985, and that too, on a non-party basis. He was a 
little more casual though, about what he said, depending on who he was talking to. The 
Iranian publication, Kayhan International, on September 18, 1977 reported Zia to have 
said (Aziz 2014): 
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What is the Constitution? It is a booklet with ten or twelve pages. I can tear 
them up and say that from tomorrow, we shall live under a different system. 
Is there anybody to stop me? Today the people will follow wherever I lead. 
All the politicians, including the once mighty Mr. Bhutto, will follow me 
with their tails wagging.  
 
Musharraf’s arguments to legitimate his rule were not much different. In his first 
address to the nation he talked about the havoc created by the politicians and how the 
military was there to undo the consequences and lead the country back to a democratic 
system. Below are some excerpts from his speech:  
You are all aware of the kind of turmoil and uncertainty that our country 
has gone through in recent times. Not only have all the institutions been 
played around with and systematically destroyed, the economy, too, is in a 
state of collapse. We are also aware of the self-serving policies being 
followed which have rocked the very foundation of the Federation of 
Pakistan (BBC 1999). 
 
That is then followed by how the military, being the only respected institution that 
had the people’s best at heart, had no choice but to intervene:  
The armed forces have been facing incessant public clamour to remedy the 
fast-declining situation from all sides of the political divide. These concerns 
were always conveyed to the prime minister in all sincerity, keeping the 
interest of the country foremost. It is apparent that they were never taken in 
the correct spirit. My singular concern has been the well-being of our 
country alone… Despite all my advice, they tried to interfere with the armed 
forces - the last remaining viable institution in which all of you take so much 
pride and look up to at all times for the stability, unity and integrity of our 
beloved country… Your armed forces have never and shall never let you 
down. God willing, we shall preserve the integrity and sovereignty of our 
country to the last drop of our blood (BBC 1999). 
 
This message was repeated many times Musharraf: "The armed forces have 
moved in as a last resort, to prevent any further destabilization. I have done so with all 
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sincerity, loyalty, and selfless devotion to the country" (Kundi 2003: 31-32). Like 
previous dictators, he continuously reiterated the sham democracy that was in place 
before he took over and how he, and the military, as an institution, were now there to 
save the country. Unlike his predecessors though, he was a little more careful with how 
he talked about the constitution. 
Quite clearly, what Pakistan has experienced in the recent years has been 
merely a label of democracy, not the essence of it. Our people were never 
emancipated from the yoke of despotism. I shall not allow the people to be 
taken back to the era of sham democracy but to a true one… [T]he choice 
before us on 12th October was between saving the body – that is the nation 
– at the cost of losing a limb – which is the Constitution – or saving the limb 
and losing the whole body. The Constitution is but a part of the nation 
therefore, I chose to save the nation and yet took care not to sacrifice the 
Constitution. The Constitution has only been temporarily held in abeyance. 
This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy. The armed 
forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely 
necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan.74  
 
The rhetoric about “corrupt politicians” was no different from his predecessors 
though. Right after taking power many politicians and bureaucrats were either arrested or 
their assets frozen on charges of corruption. Most of these charges were eventually 
dropped/not followed up, but the rhetoric remained. In a speech made during the first 
month after taking power he warned corrupt politicians and power brokers of strict 
action. 
Lack of accountability has resulted in corruption of horrendous proportion, 
threatening the very basis of our society. The term 'Ehtesab' [accountability] 
has been abused to an extent that it has lost its meaning. There is thus a need 
to re-establish faith in the process of accountability. The process of 
accountability is being directed especially towards those guilty of 
                                                 
74 General Pervez Musharraf's address to the nation on October 17, 1999. 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_12oct99/musharraf_address_17oct1999.ht
ml, Accessed March 18, 2018. 
  91 
plundering and looting the national wealth and tax evaders. It is also 
directed towards loan defaulters and those who have had their loans re-
scheduled or condoned… My advice to the guilty is to return voluntarily 
national wealth, bank loans and pay their taxes before the hand of law forces 
them to do so with penalty.75  
 
One sees these same sentiments echoed in many parts of the Pakistani civil 
society. In the words of Aqil Shah, professor of political science at the University of 
Oklahoma who focuses on democratization, the military and security issues in South 
Asia, “[t]he antipolitical stance of influential civil society groups has been further 
reinforced by the active depoliticization of society sought by authoritarian regimes” 
(Shah 2004: 378). Although this makes it sound as if these views would have existed 
even if the history of military meddling in politics in Pakistan were different, I believe 
these exist as a result of the military’s efforts to depolitisize society, but that would be 
difficult to ascertain for sure. Either way, as Shah describes, “[o]ne manifestation of this 
policy [of depolitisization] is the systematic harping on the venality of politics by 
successive military regimes, which has brought into sharp focus the arbitrary division of 
politics into random degrees of ‘corruption’ and ‘integrity’—integrity being personified 
by the military, and corruption by political leaders” (Shah 2004: 378).  Portrayals of 
politicians on the state-controlled television are usually negative while military men are 
portrayed as “honest and patriotic” (Shah 2004: 378). In recent years the ISPR (Inter-
Services Public Relations), the media wing of the Pakistani military has also sponsored a 
number of plays and patriotic songs along the same line that are aired on private channels 
as well.  
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
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It is not surprising then that the Pakistani military’s worldview has been described 
as such:   
[The army intervenes in state affairs in order] to keep the state apparatus 
working smoothly. Since politicians are narrow-minded, the masses 
uneducated and many of the civil servants corrupt, the men in uniform have 
to step in from time to time in order to safeguard Pakistan’s economic and 
social development: People have to be led, since they cannot take care of 
themselves, and they have to be led by the army, because Pakistan’s 
politicians are too corrupt and selfish (Wilke 2001: 17). 
 
This sentiment was echoed by a longtime journalist who was interviewed for this 
research. Speaking of the Pakistani military, he said that: 
[O]ur army has never been able to transform itself into a national army. It was 
trained on the pattern of the British colonialists, and even today you go to PMA [Pakistan 
Military Academy – the country’s premier military training institute] and their catch phrase 
is ‘bloody civilians, ah, bloody civilians.’ That’s what they used to say when Pakistan was 
not there on the world map [i.e. when it was under British rule].  
 
2.3.7.1 Devolution and Party-Less Elections 
Another theme that has been constant during all military regimes in Pakistan has 
been “the suspension of the political process at the national and provincial levels” (Shah 
2004: 371) by banning political parties and/or certain politicians, imprisoning popular 
politicians and creating fissures within the main political parties, boosting new political 
parties and grooming new politicians who would be more receptive to towards the 
military, holding party-less elections and creating nonpartisan local bodies through 
“devolution” schemes meant to “circumvent aspirations to representative rule and 
undermine the existing party-based elite” (ibid). Ayub Khan, for example, banned 
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political parties and introduced the system of “Basic Democracies” which was promoted 
as a devolution plan or a system of local governance.  “Basic democracies” were bodies 
of representatives elected by the public at the local level (on a non-party basis) that 
served as an electoral college for the election of the President and members of the 
legislature (Shah 2004: 361, Noman 1990: 29, Gauhar 1985).    
Similarly, Zia also imprisoned and tortured politicians and initially banned all 
political activity. In a bid to not come across as a dictator he introduced his devolution 
plan, the ‘Local Bodies System’ in 1979, under which local body elections were held in 
the same year on a nonparty basis. Through the Local Bodies System the Zia regime 
sought “alternative political constituencies” and groomed a new set of politicians to 
“downplay Bhutto’s fame amongst the working class and other dispossessed people, and 
to undermine populism in the country” (Siddiqa 2007b: 86). The military analyst Ayesha 
Siddiqa has argued that this, more than anything else, “demonstrates the military’s greater 
capacity than any other institution of the state to penetrate civil society and the country’s 
politics” (ibid). 
Musharraf’s rule was no different.76 He too imprisoned many politicians and 
imposed a ban on political activities. One of Musharraf’s main expressed goals when 
taking power was the devolution of government, which he contended to be crucial for 
building a genuine democracy (Talbot 2002: 318).  He used these programs of local 
governance and “devolution of power” to co-opt civil society agencies, especially those 
with ties to international donors.  As several countries imposed sanctions and froze 
                                                 
76  “Musharraf, like other military rulers, has suspended the political process, and sought to divide 
and rule in advance of restarting it… Attempts to discredit and artificially sideline the leaders 
of Pakistan’s two mainstream parties, however mistaken some of their previous actions may 
have been, undermine political development.” (Talbot 2002: 324) 
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development funds to Pakistan in retaliation for the coup, international donors “rerouted 
their governance programs” and funded prominent NGOs and the like that were involved 
in Musharraf’s devolution programs (Shah 2004: 380). This involvement and support of 
segments of civil society served, for the military, as a means to “neutralize external 
concerns about its coercive actions and acquire a semblance of legitimacy otherwise 
missing in the domestic context” (ibid: 377). Additionally, before the 2002 elections, the 
rules of the election process were changed so that major politicians were not able to run 
(these included imposing limits on how many times someone can be prime minister and a 
minimum education requirement, which effectively exempted people with an education 
from religious schools). Fissures were created within one of the main political party (the 
PML) which broke the party into two, and state resources were used to bolster parties that 
were supporting Musharraf.77 It was because of these machinations that in the first time 
of the country’s history religious parties won more seats in the National Assembly than 
they have ever before and won control of one of the provinces. 
Even when the country was under civilian rule, laws passed by military dictators as 
well as the manipulations of the ISI’s political cell78 (ISI or Inter-Services Intelligence is 
the country’s premier intelligence agency) were used to undermine the democratic 
system.79   In particular, it was the Eight Amendment to the constitution passed in 1985 
during Zia’s era in the absence of an elected parliament that has been used most to derail 
                                                 
77 Read the Human Rights Watch report on elections under Musharraf (Elections since General 
Pervez Musharraf took power in 1999) for more details: 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2008/.../Elections_Under_Musharraf_1999-2007.pdf  
78 This cell was functional at least until 2007 (https://www.dawn.com/news/758620).  
79 Read the Carnegie Endowment 2009 report “Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s 
Transitional Democracy” by Frédéric Grare for details about the involvement of Pakistani 
Intelligence agencies in elections 
(http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_intelligence_transitional_democracy.pdf) 
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the democratic process in the country. The bill changed Pakistan’s system from a 
parliamentary to a semi-presidential system giving the president the power to dissolve the 
National Assembly and dismiss the Prime Minister. These powers were first used by Zia 
in 1988 to dismiss the government that was formed as a result of the 1985 party-less 
elections. During the short democratic period of 1988-1999, the law was again used to 
dismiss two of Bhutto’s and one of Sharif’s governments by military-backed presidents (in 
1990, 1993, and 1996). In 1997 during his second tenure, Sharif’s government got rid of 
the law, only to be reintroduced by Musharraf in 2003. After Musharraf resigned, the law 
was again repealed by the elected government in 2010.  
 
2.3.8 International Context and the International Community 
2.3.8.1 Praise for Dictators 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter Pakistani dictators have received 
praise from foreign politicians, journalists, and academics alike, be it due to a genuine 
admiration or in order to keep up good relations with the country. Lyndon Johnson, for 
example, called Ayub: “one of [the] truly great leaders [of the time]” (Kux 2001: 166). 
Eisenhower is alleged to have said to Franco, the Spanish dictator, about Ayub’s rule that 
“while some of our starry-eyed and academic types of liberals criticized General Ayub 
when he seized power by a military coup, one can see everywhere in Pakistan 
improvements and a quite happy attitude” (ibid: 111). As has already been described 
earlier, Samuel Huntington argued (in the sixties) that among all the leaders in 
modernizing countries after World War II, Ayub Khan (the then dictator) came closest to 
“filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or ‘Great Legislator’ on the Platonic or 
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Rousseauian model” (Huntington 1986: 251).   Similarly, Pamela Constable, the South 
Asia Bureau chief for the Washington Post, credited him with attempting “to build a 
grassroots ‘basic democracy’ and a modernized economy” that did not bear fruit only 
because the Indo-Pak war of 1965 led to the collapse of his regime (2001: 17). 
When General Zia, after ruling the country with a brutal iron fist, died in 1988 the 
British newspaper The Times declared this "a bad death for the West" (as reported by 
Zunes 2007).  The U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz said that Zia was “a defender of 
Pakistan's freedom and independence and a steadfast champion of the Afghan cause” (as 
quoted in Burki 1988: 1082). US President Ronald Reagan called him “a statesman of 
world stature” and praised his “dedication to regional peace and reconstruction” (ibid). In 
a different statement he said that the US had been “fortunate to have such a friend in 
President Zia” and that they had “worked together for peace and stability” (UPI 1988). 
US Vice President George Bush called Zia’s death “a great tragedy;” the United Nations 
Secretary General called Zia “a statesman and a far-sighted leader who commanded wide 
respect throughout the international community;” the Saudi government called him “one 
of the greatest strugglers in the Islamic nation” and that “[w]ith his death, the Islamic 
nation has lost one of its most devoted and experienced leaders” (ibid). And while one 
could argue that Zia’s death is not the most appropriate time to gauge how world leaders 
felt about him, there were other foreign leaders who conveyed their condolences without 
praising the general. The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for example, ordered that 
the country’s flag be flown at half-staff; said he was distressed at the news and added that 
''I send our heartfelt condolences to Begum (Mrs.) Zia ul-Haq, the family and the 
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government and people of Pakistan… I hope and trust that the people of Pakistan will 
face this crisis with fortitude and calm” (ibid). 
General Pervez Musharraf too had his admirers within academia, journalism, and 
politics. Praise for him by some academics and journalists including Weiss and Gilani 
(2001) and Constable (2001) was discussed earlier in the chapter. Even after Musharraf 
had declared Emergency Rule, fired members of the Supreme Court and arrested 
journalists, lawyers, and human rights activists, US President G.W. Bush said that 
Musharraf hadn’t yet “crossed the line” and that the General was someone “who believe[d] 
in democracy” (as reported by Abramowitz and Wright 2007). White House press secretary 
Dana Perino clarified that the president did actually mean what he said. In an email 
message, she said that “He [President Bush] does believe that President Musharraf believes 
in democracy, and there is evidence to that fact based on the reforms he'd put in place over 
the last several years” (ibid). She added that “Musharraf has made a mistake and took a 
detour -- we are hopeful that he will restore the constitution and get the country back to 
that path to democracy” (ibid).  
 
2.3.8.2 U.S. Aid and Support for Dictators 
[An analysis] of US economic and military aid to Pakistan under different 
regimes… [shows] that the US has hardly shown any concern for 
democracy in Pakistan where its own geo-strategic goals have been at 
stake… This analysis reinforces the view that every time the US has 
required Pakistan's support to achieve its own geo-political goals, it has 
shown no hesitation in embracing military dictators (Ali 2009: 130). 
 
This is not to say that the United States has supported military dictatorships with 
the purpose of undermining democracy, but that whenever US interests were at stake, 
those interests were pursued even if that meant undermining democracy and helping 
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dictatorships at the expense of the people of Pakistan. Soon after its creation in 1947, US 
aid started flowing into the country in the early fifties. In the mid-fifties and sixties, the 
main purpose of this aid was to “contain communism and keep Pakistan from joining the 
communist bloc” (Ali 2009: 130). During Zia’s time, aid was increased manifold, in an 
effort to get the USSR out of Afghanistan. During Musharraf’s time, starting right after 
the attacks for September 11th, generous aid was provided to Pakistan for the country’s 
role in the “War against terror” (Ali 2009: 130, Ibrahim 2009: 7). The graph below 
(prepared by the Center for Global Development80) shows the history of military, 
economic, and total US obligations to Pakistan starting in 1951. For the purpose of 
comparison, shaded areas have been added that represent the times when Pakistan was 
under military rule.  As is clear, the two periods, 1972-1977 and 1989-1999, when 
democratically elected governments were in power, the level of aid was much lower 
compared to times when the military was in control of the country.81  In the next few 
paragraphs I will discuss the events taking place at the global level that influenced these 
ups and downs in US aid to Pakistan and what that meant for democracy in the country. 
                                                 
80 Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers (https://www.cgdev.org/page/aid-pakistan-numbers)  
81 From 1947-1958, the country was ruled by civilian politicians and bureaucrats, but these were 
not democratically elected governments.  
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Figure 2.3: History of US Obligations to Pakistan, millions US$(2011)82 
 
U.S.-Pakistani relationship started early on after the country’s creation.  “U.S. 
bilateral aid to Pakistan started in 1951. Pakistan received $2 billion dollars between 
1953 and 1961. By the early 1960s, aid reached $400 million per year. At its height, 
during the first half of the 1960s, U.S. assistance was more than half of all foreign aid to 
Pakistan, covering one-third of Pakistan’s development budget and financing half its 
import bill” (Ibrahim 2009: 7). Pakistan was a newly created country, neighboring a 
                                                 
82 Note from original source: “US Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan 
Authorizations (aka the Greenbook). For the years 2002–2011 we have added data on Coalition 
Support Funds spending to the military assistance category; while CSF is not technically 
foreign assistance, it has constituted the bulk of military assistance to Pakistan during the post-
9/11 period. Source for CSF amounts is ‘Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations and Military 
Reimbursements to Pakistan,’ prepared for the Congressional Research Service by K. Alan 
Kronstadt.”  
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bigger, stronger India (with leaders with a socialist bent but determined to be non-
aligned), and a geographic proximity to China and the USSR. Pakistani leaders knew the 
significance of this geopolitical situation. The nature of the relationship between the two 
countries in its early years can be ascertained by what General Ayub Khan, the then 
Pakistan Army Commander-in-Chief told the visiting US Secretary of State Dulles in 
1953: “[the US] should not be afraid to openly aid those countries which have expressed 
a willingness, and even desire, to cooperate” he said. “[Pakistan], under the present 
Government is extremely anxious to cooperate with the United States” he said and 
earnestly spoke of the “potential both in manpower and bases that is available in 
Pakistan” (Kux 2001: p. 55).83 
The aid was temporarily stopped after the 1965 India-Pakistan war (Wright 2011). 
U.S. Economic aid was eventually restored but military aid was on halt for a while (ibid). 
After Ayub Khan was forced to resign in 1969, handing over power to another military 
general, Yahya Khan, elections were held in 1970. The East-Pakistan based Awami 
League party was the winner in East Pakistan and won an absolute majority in the 
National Assembly. Yahya Khan delayed holding the first National Assembly session 
because he didn’t want the Awami League to be in power. This led to mass unrest and a 
civil war in East Pakistan, with the Pakistani army committing the most horrendous 
                                                 
83 Dulles, after his visit to Pakistan, is said to have sent this cable to the US while in Turkey: 
“Genuine feeling of friendship encountered in Pakistan exceeded to a marked degree that 
encountered in any country previously visited on this trip. Was impressed with the spirit and 
appearance of what we saw of [the] armed forces and their leaders. Have [a] feeling Pakistan is 
one country that has [the] moral courage to do its part [in] resisting communism… Believe 
Pakistan would be a cooperative member of any defense scheme that may emerge in the Middle 
East and that we need not await formal defense arrangements as [a] condition to some military 
assistance to Pakistan” (Kux 2001: p. 55-56). 
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crimes in order to quell the rebellion.84 Throughout this time though, “the United States 
served as the major foreign backer of General Yahya Khan… As army units began 
revolting in response to the repression, General Khan cracked down with a brutality that 
Archer Blood, the U.S. consul in Dhaka, referred to as ‘genocide.’ In one of the 
strongest-worded dissents ever written by U.S. Foreign Service officers, Blood and 29 
others declared ‘Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. 
Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take 
forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to 
placate the [Pakistani] government and to lessen any deservedly negative international 
public relations impact against them. Our government has evidenced what many will 
consider moral bankruptcy’” (Zunes 2007). The Nixon administration nonetheless 
continued its support for Yahya Khan85 until eventually the Congress, in response to 
public outcry over the murder of hundreds of thousands of people, halted aid (ibid). The 
war led to the breakup of Pakistan: The West Pakistani wing became what is now 
Pakistan and the East Pakistani wing became Bangladesh.  
After Bhutto took over the reins as President in 1971 (and later as Prime Minister 
in 1973), economic aid to Pakistan resumed, but the arms embargo put in place in 1965 
was not lifted until 1975 (Kux 2001: 218). Even though Bhutto had earned the title 
“Yankee-hater” prior to his election victory (ibid: 204), after taking power he maintained 
good relations with the US but at the same time strengthened ties with China and with 
                                                 
84 The East Pakistanis had long had serious grievances against the central government including 
underrepresentation in civil service and the military, economic disparities between East and 
West Pakistan, ethnic and linguistic discrimination, and political exclusion. 
85 President Nixon, addressing a Pakistani delegation in early 1971 said that while: “attitudes in 
Congress had to be taken into account and could restrict our ability to help… we would not do 
anything to complicate the situation for President Yahya or to embarrass him” (Kux: 190). 
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Muslim countries in the Middle East, established diplomatic relations with North Korea 
and North Vietnam and tried mending ties with the USSR (ibid: 207). Pakistan’s efforts 
to develop nuclear technology, especially after India tested its nuclear bomb in 1974, 
remained a bone of contention between the US and Pakistani governments. Towards the 
end of Bhutto’s rule, especially after Carter became president, US-Pakistan relations were 
not that great, and Bhutto was convinced that the US was “trying to do him in” (ibid: 
229). Bhutto’s government was overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 in a coup that 
resulted in the most brutal rule the country has experienced, lasting eleven years.  
Less than two years later, in early 1979, Bhutto was hanged on what was widely 
believed to be a sham court trial (on the charges of political murder) and Zia also 
cancelled elections. US aid, for the meantime, came to a halt (Wright 2011). At the end of 
the same year though, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The US, in a bid to get 
Pakistan’s help in fighting the USSR offered Pakistan $400 million in military and 
economic aid in 1980 to be paid over two years (ibid). Zia, describing the offer as 
“peanuts,” rejected it. As Wright (2011) points out, “Zia was smart to hold out.” Once 
Reagan took over as president in 1981, the two countries signed a six-year aid package 
(Burki 1988: 1096) which included “about three billion dollars in economic assistance 
and two billion in military aid. The Reagan Administration also provided three billion 
dollars to Afghan jihadis” (Wright 2011). These Jihadi groups were operating out of 
Peshawar, which is the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – the Pakistani province 
bordering Afghanistan (Burki 1988: 1096). At the insistence of the Pakistani military, the 
flow of weapons was to happen through the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, and 
not directly (Kux 2001: 252). Not only was funding for the jihadis coming from the US, 
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but Saudi Arabia was also convinced to match US contributions dollar for dollar (ibid). 
Additionally, arms were also flowing in from China and Egypt (Burki 1988: 1096). The 
ISI during this time became so powerful that it has been referred to as “a state within a 
state.” It was behind the overthrow of numerous democratically elected governments in 
the 1990s and to this day is not under the control of the civilian government. Even though 
the US government had in the past raised concerns with the Pakistani government about 
its nuclear program, throughout Zia’s rule, “there was, in effect, a tacit understanding that 
the Reagan administration could live with Pakistan’ nuclear program as long as 
Islamabad did not explode a bomb” (Kux 2001: 257). 
According to Stephen Zunes, an American scholar who focuses on US foreign 
policy, “the Reagan and the George H. W. Bush administrations formally denied that 
Pakistan was engaging in nuclear weapons development [throughout the 1980s] despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In addition, the United States continued 
supplying Pakistan with F-16 aircraft even as nuclear analysts concluded that Pakistan 
would likely use these fighter planes as its primary delivery system for its nuclear 
arsenal. To publicly acknowledge what virtually every authority on nuclear proliferation 
knew about Pakistan’s nuclear capability would force the United States to cut off aid to 
Pakistan, as required by U.S. laws designed to enforce the non-proliferation regime” 
(Zunes 2007). In terms of the effects of this international support for Zia on the 
development of civil society in Pakistan, it should be mentioned here that twice during 
the 1980s (1983 and 1985-86) the military regime faced a wave of mass demonstrations 
in the province of Sindh, challenging its legitimacy, and each time the movement was 
brutally crushed “without apparent objections from Washington” (ibid). While it would 
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be impossible to predict what had happened to the prodemocracy movement had Zia not 
had the support of his allies in the US and Saudi Arabia in particular, there is no doubt 
that the dictator was stronger because of this support and was probably sure of the 
impunity he enjoyed as long as he played the role he was being asked to play. The mass 
anti-Zia protests were the only ones in the country’s history that were concentrated in the 
country’s rural areas.86 
The United States eventually denied Pakistan’s status as a non-nuclear state only 
in 1990 “when the Soviet-backed Afghan regime was finally collapsing” (Zunes 2007).87 
It should be kept in mind that Zia died in a plane crash in August 1988 and Benazir 
Bhutto became the second democratically elected prime minister in December of the 
same year, so the timing of the two events happened to almost coincide. Even when aid 
was suspended though, the Bush administration continued with its military sales to the 
country, “so the transfer of spare parts for the nuclear-capable F-16s aircraft to Pakistan 
continued” (ibid). The 1990s was a period of democratic governance in Pakistan (albeit 
with continuous disruptions owing to behind the scenes military manipulations); and it 
also ended up being the decade when the country received very little in economic aid.88 
                                                 
86 A lot of the anti-Zia demonstrations took place in the province of Sindh and had an ethnic tinge 
to them. Zia belonged to a mohajir family (the term explained earlier in the chapter). The power 
and privileges enjoyed by the mohajirs in Sindh has long been a grievance of the non-mohajir 
Sindhi population of the province. None of that, of course, underplays the motives and very 
courageous actions of those who participated in the movement. 
87 The Pressler amendment, which was enacted in 1985, “prohibited U.S. assistance or military 
sales to Pakistan unless annual certification was issued that Pakistan did not have a nuclear 
explosive device” (Ibrahim 2009: 7). Even though Pakistan’s nuclear program was an open 
secret, the annual certification was not denied until October 1990. 
88 “In 1990, President George H. W. Bush cut off military aid to Pakistan. Ostensibly, this was in 
response to Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, but it’s also true that, after the Soviets were 
pushed out of Afghanistan, in the late eighties, they U.S. lost interest in Pakistan. U.S. 
assistance, directed almost entirely toward food and counter-narcotics efforts, fell to forty-five 
million dollars a year, and declined further after 1998, when Pakistan began testing nuclear 
weapons” (Wright 2011). 
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The decade started off with Pakistan hosting one of the largest offices for the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the world, employing over 
1,000 people but “in the 1990s, the United States again stopped providing funds to 
Pakistan because of the Pressler amendment. Enacted in 1985, the Pressler amendment 
specifically prohibited U.S. assistance or military sales to Pakistan unless annual 
certification was issued that Pakistan did not have a nuclear explosive device” (Ibrahim 
2009: 7). Even though Pakistan’s nuclear program was an open secret, the annual 
certification was not denied until October 1990 “triggering wide-ranging sanctions 
against Pakistan. In 1995, USAID closed its mission and pulled out of Pakistan” (Ibrahim 
2009: 7). Even more strict sanctions including economic and military aid as well as 
military sales were eventually imposed by the Clinton administration in 1998, when 
Pakistan tested its nuclear bomb under the then democratically elected government of 
Nawaz Sharif.  
This changed, for the most part though, after the terrorist attacks of September 
11th 2001.  As the U.S government readied to attack Afghanistan, gathering support from 
other countries, it ‘asked’ the Pakistani government to end its support for the Taliban.  
Musharraf’s decision to become a close ally of the U.S. government in its ‘War on 
Terror’ led to the lifting of sanctions and, in the coming years, to a very close relationship 
between the General and the Bush Administration. “A complete transformation takes 
place in the nature of the Musharraf regime, in the economy, and in the demeanour of 
General Musharraf, when one compares his first two years in office, with his subsequent 
five,” i.e. the pre- and post-9/11 era (Zaidi 2008:6).  Even though Musharraf’s decision to 
join the coalition was not very popular amongst a large part of the population, it resulted 
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in huge benefits for his own political career as well as the country's economy. Musharraf 
went from being a dictator shunned by world leaders after the coup to being “the darling 
of the West.” Not just that but a large proportion of Pakistan's debt was written off or 
rescheduled on easier terms, the World Bank, IMF and aid agencies began working with 
Pakistan again, and both the US and EU improved trade relations with the country. 
Additionally, anticipating stricter surveillance, many overseas Pakistanis started sending 
their savings to Pakistan after 9/11. All this resulted in higher GDP rates since 2002 as 
well as rising exports and investment (Zaidi 2008:8). 
Between 2002 and 2008, the United States gave Pakistan a total of nearly 
twelve billion dollars… A small proportion—10 percent—of the money 
was explicitly for Pakistani development… The vast majority—75 
percent—of the money was explicitly for military purposes. After 
September 11, 2001, the United States asked the Pakistani army to conduct 
counterterrorism operations in the FATA near the country’s western border 
with Afghanistan… Pakistan argued that its army was not equipped to carry 
out this request [They argued that it was equipped to fight conventional 
defensive battles in more hospitable terrain on its eastern border with India]. 
As a result, the United States agreed that Pakistan should train and equip its 
army for counterterrorism deployment, with the United States funding this 
extra training and equipment. To this end, the United States created the 
Coalition Support Funds (CSF). These were designed to support only the 
costs of fighting terrorism over and above regular military costs incurred by 
Pakistan. Nearly two thirds—60 percent—of the money that the United 
States gave Pakistan was part of the CSF. The CSF was also designed to 
provide money to other states helping the United States fight the War on 
Terror, but the vast majority of the funds—81 percent—went to Pakistan. 
By the end of 2007, the United States was paying for roughly a quarter of 
Pakistan’s military budget (Ibrahim 2009: 8).  
 
Not only was Pakistan receiving a lot of aid, but most of it was in the form of 
“unrestricted funds” (Wright 2011). Pakistan was “one of only four countries to receive 
direct cash transfers [from the US] …  By its nature, these cash transfers became 
Pakistani sovereign funds, precluding U.S. oversight” (Ibrahim 2009: 5), meaning that 
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the US has no control over how they are spent. Pervez Musharraf, in an interview with a 
Pakistani news channel admitted that “during his tenure he diverted many of those 
billions to arm Pakistan against its hobgoblin enemy, India. Whoever wishes to be angry, 
let them be angry—why should we bother?’ Musharraf said…  ‘We have to maintain our 
security” (as reported by Wright 2011). Pakistan was also one of a select few countries 
that were formally declared a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States (Zunes 2007). 
All this helped further strengthen an already strong and independent military and ISI. 
“U.S. funds disincentivized democratization by giving the military a disincentive to 
submit to civilian control, increasing its independence from government, and ignoring 
evidence of profiteering from military budgets” (Ibrahim 2009: 5). In 2008, after 
Musharraf had already resigned, the Pakistani government tried to bring the ISI under the 
control of the Interior Ministry but was forced to change its decision within hours after 
the angry reactions of the military leaders (Ibrahim 2009: 20, Wright 2011). Then again 
in 2010, when Kerry-Lugar bill was passed in the US suggesting that the reception of aid 
be dependent on increased civilian control of the military, Pakistani military leaders were 
furious and pushed back against any civilian oversight.  
One of the side-effects of the two major conflicts mentioned above where the 
Pakistani military benefitted from its partnership with the United States was the huge 
inflow of refugees from Afghanistan as well as the internal displacement of Pakistanis as 
a result of both the militant insurgency and the military’s response in trying to contain the 
insurgency. Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1979. By the end of January 
1980 Pakistan had already received about four hundred thousand refugees; that number 
eventually reached three million people by 1989 (Kux 2001: 253). Many of these 
  108 
refugees returned to Afghanistan after the soviet withdrawal but given the turbulent 
conditions in Afghanistan since, it is estimated that 2.5 million Afghan refugees still live 
in Pakistan (Shahzad 2018). Additionally, many Pakistanis were also displaced due to the 
militant insurgency in the northern areas as well as the response by the Pakistani military 
and the US drone strikes. 
Anther event that was also instrumental in shaping civil society in Pakistan was 
the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79. With the success of the revolution, the Saudi regime 
was concerned about the increase in power and popularity of the Shia clerics and the 
influence it may have in the area (while Iran is a majority Shia country, Saudi Arabia is a 
majority Sunni country). These fears were heightened when in 1980 a huge protest rally 
was organized in Islamabad by Shia groups against the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance 
introduced under Zia’s Islamization scheme (Shias and Sunnis have a number of 
differences in interpretation regarding Islamic law and teachings, including Zakat and 
Ushr, which are Islamic taxes). This March was so successful that the Zia regime give in 
to the demands and declared Shias exempt from these taxes. All this “provided an excuse 
for Sunni Saudi Arabia to intervene in a bid to halt Shia enthusiasm. Several seminaries 
(madrassas) [in Pakistan] were granted financial support by Saudi Arabia and many new 
schools were set up at the Saudis’ behest. As a consequence, sectarian identities in 
Pakistan crystallised” (Kamran 2017: 31). All this was happening just as the US had 
started to fund jihadi groups to fight in Afghanistan, with the help of the Pakistani 
intelligence agencies. The intelligence agencies are known to have used these same 
groups in India and Kashmir when it suited their needs. To this day Pakistan has been 
trying to tackle the problems that were created and/or exacerbated during that era. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
One thing that becomes clear after analyzing the evolution of Pakistani civil 
society is that civil society cannot just be conceived of a static collection of different 
groups and organizations. It instead needs to be regarded as a combination of groups (or 
structures) and processes both of which change over time. The Pakistani civil society has 
been affected by international events including the Cold War (the government’s decision 
to side with the US translated into harassment of leftist groups and banning of the 
Communist Party in Pakistan),89 the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent US 
funding for the fight against the Russians (political and financial support of Zia on behalf 
of the US gave Zia a free hand to continue to repress the more progressive sections of 
civil society and continue bolstering the more conservative Islamic groups), the Iranian 
Revolution (the movement led by Shiites led Sunni groups in Pakistan to assert their 
version of Islam in the country), a shift in discourse in international development (which 
translated into the mushrooming of the NGO sector with lots of international funding and 
increased professionalization) as well as the September 11th attacks on the US and the 
subsequent US attacks/invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq (which helped prolong 
Musharraf’s rule; increasing resentment against what he claimed to represent: secularism; 
as well as increasing the influence of religious parties as they spoke out against the US 
actions in Afghanistan and Iraq). It has also been affected by processes within its own 
borders, mainly the repeated military takeovers. Each dictatorship engaged in repression 
                                                 
89 In comparison, in India, which had initially decided to stay non-aligned, leftist political groups 
did not face that kind of repression and many flourished over time. Communist parties are 
strong in a number of states, for example, and have formed repeated governments at the state 
level. 
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of groups and organizations that served as places for collective action (such as political 
parties, workers unions, and student organizations), in reshaping the structure of the 
democratic institutions (by for example introducing devolution plans or party-less 
elections), as well as reshaping people’s discourses about politics, politicians and 
religion. One of the consequence of this particular history has been that Pakistani civil 
society has gone from being populated by groups where people advocated for their own 
rights (such as workers and unions) to groups that advocate for the rights of others and 
are dependent on external funds (such as NGOs). While a similar trend can be seen the 
world over, the switch is probably starker in Pakistan given the involvement of the very 
strong military in the country’s politics. 
Additionally, given all these happenings inside and outside the country, you have 
a civil society that unlike most other countries is not formed along clear lines of 
religiosity vs. secularism, or authoritarianism vs. democracy. When Musharraf seized 
power, for example, you had many liberal and secular groups supporting Musharraf 
because the Prime Minister who had just been toppled (Nawaz Sharif) had been trying to 
impose Shariah laws in the country. A few secular groups opposed him on the basis that 
his actions were illegal, and certain religious groups opposed him on the basis that he was 
too liberal. Part of this disconnect can be explained by the particular history of the 
country. There is no doubt that the urban educated sections of the society have 
historically been more secular compared to the uneducated and/or rural sections of the 
country. While the leftist and progressive groups of the sixties and seventies included 
student organizations, labor unions, and small political parties with connections with the 
working class, the divisions based on religiosity were not as stark or at least were not 
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considered a defining feature of one group or another. But once these organizations were 
crushed by the Zia dictatorship and the only people who had the opportunity to organize 
were the more educated well-to-do sections of the society (via NGOs) during a time when 
Islamization was being imposed in the country, there were no venues for people of 
different backgrounds to mingle with each other and organize. During this time the 
pairing of “democratic and secular” and “authoritarian and religious” was still pretty 
accurate in terms of describing the different groups that populated the civil society. But in 
the years that followed, as international aid started flowing into the country as NGOs 
were being encouraged and receiving funds from foreign agencies as well as the Pakistani 
government to engage in service delivery, the “democratic and secular” weren’t paired 
together as easily anymore. These NGOs were run by mostly well-educated, urban, well-
to-do people, but if their funding was coming from Musharraf, or an international 
organization or government that supported Musharraf, their support for democracy may 
not be as strong anymore. At the same it, it is also mostly liberal/secular NGOs that have 
struggled for human rights in Pakistan, which has meant making enemies with the 
military as well as religious groups. It is only by keeping in mind this context of a civil 
society with unique fault lines that the anti-Musharraf movement can be analyzed. 
This poses a challenge to the Civil Society literature: how to categorize the 
religious groups described earlier in the chapter that are also common in other Muslim-
majority countries. If members of a religious organization wage a movement targeting a 
certain sect that the organization considers heretical, demanding the state to take certain 
steps that would lead to economic and other hardships for members of said sect (as was 
the case in the movement against the Ahmadis), is that organization still considered part 
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of civil society? Or when members of an organization attack members of another 
organization that is engaged in polio vaccinations or birth control services – which 
happens quite often in Pakistan as these are considered un-Islamic or a conspiracy by the 
West to control the population of Muslims – is that an exercise in civil society? Going 
back to Diamond and Qadeer’s definitions of civil society, Diamond defined it as “the 
realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, autonomous from 
the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from ‘society’ in 
general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their 
interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective 
goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, 
and to hold state officials accountable” (Diamond 1999: 221) and Qadeer defined it was a 
“mediating space” between society and the state which includes those institutions “whose 
primary function is to organise people's relationship with the state” (Qadeer 1997: 745). 
Depending on how the argument is made, one could argue both that such actions 
are/aren’t part of civil society. One could argue about whether the stated motives behind 
the action are actually the real motives: was the motive of the anti-Ahmadi movement (to 
declare Ahmadis non-Muslims) simply to improve the functioning of a Muslim state by 
making it more Islamic? Or was it to better organize “people's relationship with the state” 
by making it clear who is and isn’t a Muslim? Or was the motive to repress and be able to 
legally discriminate against a group of people? If it’s the latter, then would that still be 
considered an exercise in civil society if the movement was organized by organizations 
recognized by the state? Is this an example of “citizens acting collectively in a public 
sphere to express their interests, passions, preferences, and ideas, to exchange 
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information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state”?, because without 
doubt, the majority of the people in Pakistan do believe that Ahmadis are not Muslims as 
they do not believe in the finality of prophet-hood with Muhammad. Whether they are 
considered part of civil society or not is something that needs to be thought through, but 
one thing is for sure, you could not use a Tocquevillian lens to study the Pakistani civil 
society. A Gramscian perspective, on the other hand, which sees civil society as 
reflecting the struggles within the wider society, makes much more sense over here.  
Another challenge that this study poses to the Civil Society literature is the 
relationship between civil society and democracy. Does civil society, by definition, 
support democracy in a country or can you have a civil society that is indifferent to it? 
Additionally, is civil society in a democratic country, by definition, stronger than a civil 
society in an authoritarian country? Do countries with stronger democracies have 
stronger civil societies? What exactly does it mean for a civil society to be strong? As 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, civil society in Pakistan can by no means be considered 
a “strong” civil society by traditional understanding of the term, yet, it is credited with 
bringing down two dictatorships, fought a third one despite facing extreme violence and 
brutality, and bringing down a democratically elected government.  
One feature of the Pakistani political scene that comes up when analyzing the 
country’s civil society is the strong street power yielded by religious groups in the 
country and their ability to make the state bow down to their demands (as was for 
example the case when the government, in response to mass protests by religious groups, 
declared Ahmadis non-Muslim or, very recently in November 2017 when similar groups 
brought the capital city to a standstill protesting a change in electoral law that required all 
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candidates to take an oath affirming the prophet’s finality, which the authorities claimed 
was a mistake and had already turned back to the original). What is interesting though is 
that these groups that have the capability of bringing thousands of people into the street 
and bring cities to a halt, have not been able to transform it into electoral power.  Part of 
the explanation may be that these religious groups are affiliated with religious 
madrassahs and are able to get their students to come to the streets, and secondly, that the 
army and intelligence agencies may be using these groups to create problems for civilian 
governments (as they have many times in the past). After the above-mentioned sit-in of 
2017 for example, when the government finally decided to take action against the 
protesters who had been blocking roads for weeks, the situation got out of control of the 
police. When the government asked the military for help, it refused to step in, even 
though the government had been promised full support a few days ago. The military 
stepped in only as a negotiator, negotiating a deal that gave in to most of the demands of 
the protestors. After the jailed protestors were released, an army officer was caught on 
camera paying all the protestors bus fare so they could make the journey back home. 
Given these kinds of machinations that go on behind the scenes, it is no surprise that 
certain groups who seem to have a lot of street power, do not have any electoral power; 
others, who dominate the westernized-liberal sections of civil society, whilst considered 
the elite, do not vote in the elections; and those who vote and support the major political 
parties, are often portrayed as the backward-looking, illiterate section of society. Some of 
these anomalies will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE STREETS REMAINED SILENT 
Musharraf was hailed as Caesar by all hues of Pakistan’s urban middle class and its 
urban elite – then as now the street remained silent. He was hailed as the embodiment of 
personal sincerity and honesty, a statesman with a sense of purpose and for his constituency 
this was enough – as for the street it maintained its silence. He was hailed as the economic 
savior and it did not matter whether Pakistan’s macroeconomic crisis had been averted 
because of the 9/11 windfall or in spite of it – as for the street, business began to stir but 
otherwise it remained silent. He was hailed as the deliverer of prosperity as massive inflows 
of money into property, banking and stocks created an unprecedented economic and 
consumer boom – the street, well, business boomed but it maintained its silence. – 
(Cheema, 2007) 
  
Noted sociologist Saskia Sassen happened to be in Lahore (Pakistan) when 
emergency was imposed by General Musharraf on November 3rd, 2007. In her article 
published in the Guardian on November 7th she wondered whether the “street will rise,” 
given how everything in the streets, bazaars, roads, airports seemed to be functioning 
normally. “My experience of the street in Lahore tells me the answer is no” (Sassen 
2007). Referring to the November 5th incident when Police raided the Lahore High Court 
Bar Association (LHCBA), baton charged, and tear gassed the premises, and arrested 
more than 800 lawyers, she said: “In its day of greatest violence, Lahore turned out to 
contain two separate worlds: that of violent repression and a larger, bustling, diffuse 
world of daily life. A thousand is a lot of arrested lawyers, but it can drown in a city of 7 
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million, especially when the local media have been closed” (ibid). Another sociologist, 
Martha Bolognani, who happened to be teaching at LUMS (an elite private university that 
was one of the hubs of anti-emergency student activism) during that year, wrote later in 
response to Sassen’s article that her “gut feeling turned to be right and the protest turned 
out to be led mainly by lawyers, students, and prominent figures of the arts and of the 
human rights circles” (Bolognani 2011, p. 22). While most lawyers in Pakistan belong to 
the middle class and the lower middle class, the others described above “are part of what 
is commonly and broadly called ‘the elite’” (ibid).  
This absence of “the masses” or working class and/or the dominance of the elite 
and emerging middle class in the movement has been noted by a number of journalists 
and academics (Bolognani 2010 & 2011, Cheema 2007, Malik 2010, Rhode 2007, 
Shamsi 2007, Vora 2007). In comparison, the anti-Ayub movement of the 60s, while 
initially populated by students, academics and party activists, was eventually able to 
mobilize working class people as well. According to Sayeed, “by early March [1969] 
labour power had replaced student power in the urban confrontation with the Ayub 
regime” (1979: 118). Factory workers in Karachi were probably the most militant during 
the movement. In March 1969 for example, almost all the factories in Karachi (about 40 
percent of the country’s industrial capacity) were on strike. The transport workers unions 
in Karachi as well as numerous unions in Lahore were organizing and coordinating 
strikes, protests, and threatening to set fire to mills etc. “In Karachi workers took over 
two of the largest mills. There followed not only a stoppage of all industrial activity in 
the area but also a flight of capital from abroad with a sharp decline in the foreign 
exchange value of the rupee and a 40 per cent rise in the price of gold. All this created 
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such a panic among the factory owners that weeks before martial law was declared on 25 
March, they were appealing to the government to send troops to the industrial areas as the 
police were totally unable to cope with the trade union violence” (Sayeed 1979:120).90  
So why did the “streets,” for the most part, remain silent in the 2007-08 pro-
judiciary protest movement? Bolognani summarized the reasons that have been given by 
others to explain the absence of the working class from the movement as such: “a general 
feeling of resignation about the recurrent use of martial law in the country, the fact that 
social justice issues (such as the rise of flour prices) would have been much more 
appealing to them, and also the assumption that many people in the country still do not 
regard democracy as the best system of governance” (Bolognani 2011, p. 21-22). In the 
words of a journalist covering the movement, the indifference of most students to the 
political situation can be explained by “the cynicism born of living in a country that has 
spent 31 of its 60-year history ruled by the military or corrupt and inept civilian leaders” 
(Vora 2007).  While none of these reasons are incorrect, I contend that one needs to look 
at how these explanations intersect with class- and urban-rural differences in Pakistan in 
order to really understand why the movement was limited in terms of its composition the 
way it was. 
In the next few sections I first explore the class- and urban-rural differences in 
terms of voting patterns and attitudes towards politics in general and politicians in 
particular. I then try to explain the roots of these differences by looking at 1) the role of 
                                                 
90 The strength of the workers is evident in the fact that while politicians were negotiating with 
Ayub, the All-Pakistan Trade Union Council, in the midst of all the labor strikes, sent a 
telegram to the political leaders making it clear that  “a settlement which merely restored 
parliamentary democracy ‘without economic democracy would not be acceptable to the 
workers and peasants’” (Sayeed 1979:122-23). 
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the military in the first few years after Pakistan’s independence as well as the economic 
performance of military regimes; 2) the circumstances and consequences of the birth of 
the country’s first populist political party (the PPP) and the nature of other political 
parties; 3) the differences in the military’s land-grab policies in rural vs. urban areas; 4) 
Zia’s Islamization program and other policies instituted by military regimes; as well as 5) 
differences in the class background of military personnel vs. politicians. The chapter ends 
with looking at how the class- and urban-rural divides that were visible in this movement 
affected different aspects of the movement.   
 
3.1 Class, Education, Elections, and Democracy  
Much has been written about the relationship between class, income, education 
and political attitudes. “[M]ost studies of political behavior in advanced democracies find 
strong links between education, income, and voter turnout” (Asia Foundation 2008, p. 
167). There are numerous studies for example, which show a positive relationship 
between level of education and propensity to vote and/or to be politically active 
(Converse 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). 
When looking at research that has been done on the middle class and their 
attitudes towards democracy, one can find a number of themes. “A long-standing 
geographical imaginary has it that urban centres are the trailblazers not only of economic 
development, but also of historically ‘progressive’ phenomena such as modernity and 
democracy, leading lagging regions and rural areas towards their own futures” 
(Glassman, 2010. p. 1301). A growing middle class has been argued to, in itself, cause a 
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move towards democracy or at the very least create the conditions that make it easier for 
the country to move towards democracy (Huntington 1968, Lipset 1959).  Members of 
the middle class – at least in advanced economies – are supposedly more likely to support 
the rule of law, legal protections, and greater accountability of government (Birdsall 
2010). Others have concluded that the size of the middle class in a country positively 
influences indicators of democracy and political stability (Easterly 2010). Still others 
make a more nuanced argument that while factors like a large middle class, affluence, 
education, etc. may be advantageous for democracy to develop, democracy is not an 
inevitable outcome; it “has to be chosen, implemented, and perpetuated by ‘agents,’ real 
live political actors” (Schmitter 1992,  424-25). Furthermore, the consolidation of 
democracy occurs only when the country comes up with a set of institutions agreed upon 
by the politicians and supported by the citizens, which is usually hard to do given the 
heightened expectations and conflicting interests that are characteristic of periods of 
transition (ibid, 425). 
More recently, some theorists have argued that the above-mentioned models used 
to explain middle class growth and attitudes towards democracy in more developed 
countries may not be applicable to developing countries (Fernandes and Heller 2006, 
Glassman 2010, Siddiqa 2011, Zaidi 2005). Siddiqa (2011) argues that the whole debate 
about the middle class, progress, and democracy has been borrowed wholesale from 
western history without examining the intricacies of developing countries, where much of 
the middle class may not necessarily be liberal or politically progressive (p. 62). 
Fernandes and Heller (2006) similarly posit that historically “middle classes have been 
notoriously fickle vis-à-vis democracy. If middle classes helped usher in formal 
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democracy, rejecting the status privileges of pre-democratic orders, they have also drawn 
the line at empowering those that would threaten their own privileges” (Fernandes and 
Heller 2006, 505).  
Glassman (2010) uses the happenings in Thailand in the 2000s to make a similar 
argument about the Thai middle class. Bangkok, he says, “is not a site of the most 
progressive democratic sentiment, while the countryside is neither a site of purely corrupt 
patronage systems nor of the romantic rural idyll” (Glassman, 2010. p. 1318). While the 
Thai urban middle class demanded an end to the then authoritarian regime in the late 
1990s leading to elections in 2001, they also then within a few years, backed a military 
coup to overthrow the democratically elected government. Thaksin, who became prime 
minister in 2001, was the first prime minister in Thailand's history to serve a full term in 
office and his TRT regime was in power until 2006. He was extremely popular amongst 
the rural poor and the urban slums, owing to many of his social spending policies that 
benefited the poor, including cheap medical care and debt-relief, and was re-elected as 
prime minister in 2005 only to be overthrown by a military coup which happened after a 
middle class urban campaign of mass protests accusing him of corruption, abuse of power 
and autocratic tendencies. Even though Thaksin’s authoritarian tendencies were obvious 
early on in his tenure including his media crackdown and his war on drugs in 2003 that 
saw more than 2,500 people dead (BBC 2011, Glassman 2010), “there was precious little 
protest against these kinds of practices among middle-class groups, who largely seemed 
accepting of Thaksin’s policies, provided they worked economically” (Glassman, 2010. 
p. 1313). While no one can deny Thaksin’s authoritarianism and corruption, one can also 
not deny his popularity amongst many and that he was the democratically elected prime 
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minister. The Bangkok-based pro-coup middle class were able to use their political clout 
and media access to overturn these policies (ibid, p. 1318). For this group of people 
“corruption and socio-political underdevelopment (intellectual, moral and political) of 
Thai rural society is responsible for much of the [country’s social problems]” (ibid, p. 
1305). 
In India, similarly, “the public construction of politics [since the 1960s] has 
increasingly been transformed towards that of an ‘immoral vocation,’ a site of 
unprincipled pragmatism, corruption, nepotism and greed” (Hansen, 1999, p. 56). This is 
most likely a result of the fact that the composition of party activists and elected 
representatives has changed since, to include members from lower caste groups as well as 
the peasantry whose “style, language and social practices are decidedly more ‘rustic’ and 
‘plebian’ than those of the preceding generation” (ibid). Leela Fernandes (2004) 
describes how discourses of corrupt politicians dominated her interviews and informal 
interactions during her fieldwork in India (p. 2426).  Politicians in India are either from 
lower-class backgrounds or they cater to the lower classes. “This frustration of the middle 
classes at what they perceive as a political field that caters to the poor and working 
classes at the expense of middle-class interests lies at the heart of the production of the 
consumer-citizen in the context of liberalisation” (ibid, p. 2426). In Pakistan as well, the 
middle class has traditionally been known to side with authoritarian regimes (Siddiqa 
2011, Zaidi 2005). The middle and upper class for the most part seems to relate more to 
the military than to politicians; the politicians seem to speak the language of the poor, and 
until recently, the language of the ruralites. When you have a movement populated by the 
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middle and upper classes, their attitudes towards politicians and the military are sure to 
affect the direction of the movement, a point we will come back to later in the chapter.  
In the next section, I show how the above-mentioned trends of the relationships 
between the middle class, education, and voting or political attitudes do not fit as neatly 
in the case of Pakistan.  After providing some evidence for how the Pakistani case is 
different, I then delve into some historical background to try to come up with an 
explanation of why that is the case. 
 
3.1.1 Class, Education, Elections, and Democracy in Pakistan 
Before discussing patterns in voting behaviors along lines of education, income, 
urbanity-rurality, let’s take a quick look at what the population of the country looks like. 
According to the 2017 Census, Pakistan has a population of about 210 million with a 
literacy rate of 58%. Fifty seven percent of children belonging to the poorest families in 
Pakistan are out of school. The percentages decrease as income level increases: 37, 26, 16 
and 10% of children belonging to poor, middle, upper middle, and rich families 
respectively are out of school (DAWN 2015).  In the year 2007, 64.6% of the population 
lived in rural areas and 35.4% in urban areas (World Bank Open data website). Literacy 
rate in 2008 in Pakistan’s rural areas was 46% compared to 71% in urban areas 
(UNESCO 2011: 3). Educational levels tend to be higher in urban areas due to easier 
access to educational institutions. The size of the middle class in the country is estimated 
to be about 34.6% of the whole population (Nayyab 2011: 14) 91 but it’s described as a 
                                                 
91 The author provides three different estimates of the middle class: the strict middle class 
(18.8%), expanded middle class (34.6%), and broadest middle class (35%). The second 
category includes people from the “upper lower class” and the third includes the “lower upper 
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largely urban phenomenon as the only 20.9% of the rural population, as opposed to 
53.7% of the urban population is estimated to be middle class (ibid). 
 
3.1.1.1 Voting Patterns by Education and Income  
Even though there is a dearth of systematic data on voting trends in Pakistan, one 
can look at the numerous studies that have been conducted and try to pan out any patterns 
that may exist in terms of education, class or the rural-urban divide. There have been a 
few studies that have been conducted to explore the relationship between voter turnout 
and education levels. Sheikh et al conducted a survey of 600 registered voters belonging 
to urban and rural areas of Taxila and Wah Cantt (in the province of Punjab) and found 
that respondents with lower levels of education were more interested in voting in the next 
elections compared to their more educated counterparts (Sheikh et al 2013, p. 415). They 
did see a slight change in the 2013 national elections though, where “many educated 
respondents showed interest in voting” and attributed that to the fact that this was the first 
time a government completed its 5-year tenure (ibid, p. 451).  
Akramov et al’s study (2008) also showed a negative correlation with level of 
education in Pakistani local elections as did the Asia Foundation’s (2008) survey results 
based on a representative sample of 2,722 eligible voters in Pakistan in 2007. Amongst 
people with no education, 53% reported having voted in many or every election.  For 
people with a madrassa (religious school) schooling or a primary education or less, this 
                                                 
class” as well (Nayyab 2011: 14).  The author prefers to use the “expanded middle class 
estimate” to counter the “stringent measurement method suggested to estimate the middle 
class” in her paper (ibid: 13) 
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percentage ranged between 46-50%, and for those with a middle school education or 
more it ranged from 40-43%.  
 
 
Educational Attainment 
Never 
or 
Once 
2-3 
Times Many or Every 
Elections 
None 33 14 53 
Madrasa (Religious school) 46 9 46 
Some Primary 38 14 48 
Finished Primary 31 18 50 
Middle School 41 20 40 
Matric (10 yrs of education) 39 17 43 
F.A./F.Sc or above (12 + yrs of 
education) 39 19 41 
Based on data from Table 8.1a (Asia Foundation 2008)92 
Table 3.1 Past Electoral Participation in Percentages (Number of Elections in 
which Respondent has Voted) 
 
 
 
The data on voter turnout and class/economic status is a little less clear though. 
While Sheikh et al (2013) reported that the “majority of the respondents cast votes and 
participate [sic] belongs to lower strata of the class” and that amongst the “lower class” 
respondents, 95% claimed to have voted as opposed to 70% from the middle and 45% 
from the upper class respondent (p. 415),93  Akramov et al did not find any correlation 
between voter turnout and economic status. They concluded though that this could either 
mean that the relationship is nonexistent or that it’s not linear (p. 10). The Asia 
                                                 
92 Some of the categories of number of times voted were collapsed to be able to see clear patterns. 
93 The authors do not provide a definition of the class categories used. 
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foundation study similarly concluded that the relationship between income and voting 
attitudes are either negatively or “less systematically” associated:  
While the survey findings suggest that higher class and income are 
associated positively with levels of political interest, awareness, and many 
other pro-election attitudes, the data suggest that they are associated 
somewhat negatively—or less systematically—with actual voting behavior 
(Asia Foundation 2008, p. 166). 
 
The authors conclude the report with the observation that “While most studies of 
political behavior in advanced democracies find strong links between education, income, 
and voter turnout, the survey results for Pakistan suggest a different pattern of electoral 
participation” (Asia Foundation 2008, p. 167). Similar interesting patterns can be noted in 
terms of the urban or rural location of voters, discussed in the next section. 
 
3.1.1.2 Voting Patterns by Urbanity/Rurality  
Differences in voting behavior in rural vs. urban residents seem to cut along the 
same lines as low vs. high levels of education. In February 2008, for example, 62% of 
ruralites, as opposed to 33% urbanites said they were very likely to vote in the upcoming 
elections.  Only 5% ruralites said they will not be voting, as opposed to 22% of urbanites 
(Gallup Pakistan 2008). While the trend was similar in 2013, the percentage of urbanites 
who said they were very likely to vote increased. Sixty four percent of ruralites as 
opposed to 49% of urbanites said they were very likely to vote (Gallup Pakistan 2013).94 
It should be noted that the 2013 elections have been touted as the elections when the 
number of urban voters was actually higher than in previous years owing to the fact that 
                                                 
94 Similar questions not asked before the 2008 elections. 
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the former cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, a darling of the educated middle class 
(especially amongst the youth), was a serious contender in the elections, and the 
percentage of young eligible voters was much higher (demographically speaking). 
The 2013 Gallup poll also showed that people in rural areas  had greater 
confidence that the elections will be free, fair, and independent (68% compared to 48% of 
urbanites) and were less worried that there will be a breakdown of law and order on 
Election Day (33% compared to 22%) (Gallup 2013). The study reports that voter turnout 
is much higher in “the most undeveloped, neglected and illiterate regions of the country 
including Interior Sindh and Southern Punjab… [compared to] urbanized regions like 
Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi” (Gallup 2017). The Asia foundation study (2008) 
reported similar results in terms of political attitudes with higher percentages of people in 
rural areas having more trust in the Election Commission of Pakistan (p.80), more trust in 
the National and Provincial Assemblies (p. 94), as well as more trust in the National and 
Provincial Governments (p. 99 & 103) compared to their urban counterparts.  
The pattern seems to be similar in local elections. Akramov et al (2008) for 
example showed that voter turnout in Pakistani local elections has a positive correlation 
with being a resident of a rural area, being male, or being a farmer (p. 10). Ghauri (2016) 
reported the same pattern. “People in the country’s least developed districts are more 
interested in local governments as compared to their compatriots in urbanised areas.” The 
two largest cities in the country, Karachi and Lahore, that have a combined estimated 
population of about 30 million, for example, “remained at the bottom in terms of voter 
turnout in their respective provinces [with turnout rates of 36% and 44% respectively] .” 
Tharparkar on the other hand, “the district considered the most neglected and illiterate in 
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Sindh, showed a voter turnout of 70% — the highest in the province. Similarly, Layyah 
and Bhakkar districts in southern Punjab, also considered the least developed” each 
recorded the highest turnouts of 71% (Ghauri 2016). 
Even within the bigger cities, voting patterns seem to differ based on the overall 
socio-economic status of the area. For example, the posh areas of Model Town and 
Gulberg in Lahore had voter turnouts of 37% and 39%, respectively in the 2015 local 
elections. In the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the overall turnout was 43.52% but 
within the province, the capital city of Peshawar had a turnout of 32.72% compared to 
57.77% in Dera Ismail Khan, which has much lower literacy rates. Similarly, in the rural 
areas surrounding the capital city of Islamabad the voter turnout was 68% in Saidpur and 
63% in Pind Baghwal, compared to 27% in the posh area of F-10 (Khan 2016). 
It thus seems to be a recurring theme that people with lower incomes and/or lower 
levels of education as well as people living in rural areas have a higher propensity to vote 
or to have more confidence in the electoral system.95 The flip side of this phenomenon 
would be support for military regimes. Unfortunately, data is not as readily available in 
terms of people’s attitudes towards military governments along those lines.  Two studies 
that the author found that included questions trying to gauge these attitudes were a Gallup 
1999 poll conducted the day after Musharraf’s coup which reported that 75% of urbanites 
                                                 
95 Different explanations have been given for this phenomenon. While some argue that the poor 
have more to gain from elected governments (Siddiqa 2007) and that the patronage networks 
offered by mainstream political parties which serve as “an essential intermediation device for 
citizens confronted by an oppressive, fractured and dysfunctional state” (Cheema 2007), others 
have argues that “landowning has traditionally been the social base from which most politicians 
emerge, especially in rural areas” and these landowners demand loyalty from their tenants 
(Dalrymple 2008).  Others point to the fact that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s first populist 
leader and his Pakistan People’s Party energized rural Pakistan and the effect of that can still be 
seen. This will be discussed further in the next section. 
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approved of the military actions, but the poll was not conducted in rural areas. Another 
Gallup poll conducted in 2008 showed the urban-rural divide in terms of the decision to 
call back army officers from civilian institutions.  At the beginning of 2008 (after 
Musharraf resigned as the Chief of Army Staff), the new Chief of Army Staff, General 
Kiyani issued an order for army personnel serving in civilian institutions to return to the 
barracks. In the Gallup poll conducted in February 2008, this question was asked: “In 
your opinion, is the decision to call back army officers from civilian institutions the right 
decision?” Seventy two percent of ruralites, as opposed to 57% of urbanites said that was 
the right decision. Almost the same percentage of people said it was wrong (17% 
urbanites and 16% ruralites) and the rest said they were not sure (Gallup Pakistan, 2008). 
If one looks at the results of the 2002 General Election results held under 
Musharraf, one can see many of these above-mentioned themes come into play. The 
elections were held at a time when the leaders of the two main political parties had been 
forced into exile, when not only did Musharraf not experience any opposition but was 
actually very popular (at least amongst most of the elite and the middle class), and at a 
time when the military was completely in charge of the country.  When Musharraf 
toppled the then elected government in 1999 and appointed himself president, the 
Supreme Court retroactively approved the coup in May 2000 and gave him three years to 
hold elections (Shah 2003: 26). Polls conducted in these first few after the coup showed 
that the General enjoyed popular support. The Pew Global Attitudes Project conducted in 
August-September 2002 for example showed the 76% of those surveyed had a positive 
view of Musharraf and only 16% viewed him negatively.  But the general realized that he 
couldn’t hope “to rely indefinitely on the “entrance legitimacy” that he had when he first 
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took over, and [needed] some sort of popular consent to rule” (ibid). Thus, before holding 
national elections he held a “referendum” which was condemned by national and 
international agencies as a sham, in which 97.5% of the voters favored keeping him as 
president for another 5 years. 
The October 2002 elections were highly manipulated to ensure a win for 
Musharraf’s preferred party, the PML-Q.96  Constitutional changes were made to bar 
Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto (the two most popular politicians in the country) from 
contesting the elections. They were both already, at this point, in forced exile. 
Additionally, the voting age was decreased to 18 “believing that Pakistan’s millennials 
would endorse his vision of Enlightened Moderation and vote for candidates he approved 
of” (Zaidi 2017d).  Furthermore, all candidates were now required to have a Bachelors 
degree in order to contest the elections, “a move which, according to the EU observers, 
denied 96 percent of all voters their right to run for office” (Shah 2003: 28) – people who 
attended religious, madrassah schooling were exempt from this condition.  Other tactics 
that were used were reviving a constitutional amendment allowing the president to 
dismiss an elected government, the suspension of the constitutional ban on floor-crossing 
(to ensure the ability to get enough votes to form a government), gerrymandering, and 
spending of government funds on the president’s preferred party, the PML-Q. These 
elections were criticized by both external and internal organizations such as the European 
Union Election Observation Mission to Pakistan and Human Rights Watch.97   Despite all 
these manipulations, Musharraf’s political party won only 27% of the popular vote and 
                                                 
96 For details of these manipulations see Shah (2003) and Zaidi (2017d). 
97 The EU Observer Mission report is available at www.eueom.org.pk/ finalreport.asp and Human 
Rights Watch Background Briefing at www.hrw.org/press/2002/10/pakistan-1009.htm. 
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no more than 34% of the general seats (Cheema 2007). PPP won 23% of the seats, PML-
N 5.5%, and MMA (a coalition of religious parties) won a surprising 18% (PILDAT 
2013).98  For purposes of comparison, the table below shows the percentage of seats and 
the popular vote won by the top two parties in previous elections. In the subsequent 
elections of 2008 and 2013, PML-Q won 15% and less than half a percent of the seats in 
the national assembly respectively. 
 
 
  1990 1993 1997 
  
% of 
Votes 
% of 
seats 
% of 
Votes 
% of 
seats 
% of 
Votes 
% of 
seats 
PML(N) 37 51 40 36 46 66 
PPP 37 21 38 43 22 9 
Gallup Pakistan 1997 
Table 3.2 Party Share of Votes - National Assembly Elections  
 
While data is not available for the 2002 elections in terms of urban-rural, income, 
and educational background, if past records are any indication, one could argue, as 
Cheema (2007) did that had educated urbanites actually voted, his party would have won 
a lot more seats. In the next section I try to explore the roots of these differences: why do 
people with lower levels of education and income, and those belonging to rural areas, 
                                                 
98 This was the first time in Pakistan’s history that religious parties won so many seats in an 
election. “The MMA also inadvertently benefited from General Musharraf’s constitutional 
engineering. His bachelor’s-degree requirement, for instance, disqualified nearly half of all 
those who had held national and provincial legislative seats at the time of the 1999 coup, yet the 
Islamists stood unscathed as the Election Commission of Pakistan swiftly ruled that their 
madrassah (religious school) degrees would count as B.A. equivalents. Official bans on 
political activity meant little to Islamist parties long accustomed to using mosques and 
madrassahs as platforms for mobilization. Even so, the regime did little to interfere with public 
rallies by religious factions even as it ruthlessly suppressed secular opposition gatherings. In 
June 2002, for instance, baton-wielding policemen assailed and arrested several senior PML-N 
leaders before a public rally in Rawalpindi. Just two days earlier in Lahore, the capital of 
Punjab, 20,000 Islamists—including members of extremist groups nominally banned by 
Musharraf—had congregated unhindered to hear speakers castigate the general for “selling out” 
Afghanistan and Kashmir in return for favors from Washington” (Shah 2003: 30). 
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seem to be more inclined to vote and why higher income, more educated urbanites tend to 
shy away from electoral politics and support military regimes. 
 
3.2 Roots of the Class- and Urban-Rural Divide  
3.2.1 Role of the military in the first few years of Pakistan’s existence and the 
economic performance of military regimes  
Given the rather brutal conditions right after the creation of Pakistan as millions 
of people migrated to the “right” country and hundreds of thousands of them were killed 
on the way, the need to help those who made it safely, the insecurity of being the new 
smaller state geographically divided by a bigger, stronger India, and the breakout of a war 
with India in the first year after independence meant that the military became central to 
the security and existence of the country. “From then onwards, military security was 
given maximum priority, resulting in the government allocating about 70 per cent of the 
estimated budget in the first year for defence” (Siddiqa 2007b: 63). Before independence, 
the British had controlled India by strengthening the state civil bureaucracy. After 
independence, while the Indian bureaucracy accepted the dominance of politicians, the 
Pakistani bureaucracy – using the political upheavals in the country as an excuse99 – 
chose to strengthen itself with the help of the military, undermining the political process. 
The first military coup in 1958 came at the behest of the civil bureaucracy (ibid: 67-70). 
The military’s strength has only grown since then with the armed forces taking an even 
more active part in shaping and manipulating the country’s politics. 
                                                 
99 During 1947 and 1958, the country had seven prime ministers and eight cabinets; none of 
which were elected through national elections and were all unable to provide the country with a 
constitution.  
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The country spends much more on the military compared to other countries with 
similar economic standing. The share of military spending as a percentage of GDP has 
fluctuated between 3.5 and 8.5% of the GDP (see graph below). The lines show periods 
of direct military rule in the country post 1971 (data before 1960 is not available on the 
World Bank website), 1977-1988, and 1999-2008. It is interesting that the two 
democratic interregnums saw a decrease in military spending as a percentage of GDP. 
While the percentage also seems to have decreased during Musharraf’s rule, it was partly 
a result of budgetary manipulations where military pensions were moved to civilian 
expenditure in 2002. It should also be noted that this spending does not include costs 
related to the country’s nuclear program. Some have argued that military spending in 
Pakistan has “squeezed out” public spending on programs of social welfare leading to 
very low levels of education and health (Khan 2000, 188-89). Despite having higher per-
capita income compared to both India and Sri Lanka, for example, the country 
consistently rates lower than both in terms of social development indices (ibid). Given the 
fact that more than half the country’s budget is spent on defense and debt-servicing, it is 
no surprise that little is left for purposes of human development.100  
                                                 
100 In the latest budget 2018-2019 (at the time of this writing), defense expenditure comprises 
23% and debt servicing comprises 31% of the country’s budget. This 23% does not include 
pensions of military personnel and other expenses that are usually hidden under non-defense 
expenditures (https://tribune.com.pk/story/1688346/2-year-2018-19-defence-debt-eat-half-
proposed-outlay/)  
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Data from World Bank Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org/ 
Figure 3.1: Military expenditure in Pakistan as % of GDP 
 
The main issue here though is the country’s economic performance under military 
rule. I contend that while the country seems to do better economically under military 
regimes, poorer economic performance under democratic regimes cannot simply be 
attributed to “corrupt and incapable” politicians, contrary to popular belief; additionally, 
the better performance of military regimes primarily benefits the middle and upper class 
people, which may contribute to their attitudes towards politicians and military rule. 
 Researchers who have analyzed the state of the Pakistani economy have reported 
periods of economic “booms and busts” that correspond with periods of military and 
civilian rule in the country (Amjad 2014, Lopez-Calix et al 2012, World Bank 2013). 
Pakistan’s economic growth performance can be divided into periods of relatively high 
growth: the 1960s, 1980s, and the early to mid-2000s—Ayub Khan, Zia ul Haq and 
Pervez Musharraf’s military rule, respectively—and periods of low growth: the 1950s, 
1970s, 1990s, and 2008 onward—the time when the country was under civilian control 
(Amjad 2014, p. 92). While the average GDP growth rate under military regimes was 
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more than 6 percent, the average for democratic governments was 4.3 percent (World 
Bank 2013, p. 31).  
This difference in performance however cannot simply be attributed to “better 
quality,” less corrupt leadership provided by the military governments. It is rather a 
consequence of a) the ability to push through reforms associated with national growth 
spurts without having to care about any consensus, public opinion, or political stability, 
and b) the high levels of foreign aid that have been characteristic of military regimes in 
Pakistan (Amjad 2014, Burki 2007, Lopez-Calix et al 2012, World Bank 2013).  In all 
three cases, the military regimes were able to bank on the major geopolitical events of the 
time: the Cold War during General Ayub Khan’s rule (1958 to 1969), the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan during General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule (1977 to 1988), and the post-9/11 U.S. 
“War on Terror” during General Musharraf’s rule (1999 to 2008), three events that 
helped Pakistan secure high levels of foreign aid and beneficial deals with international 
monetary institutions. “In contrast, the democratic Bhutto and Sharif regimes of the 
1970s, 1990s, and late 2000s were times of political upheaval, regional tensions, natural 
disasters, little structural reform, and global economic uncertainties” (World Bank 2013, 
p. 31). 
In the late 50s and into the 6os, the then dictator Ayub Khan, in order to 
accelerate industrial growth, provided maximum incentives to private entrepreneurs. But 
while Pakistan experienced a boom in industries in the 50s, the condition of the workers 
of those factories did not improve. So while large-scale manufacturing grew by an 
average of 22.6% annually between 1950 and 1956, the real wages of workers decreased 
during the same time period (Khan 2000, p. 184).  “It was above all corruption at the 
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government level and excessive concentration of industrial and financial power in the 
twenty-two big industrial families which robbed Ayub’s government of much of its 
legitimacy” (Sayeed 1979:115). Those infamous 22 families owned 68% of Pakistan’s 
industries and 87% of its banking and insurance assets during the 60s (Siddiqa 2007b: 
75). It should thus be no surprise that the ones benefitting from the regime’s policies 
“were sympathetic to their source of power, the army. The landed-feudal class that 
traditionally dominated politics also developed links with the bureaucracy and the 
industrial class” (ibid).  Even though Ayub introduced land reforms, these reforms did 
nothing to dilute the influence of the landed elite. Unlike India where feudalism was 
legally abolished soon after partition as the landownership ceiling was set at 10 acres per 
family, Ayub set the ceiling at 36,000 produce index units per individual. This meant that 
big landlords could simply transfer some of the property to other members of the family 
without reducing their power or influence (ibid). 
A similar pattern can be observed under Musharraf’s rule, although this time 
around the benefits of the growing economy spread a little wider to the middle class as 
well. Khan (2007) found that while the country experienced higher GDP growth under 
Musharraf compared to the previous eleven years of civilian rule, the same is not true for 
social development indicators.  While looking at growth in GDP, it is very obvious that 
this happened only after 2001. After 9/11, the West needed to “cosy up to Musharraf in 
order to push its new geopolitical imperatives” (Malik 2010: 106). Prior to 2001, owing 
to the country’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, it was one of the most sanctioned countries 
after Libya (Moreau 2006).  Pakistan’s GDP growth rate was close to zero, it had $38 
billion in debt with no international aid or foreign reserves to speak of (Malik 2010: 106, 
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Moreau 2006).101 After 2001 though, the GDP growth rate kept increasing, reaching 7% 
in 2006-2007 (ADB 2008: 181).  During the same fiscal period, total investments had 
reached 23% of GDP and Foreign Direct Investment has reached a record $5.1 billion 
(ibid). The country received about $10 billion in US aid over the next six years, most of 
which went into the unaudited defense sector, remittances increased, (Malik 2010: 106) 
and a push for privatization “provided the early impetus for the rise in FDI, centered on 
services (primarily banks and telecommunications)” (ibid 182). 
 
 
Taken from ADB 2008: 181  
Figure 3.2: GDP Growth Rate in Pakistan 
 
 
 
There was no dearth of newspaper articles and economists touting the country’s 
performance in words such as these: “Until the beginning of 2007, Pakistan had a 
construction and consumer boom, with growth approaching 8 percent; for several years 
its stock market was the fastest-rising in Asia. As you travel around Pakistan today you 
can see the effects of the boom everywhere: in vast new shopping malls and smart 
                                                 
101 The then Washington Post South Asia bureau chief, Pamela Constable, wrote in a paper 
published January 2001: “By the end of his first year in power… Musharraf has proven 
somewhat of a disappointment… [F]oreign investment has plummeted, unemployment and 
poverty have continued to rise, and none of the country’s longstanding structural and societal 
problems seems any closer to solution”(Constable 2001: 16). 
Aggregate GDP 
growth rate 
Per Capita GDP 
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roadside filling stations, in the cranes of the building sites and the smokestacks of 
factories, in the expensive new cars jamming the roads and in the ubiquitous cell-phone 
stores. In 2003 the country had fewer than three million cell phones; today apparently 
there are 50 million, while car ownership has been increasing at roughly 40 percent a year 
since 2001. At the same time foreign direct investment has risen from $322 million in 
2002 to $3.5 billion in 2006” (Dalrymple 2008).  
Yet if one pays close attention, one notices that the indicators that are used to 
signify this growth are increase in sales of TVs, cell phones, and other consumer products 
as well as increase in Foreign Direct Investment, opening of new businesses that sell 
international brands, and the establishment of residential areas that are only affordable for 
the upper and upper middle class people (Dalrymple 2008, Moreau 2006, Wonacott 
2007). Moreau (2006), in an article talking about the economic success of Pakistan and 
its booming economy, for example, quoted many people touting the state of the economy, 
but all except for one were businessmen and CEOs102. The only person interviewed who 
                                                 
102 “Last year the country's GDP growth rate hit 8.4 percent, the world's second highest behind 
China, following two years of solid 6 percent growth. This year the economy is predicted to 
expand by nearly 7 percent. After years of instability, ... The United States and Europe 
immediately lifted all sanctions; Washington gave Pakistan $600 million outright to meet 
urgent debt payments, and forgave another $1.5 billion in debt. Working with Aziz, America 
and other creditor nations also rescheduled Pakistan's heavy debt over a manageable 30 to 35 
years. In 2004, the United States pledged $3 billion in economic and military assistance over 
the next five years, in addition to $100 million for education reform. The EU pitched in, lifting 
quota restrictions on Pakistan's main export, textiles. At the same time, Aziz, who is now prime 
minister, began enacting a series of common-sense economic reforms… He also instituted a 
sweeping privatization program that has won kudos from both domestic and foreign investors. 
State-owned companies in numerous industries--banking, cement, fertilizer, utilities--have been 
sold off, as has a chunk of the state's inefficient telecom giant, PTCL. The newly privatized and 
cash-flush banks have been on a lending spree, extending loans to capital-starved domestic 
businessmen and to the Pakistani middle class, which until 2002 had little access to consumer 
credit. People have snapped up credit cards, and are buying cars and other big-ticket products 
with easy-credit bank loans. "This is the best government we've had in the past 30 years," says 
prominent Lahore businessman Syed Babar Ali, who heads some of the country's biggest joint-
venture companies, including Coca-Cola and Nestlé” (Moreau 2006). 
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was not a businessman or CEO, but a journalist, had this to say: "The rich have become 
very rich since 9/11, and the middle class is better off, but not the mass of Pakistanis" 
(Moreau 2006). Towards the end of Musharraf’s rule, even those touting the booming 
economy were forced to add a sentence or two about the high levels of inflation (11% in 
2005, 8.5% in 2006), a sluggish job market, and shortages of flour and electricity 
(Moreau 2006, Dalrymple 2008, Dalrymple 2008). While the economy has never 
performed well under democratic governments on a consistent basis, and the country 
experienced mixed results in terms of reductions in poverty levels during the democratic 
interregnum of 1988-1999 (ADB 2001: 122, World Bank 2002: 3), these governments 
ran numerous social welfare programs such as the Youth Investment Promotion Society 
(meant to decrease youth unemployment by providing subsidized credit for small 
businesses), the Social Action Program (with plans of creating a million jobs in the 
education and health sectors), and other programs to improve healthcare for women and 
promoting family planning (ADB 1995: 158-159). Under the more bureaucratic military 
regimes on the other hand, the common man “has fewer benefits and little access to the 
trickle-down of resources… Such governments put up a show of deciding things on merit 
which means that there are fewer openings for the common man who cannot boast of 
academic or other credentials… Political parties, because they depend on the support of 
voters, have to provide opportunities to their supporters. Furthermore, political parties are 
comparatively less pretentious about merit than bureaucratic governments. Although 
there is no evidence that governments run by bureaucrats or technocrats care more for 
merit, they generally pretend to be meritocracies, which means that their patronage is 
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limited to a select group of people and not the general public. The typical cronies of 
bureaucratic regimes (civil and military) are the fairly educated middle class” (Siddiqa 
2007). It should thus be not very surprising that people belonging to the middle and upper 
class are generally more supportive of military rule. 
     
3.2.2 The birth of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the nature of other political 
parties and the democratic interregnums  
The anti-Ayub movement of the 1960s was populated by political activists, 
workers unions, intellectuals and student activists in public universities. Student groups 
in major universities were inspired by protests all around the world in the sixties and 
would often have protests in solidarity.  Using the language of socialism, Z.A. Bhutto 
(the main leader of the movement) – with his party slogan of “Roti, kapra, aur makan” 
(Bread, clothing, and shelter) – “tuned into the discontent of the growing number of 
working-class people disenchanted with the elitist politics and policies of the Ayub 
regime” (Siddiqa 2007b: 76). People supported Bhutto either because his proposed 
economic policies resonated with them or because they found the ideals of democracy 
inspiring.  
Bhutto’s rule has been described as a “bundle of contradictions” (Khan 2000: 
184). While on the one hand Bhutto travelled to the remotest parts of the country and 
introduced policies to improve the conditions of the most impoverished, nationalized 
banks, industries, and educational institutions, he also at the same time made alliances 
with powerful feudals and landlords. While he rose to power with the help of militant 
labor unions and introduced progressive labor laws, he also penalized workers groups 
that were too critical of him (Khan 2000: 184, Zaidi 2017b). Nonetheless, real wages of 
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workers rose significantly while he was in power (Khan 2000: 184). When it came to 
labor’s demand for higher wages, they received encouragement from the government. 
The government implemented a system of “wage-price packages,” whereby wages were 
linked to prices “through periodic coordinated adjustments in taxes, wage rates, and price 
increases on essential products” (Sayeed 1979:127).While on the one hand he introduced 
some progressive land reforms, on the other hand he also welcomed big landowners into 
his party.  But even though the land reforms were not as successful as the government 
claimed,103  “tenancy reforms for agricultural workers and for landless labour did give 
those cultivating land far greater usufruct and legal rights to the land than they previously 
had” and social programs such as the nationalization of the educational sector, food 
subsidies programs, as well as a “people’s health scheme” which provided free health 
care to all also benefitted many who had previously not had access to such services 
(Weinbaum 1977: 602, Zaidi 2007b). Bhutto and his government are also credited with 
giving Pakistan its first democratic constitution in August 1973, for which it had to make 
“a large, discordant group of nationalists and Islamists to agree to the draft” – not an easy 
task (Zaidi 2007b). 
Probably one of Bhutto’s greatest contributions to Pakistani society was that he 
aroused hope and political consciousness amongst the “common man:” the rural peasant 
and the urban worker (Gilani 2013, Jones 2003, Sayeed 1980). According to Gilani, 
“until 1970, the vast majority of Pakistan’s rural and urban poor were marginalized in 
                                                 
103 “The government had decided that the land resumed from landowners would not receive any 
compensation unlike the Ayub Khan reforms of 1959, and this land was to be distributed free to 
landless tenants. The ceilings for owning land were also cut from 500 acres of irrigated land to 
150 acres in 1972. Although a lot of propaganda was churned out about the success of the 1972 
reforms, the resumed land was far less than was the case in 1959, and only one per cent of the 
landless tenants and small owners benefited from these measures” (Zaidi 2007b). 
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political affairs” (Gilani 2013).  It was only in the 1970 election that this section of the 
society was mobilized and energized by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his People’s Party (ibid). 
His party has been credited with instilling a “new spirit of individual dignity” amongst 
the poor (Qadeer 2006: 29); with the most common praise or criticism (depending on 
whom you ask), being that “Bhutto has emboldened the servants”104 (ibid).  
It was thus no surprise that the composition of the anti-Bhutto agitation that arose 
in 1977—intensifying after the PPP victory in the elections—was very different from the 
anti-Ayub protests of the late sixties. While in the late sixties the country experienced the 
highest levels of labor militancy, despite the fact that well organized trade and labor 
unions were almost non-existent, in 1977 the more than 9,000 unions  were for the most 
part absent from the anti-Bhutto protests (Sayeed 1979:114).105 Under Bhutto’s rule, 
many businesses suffered due to the different nationalization schemes and private 
investment also declined (Sayeed 1979:128). The protests were populated mostly by 
religious parties, conservative sections of the middle class and urban merchants and 
traders (amongst which the religious groups had a strong hold), as well as some 
professional groups like lawyers and some intellectuals who argued that Bhutto had 
abandoned his socialist ideals and become authoritarian (Sayeed 1979:129, Gilani 2013). 
The elite and entrepreneurial classes, according to Hasan (2002) had every reason to 
throw their weight behind the anti-Bhutto alliance:  
The populist political culture promoted by Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party 
(PPP) had seriously undermined the political power of the elite. Bhutto's 
                                                 
104 The term “servants” is used for people who work in other people’s homes as domestic helpers. 
Since labor is so cheap, almost all middle- and upper-class families have some sort of domestic 
help at home. 
105 Probably the only exception was the ’wheel jam’ strike (total transport strike) in April (Sayeed 
1979:114) 
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nationalisation of industry (even of small cotton ginning and rice husking 
units) and education as well as his alliance with the big feudal interests had 
adversely affected the economic and political power of businessmen, traders 
and middlemen. The religious parties and their network of mosques and 
'madrasas' (seminaries) were the backbone of the alliance. In the Bhutto era, 
they had seen the propagation of a state culture, which they felt was 
undermining their authority and promoting what they considered were 'un-
Islamic' values while it was the promotion and protection of Islamic values 
that gave them authority. They were horrified at the increasing 'immorality' 
in society. In the PNA [the anti-Bhutto Pakistan National Alliance], there 
were also socialists and liberal intellectuals who thought that Bhutto had 
betrayed both socialism and democracy and had assumed dictatorial 
powers. Meanwhile, Pakistan's establishment (the army and bureaucracy) 
were on the whole supportive of the PNA. Many of their younger members 
belonged to the new entrepreneur or conservative middle classes, who had 
emerged in the post-Ayub era due to urbanisation, migration of family 
members to the Gulf and fragmentation of landholdings to become 
important players in the political drama of Pakistan (Hasan 2002: 4550). 
 
After Bhutto’s PPP won the 1977 elections in a landslide, protests against Bhutto 
intensified as the PNA alleged rigging by the PPP, eventually leading to a military 
takeover by General Zia and the execution of Bhutto by the military junta in 1979. Zia, 
after taking power, promised general elections within 90 days, but remained in power 
until 1988 when he died in a suspicious plane accident.  Many of Zia’s policies and 
actions continue to affect the country to this day. As Husnain argues, “[t]he current 
weaknesses of the party system are associated with the decline of the PPP and the 
inability of other parties to develop an ideologically based mass appeal” (2008: 145). In 
an effort to diminish PPP’s popularity, the Zia regime initially banned political activity, 
jailed most of PPP’s leadership, then introduced and groomed new politicians to run in 
his non-party basis elections (Hasnain 2008: 145, Siddiqa 2007b: 86, Zain 2010: 92).  
“This was necessary to downplay Bhutto’s fame amongst the working class and other 
dispossessed people, and to undermine populism in the country… Zia sought alternative 
political constituencies and a new breed of politicians who were loyal to the military 
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establishment through introducing the ‘local bodies system’” (Siddiqa 2007b: 86).  This 
“localization of politics” undermined PPP’s national appeal (Hasnain 2008: 145). The 
local body elections that were held on a non-party basis were “designed to serve as a 
political pressure valve and to deflect attention away from the PPP and culminated with 
the national elections in 1985, also held on a non-party basis” (ibid).  Under his rule, 
religious parties gained strength and Islam became a much bigger part of public life, with 
the government introducing certain strict sharia laws. Politicians such as Nawaz Sharif (a 
protégé of Zia) and others were given prominence as an alternative to the PPP. Unlike the 
PPP, these politicians had a stronger base amongst the more conservative sections of the 
urban middle class, especially traders, merchants, business owners and the like.106  
All these restrictions and manipulations have had enduring impacts on political 
parties in the country.  The political party system was not very strong to begin with.  
Since its inception, Pakistan has gone through four democratic or non-military 
interregnums (1947-1958, 1971-1977, 1988-1999, and 2008-to date), which means that in 
its seventy years of existence, political parties have been in power for only about half 
those years. Even during that time, political parties have not been allowed free reign to 
run the country. Between 1951 and 1958 for example, seven prime ministers were 
dismissed but the country only has two Governor Generals and one Commander in Chief 
(Zain 2010: 92). Between 1985 and 1999, all five prime ministers were removed before 
their tenure was over, directly or directly by the military (one of them while Zia was still 
in power). So far, nine legislatures have been dismissed before their tenure was over 
                                                 
106 Over the years, Nawaz Sharif and PMLN (the party he belongs to) have been able to grow out 
of being an establishment party to one that has taken a more serious stance in favor of 
democracy. While this discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation, part of that transition 
(as it relates to the Lawyers’ movement) is discussed in chapter 3.  
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(ibid), leaving only three elected governments to complete their constitutional terms. 
“There is no denying the fact that successive unconstitutional regimes adopted a policy of 
de-politicization of political parties. To de-politicize the associational realms and further 
render political parties irrelevant to the state, successive military regimes came out with 
non-party elections” (ibid). 
This focus on non-party elections and localization of politics by military regimes 
weakened the already not-so-strong political party system and helped encourage 
“beradari based” voting, where people vote more on the basis of caste or kinship.  
“[Public campaigns since 1985] are largely devoid of national issues… Broader issues of 
public policy were overtaken by family and kinship identities. Another aspect of 
localization of politics is found in the institutional mechanisms of the administrative set 
up in district governments. The previous elected local administration was supposedly 
non-party. It reinforced the de-institutionalization of politics, including de-legitimization 
of party politics at the local level” (Zain 2010: 93). This may also explain why, as 
Hasnain’s research on political party performance during 1988-1999 found, most political 
parties in Pakistan have been more concerned with patronage, i.e. providing benefits to 
small or targeted groups of people rather than public goods that benefit the larger public 
(2008: 129). Political parties in Pakistan have always revolved around party leaders—
many of whom treat them as personal properties—with most parties not even holding 
internal elections.107 The period of 1988-1999 was one of political immaturity for the 
main political parties – they at times supported military intervention in order to get rid of 
                                                 
107 Ironically, religious parties are the only ones that have a tradition of holding intra-party 
elections. 
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the party in power, in hopes of winning the next elections.108 To add to that, the constant 
behind the scenes manipulations as well as overthrows of government by the military 
meant that parties did not get a chance to focus on strengthening their internal structures.  
So while people in rural areas, and poorer urbanites, the vote-banks of the 
political parties may have benefitted somewhat from either a reduction in poverty level, 
social programs meant for the poor, or other benefits they may have received as favors 
from their elected officials (such as the construction of a road, a school, or a hospital in 
their area), what the more educated urbanites saw during the 1990s was political parties 
fighting each other and being overthrown by military governments in the name of getting 
rid of corruption and misgovernance. These dynamics of military manipulating politics, 
playing favorites towards certain political parties over others (each with their own 
support base), and creating hindrances for political parties to govern effectively, all 
contributed to the class- and urban-rural divide described above.109 
 
3.2.3 The military’s land-grab policies  
Another factor that may explain the difference in perceptions about the military 
along class and urban-rural lines is the military’s policy of land-grab and how it has had 
different consequences for different sectors of society. Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani 
researcher and military analyst, conducted in depth research into the military’s land-grab 
                                                 
108 The Charter of Democracy signed by 2006 was the first time that the two main political parties 
pledged to work together for democracy, without undermining each other.  
109 While the two main political parties, the PPP and PML-N have matured enough, the 
phenomenon can still be observed with Imran Khan’s younger party (PTI) which, since the 
2008 elections had been asking the military to intervene to get rid of first the “corrupt” PPP 
government, and then the “corrupt” PML-N government. Additionally, Imran Khan has been 
creating instability for the democratically elected governments with the military’s covert, and 
sometimes overt, support with its constant protests and sit-ins lasting weeks and months at a 
time. 
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policies over the years for her investigative book Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military 
Economy (2007). The military uses pre-partition laws such as the Land Acquisition Act 
of 1894 and the Colonization of Land Act of 1912 to take over land  for “public 
purposes” or sell it to its personnel at extremely subsidized rates (Siddiqa 2007b: 181, 
185), thus making it one of the largest landowners in the country (ibid: 174). It controls 
about 12% (11.58 million acres) of the total state land in the country, which is more than 
any other group or institution in the country. The military is “the only state organization 
that has institutionalized the acquisition of state land for distribution amongst the 
members of its fraternity,” a practice streamlined under Zia’s rule (ibid: 175).While other 
institutions also hold land, the military is the only institution that is allowed to convert 
land allocated for official purposes to private use (ibid).  
The military engages in two kinds of land-grabs (described in more detail below): 
land that is allocated to officers and retirees for personal use and land that is used for 
commercial purposes by individuals or the military as an institution. In rural areas, this 
usually translates into farm and forest land being used by current and retired military 
personnel for residential or farming purposes. This may be land that is or is not currently 
under use by others. The land is either given for free or at very subsidized rates. If used 
for farming, the land may be leased to local farmers. When someone loses from such 
arrangements, it usually happens to be poor farmers. In urban areas, unused or squatter 
areas are allocated or sold at very low prices to the military. Huge housing schemes have 
been developed, known as “Defense Housing Societies” in all major cities in the country. 
The land or houses in these areas are then sold off to civilians at very high prices. Again, 
the ones who lose from these arrangements are those who may have been squatting in 
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those areas, and the ones who gain are upper-middle and upper-class civilians who buy 
property in these areas and enjoy the cleaner, well maintained, upscale residential areas 
administered by the Pakistani military.   
 Of all the land that the military controls, almost 60% is in rural areas (Siddiqa 
2007b: 175). Of this land in rural areas, about 1 % is in use by the military for operational 
purposes such as camping grounds and dairy farms et al, 0.5% is controlled by 
subsidiaries of the military (their business ventures),110 and 98.5% of it is owned by 
individual members of the armed forces (ibid) and can be used however they see fit. It is 
important to point out that “no other government department [in Pakistan] has the 
authority to redistribute state land for the benefit of its officials. In the military’s case, 
about 6.8 million acres have been distributed among the officers and non-officer cadre for 
their personal use” (ibid). 
This policy of land-grab has created a lot of resentment especially in rural parts of 
the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. Siddiqa recounts many instances of villagers 
being forcibly evicted from certain areas so the land can be used by the military (2007b: 
191-92, 198-99).  A lot of the times, this is done without proper compensation.  In many 
cases, Siddiqa contends, people are probably scared of resisting and hence they never 
come to fore (ibid). The cases that are known are the ones where people resisted and 
hence caught the eye of the media. One such case was in central Punjab (Okara) in 2001 
where farmers resisted the military’s attempts to change contract terms from share 
cropping (share input and output, plus legal claim over the land along with the owner) to 
paying rent in cash (ibid: 177). Once the conflict erupted, it was uncovered that while the 
                                                 
110 Such as the Army Welfare Trust, Fauji (Army) Foundation, and Bahria (Naval) Foundation. 
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government had leased the land to the military before partition, the lease had expired 
several decades ago and the military has been controlling the land illegally (HRW 2004). 
The conflict turned into a full-fledged movement with the farmers demanding “mulki ya 
maut” (ownership or death). The farmers had to face repression and violence in response 
to their demands and military’s land acquisitions started becoming more obvious.  
In urban areas, this land-grab mostly takes the form of land acquisition for (i) 
official purposes at highly subsidized prices—as for example was the case when the army 
decided to move its headquarters to Islamabad and was sold 1400 acres of “the most 
expensive and exclusive urban real estate in the country” at a price of Rs. 180 per square 
yard as opposed to the market rate of Rs. 110,000-120,000 per square yard (Mir 2005) – 
or for (ii) commercial purposes, in the form of Defense Housing Societies.  “Land is 
acquired at nominal rates from provincial governments, and developed with money taken 
as advance payments for residential and commercial plots from officers. Allotment letters 
are then sold to civilians at several multiples of the price they paid. Thus, some of the 
richest families in the country live in some of the most garish houses in these housing 
colonies” (Husain 2016).  The military has now become one of major players in the urban 
real estate sector. Its housing schemes in the country’s major cities “are highly overpriced 
and attract huge amounts of speculative capital” (Siddiqa 2007b: 185). After September 
11, 2001, many Pakistani expatriates, driven by the fear of discrimination, started 
investing their money in Pakistan, mostly in the real estate and service sectors (Malik 
2010: 107). A lot of this investment went into the safest real estate options, the Defense 
Housing Societies run by the military.  This “convergence between military sponsored 
defence housing projects and expatriate Pakistanis caused a surge in property prices as 
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well as the evolution of ‘gated communities,’ putting more strain on the lower strata of 
the middle class” (ibid).  
It is thus not surprising that the poor farmers in rural areas have more of a bone to 
pick with the military than the more well-to-do urbanites. The military’s land grab in 
rural areas, when it affects others, means loss of agricultural land or livelihood for the 
poor. In urban areas though, when it affects others it means providing upper and upper-
middle class military and non-military families well organized, clean, housing areas or 
loss of housing for slum dwellers as was the case in the squatter colony Qayyumabad (in 
Karachi) when the Defense Housing Authority acquired 30 acres of land that were “set 
aside by the municipal authorities for amenities like power generation, water purification, 
a school and a playing field for the deprived people of this slum” (Husain 2016). 
 
3.2.4 Zia’s Islamization program and other military policies  
After Bhutto’s government was overthrown in the 1977 coup, General Zia-ul-Haq 
started an Islamization campaign, the effects of which the country is still dealing with.  In 
particular, Zia’s Islamization campaign and the ban on student unions and politics on 
college campuses and universities contributed to many middle and upper-middle class 
urbanites losing touch with the rest of the society and/or losing interest in electoral 
politics.  “In 1977, Pakistan's ruling elite was by and large ‘westernised’ … [and official] 
culture was not linked to Islamic dogma or rituals” (Hasan, 2002: 4550). While limited to 
a tiny elite,111 “there were race courses, bars, night clubs, unpersecuted traditional red-
                                                 
111 Hasan defines elite as “the westernised, English-speaking rich and professional classes in 
Pakistan. Almost all of them live in the larger cities and many of them come from the landed 
families” (Hasan, 2002: 4553).  
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light areas; state patronage to music, dance and cinema; and a booming tourist industry, 
both local and international. Pakistan's bureaucrats, army personnel, professionals, upper 
and upper-middle businessmen and entrepreneurs, intellectuals, academia and liberal 
politicians were part and parcel of this culture and participated in everything that it 
offered” (ibid). One of the activists interviewed for this research, an upper-middle class 
self-identified Marxist who was very active in the anti-Ayub movement as a college 
student, reminisced about those times when talking about his college years (late sixties) 
and how things in Pakistan have changed since: 
It was the most open society at that time. In Karachi there were open bars, 
there were disco clubs, there were even striptease in certain restaurants and 
hotels and you could walk in Karachi late at night; even couples used to 
stroll on the beach… or Victoria Road without any fear.112 I was in Karachi 
in 1968. And I saw that myself. And I never saw such a peace and [calm]… 
and a freedom of walking late at night and... doing certain things. Though 
we were not allowed to criticize the dictator, but other things were free. 
 
Zia’s Islamization campaign was able to get rid of all of that and more. Places that 
provided or served as a venue for “western entertainment” were closed down; drinking, 
dance, and many forms of singing were banned. This, according to Hassan (2002), made 
the elite even more segregated from the rest of the population.  They continued with their 
western lifestyles, and the junta was happy to turn a blind eye as long as it was done in 
the confines of their home, gated communities, or private clubs. The junta also rolled 
back many of Bhutto’s policies, which the elites had been opposed to as well (ibid). This 
                                                 
112 In Pakistan, any young heterosexual couple can be stopped by the police and asked to produce 
a marriage certificate. Although it’s not the law, police officers usually use this tactic to make a 
little extra money. When they suspect that a couple may be on a date, they may stop them, ask 
them for a marriage certificate, and if the couple is unable to produce one, threaten to take them 
home to the girl/women’s parents. In order to avoid a difficult and embarrassing situation, most 
people just pay the police off.  
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process continued throughout Zia’s regime (1977-1988) as a result of which, “the 
children of the elite no longer study in state universities. A majority of them enroll for 
their first degrees abroad or study in private universities, which guarantee them a place in 
a foreign academic institution...  [They are] more at home at Hyde Park in London than at 
the Hill Park in Karachi... They have abandoned the city centres and live in increasingly 
posh and isolated ghettos surrounded by armed guards and security systems with their 
own clubs, golf courses, libraries and recreational facilities” (ibid: p. 4551). What this did 
is that it made the educated, upper and upper middle class people with western lifestyles 
lose touch with the lifestyles and the realities of the rest of the society. Not only were 
they comfortable living in their own segregated communities, they also lost touch with 
why politics and politicians mean more to people less privileged than themselves. 
Apart from banning many forms of entertainment and destroying the arts in the 
country, General Zia also brutally crushed any resistance and got rid of any means that 
people may have had for organizing. Student Unions, for example, were banned from 
colleges and universities and the only groups that were allowed to exist were Islamist 
groups or those formed along ethnic lines. The military cultivated “extremely orthodox 
religious leaders and their followers who support[ed] the government's decision to assign 
the highest priority to Islamization and favor[ed] the employment of the resources of the 
state, including civic machinery, to effect the "total and immediate" Islamization of 
society. These religious leaders constantly criticize[d] and condemn[ed] left-of- center 
political groups and describe[d] them as secularists and communists – two of the most 
despised political labels in Pakistan currently. This diverts the attention of several 
political groups from the military government to these orthodox religious leaders, and 
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from the basic political issues to the secondary and noncentral issues played up by these 
ultraright religious leaders” (Rizvi 1984: 544-45). Even though the article just quoted was 
written during Zia’s time, all this stands true to this day in terms of the military’s 
patronage of such groups and how their actions benefit the military.   
During the same time-period, activists who worked for a living were squeezed 
financially. One interviewee, a middle-class life-long activist, active in the anti-Ayub, 
anti-Zia, as well as anti-Musharraf movement described the difficulties that he and his 
fellow activists had to endure during Zia’s time: 
Zia did a very ‘good’ thing, Zia or the army. What he did was that instead 
of murdering them [activists], he killed them by economic means. Keep 
them for six months in jail, for two months... my business was destroyed, 
his [pointing to friend sitting next to him] business was destroyed, our house 
fell, my poultry farm was auctioned... I mean he killed financially. The 
conscious worker, who was a danger to him, who would stand again and 
fight, he got into worrying about his daily meal; there is nothing more 
important than a child's hunger. But, still, people had the courage to fight. 
Someone’s business went bankrupt, somebody else’s land got sold off... 
innumerable people [suffered]… So many people… It was [our] children 
who came and saved the day; [name of friend] here was also saved by his 
children. My sons as well; they became strong, their businesses prospered; 
otherwise we all would have… 
  
Another activist, who belonged to the PPP during Zia’s time and thereafter (but 
recently joined a different party), also described his struggles and lamented the 
depoliticization of Pakistani society:  
It saddens me a lot that our society has been depoliticized especially during 
Zia’s time. A lot of people don’t know about our history. Lots of people ask 
me about my struggle. I tell them I went to prison when I was 22, got out 
when I was 28. So a lot of people, activists of today, don’t know about that 
history. But people from my cohort, from PPP, who were crushed by the 
PPP itself, a lot of them went abroad… they left; the new generation don’t 
know anything about what happened in the 80s, what Zia did. What he did, 
we are bearing the brunt today. Fundamentalism is his doing, madrassahs, 
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weapons, heroin, kalashnikov culture, all his doing, and our society doesn’t 
know much about that. 
 
It must be noted that while the first individual quoted above seemingly belonged 
to the upper middle class and was comfortable conducting the interview in English, the 
other two activists who described their financial hardships as a consequence of their 
activism, both spoke in Urdu. This theme was observed through the course of interviews. 
Other academics for example, who had been active during the sixties, described having 
gone to jail for a few nights at the most, but non-academic activists, party activists, and 
others who were not professionals, seem to have been jailed for longer periods of time 
and experienced more hardships. It could be the case that either the more educated people 
belonging to higher socio-economic strata engaged in activities that were not as risky, or 
that owing to their socio-economic capital they were able to escape harsher treatment at 
the hands of the military.    
As mentioned above, one of the strategies used by Zia to crush opposition was to 
ban student unions. One of the handful of student groups that was allowed to function on 
campuses was the Islamist IJT (the student wing of the Islamist political party, Jamaat-e-
Islami). “Over the years, the IJT earned a reputation for brutally suppressing other 
student political groups” (Vora 2007), especially at the Punjab University (PU) campus. 
Public universities like PU, at the behest of the government, expelled liberal and 
progressive professors and students who tried to organize to resist military rule. Activism 
was gradually “beaten down and a new generation of Pakistanis grew up associating 
student politics with IJT thuggery, something best avoided” (ibid).  
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The more seasoned student activists interviewed, all complained about this 
depolitisization on campuses. “Students have become very de-politicized here. Very, very 
de-politicized… politics is still considered a bad thing,” said one student organizer. She 
continued to explain that “[initially] we didn’t want any political party high-jacking us. 
That was the major point… we thought that the only way to bring students [in to the 
movement would be] … to assure them that this is not a sponsored thing [by any political 
party], this is just us, doing what we’re doing.” A fellow activist, from the same 
university, explained how the handful of student activists on campus “[for quite a while 
now] had been talking about how there was no political atmosphere in the university, no 
political awareness among the students.” One of the issues that this student group took up 
was the restoration of student unions, but they had a hard time getting support from 
fellow students.  
[W]e took up the issue of the student’s union and pushed for it to be 
restored. But again, that’s an issue that students don’t uh, you know, they 
don’t want the student union restored. Most of them don’t because they 
think it’s just going to bring you know, politics back and politics is like a 
dirty word, you know. [To them] it means dealing with other people’s 
vested interests, it’s basically just vested interests and power; it has very 
little to do with actually changing things. 
 
Similarly, a student activist from a private university discussed how “a lot of 
students [in the movement, until] … a few months ago hated politics.” He said that to 
these students, “politics meant something really bad… it's like a swear word now.” 
Another student from the same institution, who had become politically active for the first 
time during the Lawyers’ movement, talked about how he himself never liked politics 
and that “people of [his] generation were jaded with politics.”  
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3.2.5 Class background of military personnel vs. politicians  
Another reason why the more well-to-do Pakistan urban professional class tends 
to prefer the military over politicians is that unlike the politicians—who traditionally 
belong to the landed and industrial elite113—military personnel belong to the professional 
class with whom professional urbanites can relate more easily. This was evident from a 
number of interviews—especially people for whom participation in the Lawyers’ 
movement was the first experience in activism—and expressed most clearly by this 
student activist who had also studied abroad: 
[M]ilitary rulers, when they intervene, they come from a more middle-class 
background… I mean you look at people you socialize with and people in 
the military are like you. I mean, somebody like me, with my socioeconomic 
background, a class fellow of mine could have ended up in the military and 
gone all the way to being a general. But when you look at politics you see 
people who are completely, very rich, either feudals or industrialists.  There 
are a few middle-class people but they are also very rich and they are not 
the movers and shakers within those parties in the sense that, they are not 
the main leaders… [So] I don’t think that this disconnect with politics is 
totally without reason. 
 
Unlike the politicians, the military personnel dress like them, engage in the same 
activities as them, vacation at the same places, and speak like them (a combination of 
English and Urdu or just English). Renowned journalist Pamela Constable writing in 
2001 described how Musharraf had “made himself easy to like… He spoke good English 
and mingled easily with civilians. Although he hailed from a conservative military 
establishment and had been trained as an infantry officer and commando leader, he was 
also the product of a widely traveled, well-read middle-class family. He espoused a 
modern worldview and a moderate interpretation of Islam… To project a non-
                                                 
113 See Zaidi (2004), Cheema et al (2005), Javid (2011), and Chaudhry et al (2013) to read about 
Pakistani politicians’ socio-economic backgrounds. 
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fundamentalist image, he posed with his family holding two small dogs, considered 
unclean by conservative Muslims” (Constable 2001: 21). The more “traditional” 
politicians on the other hand—considered “corrupt and self-serving” by the educated 
urbanites (Obed 2017)—are not fluent in English, own many acres of lands or factories, 
and employ many farmers or workers, and live a lifestyle that is different from the urban 
professional class. While it’s true that the “[m]ilitary establishment is an old ally of the 
professional class providing protection, economic stability, housing, and other services in 
exchange for the social influence wielded by members of this class,” (ibid) the disdain for 
politicians also has “cultural” roots (for the lack of a better word) in the sense that the 
professional urbanites can relate much better with military personnel than with politicians 
and political party workers. A lot of the political party bigwigs for example include big 
landowners who employ lots of workers and most of the political party workers belong to 
the “masses” – i.e. workers, small business owners, etc. in urban areas.   
During the course of conducting interviews for this research, I couldn’t help but 
notice that most of the political party activists and politicians (and these did not include 
the “top” or most well-known politicians) lived in areas that I, as a privileged daughter of 
a university professor, had never had the chance to visit. They were not run-down, ghetto 
style areas, but places like the old inner city of Rawalpindi for example, where people 
had been living in the same family home for a few generations, or offices in market 
places where people belonging to my background would usually not go as they cater to 
people belonging to the lower/lower-middle classes. One of the reasons Imran Khan, 
former cricketer-turned-politician has gained so much popularity amongst the educated 
urban youth is that even though he too is extremely rich, he “speaks their language.” He 
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can speak English just like they can, he’s not a landlord, he may have similar taste in 
music as them (i.e. more westernized as opposed to traditional folk music and the like), 
he’s preoccupied with corruption in politics,114 and he thinks the military can save the 
country from the traditional corrupt politicians.  
Zaidi (2008) uses the term “lifestyle liberalism” to describe the affinity educated, 
well-to-do urbanites feel towards the military (compared to politicians). In his words, in 
choosing to support Musharraf after his coup, “Pakistan's middle classes and elite may 
have privileged social and lifestyle liberalism over the messy business of democracy” 
because “a military dictator who promised lifestyle liberalism with a robust economy 
would somehow be [preferable]… to democracy with its many uncertainties and 
instabilities, not least, the uncertainty of social and lifestyle choices” (Zaidi 2008: 9). 
After all, Musharraf came from an urban, professional middle-class background and “his 
early days in power promised the very principles indicative of his background – a fresh 
start and ‘enlightened moderation’” (Malik 2010: 58). It should be noted that in the 
current discussion, class is being treated more as a cultural concept (Liechty 2003, Ansori 
2009).  
Many analysts and researchers have talked about the support that Musharraf 
received from the liberal sections of society, which tend to be educated, upper-middle 
and upper-class urbanites (Shah 2004, Rashid 2008, Zaidi 2008, Bolognani 2011). Shah 
describes the support that Musharraf received from “liberal sections of Pakistani civil 
society” after his coup, by not just welcoming the coup but also by joining “the regime at 
the highest levels of state” (2004: 358). Similarly, Bolognani writes about the almost 
                                                 
114 Pakistanis with more education and higher income are more likely to view corruption as a 
serious problem in the country (Asia Foundation 2008: 99). 
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non-existent opposition Musharraf got from a handful of civil and human rights activists 
as many “of the Pakistani upper classes [were impressed] with the projection of an 
alleged ‘liberal’ vision” which was maybe most obvious with the highly positive reaction 
from this section of the society to a picture of Musharraf in which he is seen stroking his 
Chihuahuas115 in an interview right after the coup (Bolognani 2011, p. 20). 
Apart from certain sections of society feeling more of an affinity to the military 
based on “cultural” similarities, another factor that contributes to the preference of 
military over politicians is, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the military’s attempts to 
depolitisize Pakistani society, one manifestation of which “is the systematic harping on 
the venality of politics by successive military regimes, which has brought into sharp 
focus the arbitrary division of politics into random degrees of “corruption” and 
“integrity”—integrity being personified by the military, and corruption by political 
leaders” (Shah 2004: 378).  One of the ways this is done is by portraying politicians on 
the state-controlled television as corrupt and evil while military men are portrayed as 
“honest and patriotic” (Shah 2004: 378). Until not too long ago, the state-controlled 
television was the only channel available to the majority of viewers in the country and 
many of the above-mentioned plays were sponsored by the military itself.  One of the 
activists, an undergraduate student—belonging to a well-to-do family—who became 
politicized as a result of the Lawyers’ movement reflected on his own perceptions about 
the military: 
Till class [grade], maybe, like 8th, I was very...I had a very high opinion 
about the Pakistani military. I even applied to join the air force, but because 
of my eyesight I couldn't pass through, which is actually good; I mean, in 
                                                 
115 Traditionally, in Pakistan, dogs are considered “dirty” animals. Having a dog for a pet is a sure 
sign of the owner being liberal and westernized.  
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hindsight it's actually good that I couldn't go there. But till that point I had 
a very good opinion, and that was sustained by these mili naghmas [patriotic 
songs116] and these dramas117 and stuff. But once I started reading about the 
history of the country and what the military has done, you know, in 
Bangladesh, which is not mentioned in most of our textbooks, and you 
know, there are other atrocities, in Baluchistan and other parts, and their 
interference in every political decision, that image has completely reversed. 
So, we do need a strong military, it goes without saying, but it should remain 
within its constitutional limits, and not try to interfere with every decision 
of the country. So now I don't really have such a good opinion about the 
military. 
 
Many of the activists/movement participants interviewed talked about how they 
had supported Musharraf when he initially took power. This retired government official, 
for example—who, never having attended a protest ever before in his life, was very 
active in the movement—talked about why he had initially supported Musharraf: 
[W]hen Musharraf took over, I welcomed it and I supported him because I 
thought he would profit from the experience of his predecessors, military 
dictators and I think he was young and he knew where his predecessors have 
gone wrong, where they have slipped and I remember he used to talk about 
Ataturk, so I supported him and it didn’t took me long, you remember he 
held a referendum [in 2002] like Zia-ul-Haq, that’s when I realized that he’s 
there to stay, he has every intention of perpetuating himself. Then what 
really disillusioned me was his … I thought that eradicating of corruption 
would be given high priority. 
 
When educated people in Pakistan make a positive reference to Ataturk, they are 
usually referring to his attempts to westernize and modernize Turkish society and 
eradicate the role of religion in governance and public life. The interviewee had served 
under previous military governments yet gave Musharraf the benefit of doubt because he 
thought Musharraf would try to reduce corruption in the country.  
                                                 
116 Patriotic songs, aired regularly on TV and radio, are very common in Pakistan. These songs 
sing the praises of Pakistan’s beauty, its strength, the military, and the likes.  
117 TV shows in Pakistan are referred to as “dramas.” 
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Another activist, an ex-PPP member who is now a member of a different, 
much smaller political party, had similar things to say about Musharraf in terms of 
his liberalism and his promises to eradicate corruption: 
[When] Pervaiz Musharraf came… we expected a lot from Pervaiz 
Musharaf that he is a progressive man and liberalism (sic) and he will do a 
change and people will be made accountable, so in the beginning we had a 
lot of hope that he will bring about change but with time we saw that he too 
is going toward dictatorship and the [process of] accountability that he had 
started out with was waning, he was bringing forth a lot of corrupt people 
[to govern] so we stood against him. Overall, we never supported any 
dictatorship, so then I thought this is also a dictatorship [so] I should also 
oppose it. 
 
Yet another activist, a working professional who was new to activism, and had 
also initially supported Musharraf, had this to say about Musharraf: 
[I]f you look back now, from Musharraf, you have not gotten a [single] 
corruption charge against him. I mean, that’s a lot to say for him. Um, why 
I’ve been, I’ve been anti-Musharraf, from, literally from 2006 or 2005, and 
um, and he, that’s a big statement to say that, you can’t lay, can’t put a 
corruption charge on him. 
 
He seemed to go through a lot of pains to justify what went wrong with 
Musharraf: 
Musharraf might have his heart set right in the start but when these leaders 
actually assume bureaucratic positions, what happens is they surround 
themselves with yes men. And when the yes men start applauding them for 
every action and deed they do, they get disconnected from reality.  
Musharraf from the start was very much connected to reality, he could stand 
up and look you in the eye and say this and that, this is wrong, I want to do 
this, and give me some time and I will do it. And people would look at him 
in his eyes and say he means it and he will, we’ll stay with him. And so, that 
commitment faltered along the way and um when, when the famous 9th 
March incident happened in Islamabad, um I think that was when he was 
defending, I think he was stumbling across so many problems and he just 
could not handle it and he ultimately ended up attacking the chief justice. 
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So it was probably a chain of events, being disconnected from what reality 
was that led to him, he was trapped.   
 
Politicians, on the other hand, were characterized in very different terms from 
Musharraf.  For example, when talking about politicians, he constantly referred to all the 
politicians, either individually by name or collectively, as corrupt (“all those corrupt 
leaders that are out there,” for example, as opposed to Musharraf, who “provided a high 
moral ground” to the country). Politicians also did not get the same slack as Musharraf 
did when it came to making mistakes. When talking about the failed assassination attempt 
on Benazir’s life the day she returned to Pakistan,  
[W]hen the bomb blast happened in Karachi… when Benazir arrived on the 
18th of October… [I thought that] if Benazir had died, you would have 
opened a Pandora’s box for the second shaheed (martyr) to have come into 
People’s Party and it would allow these, the corrupt politicians underneath 
Benazir a free reign of power for another 5 to 10 years. And that’s exactly 
how it worked out… Low and behold, two months later, Benazir actually 
dies. And that’s exactly how it played out that the other crooks in the party 
took over and are now enjoying a free reign. So, I think People’s Party, I 
believe, with or without Benazir, was exactly the same. It’s just a ruthless, 
corrupt politician group. 
 
You can observe a similar phenomenon in this interview with an activist 
who had personal experience with advanced Western countries. When he 
mentioned his initial support for Musharraf, he also at length tried to explain what 
went wrong with Musharraf’s rule: 
Musharraf did initially have a 7-point agenda. He did open up the media, he 
did have devolution [as one part of his agenda] which could potentially open 
up some doors for more people to participate in politics at the grassroots 
level, so in that sense what has happened is that, people gave Musharraf a 
blanket welcome, to the extent of being unhealthy, and then they expected 
too much out of him, more than anyone could have delivered realistically. 
Musharraf probably… also overestimated himself, that’s what I think, 
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maybe it’s not true. He took initiatives in several areas… The pattern that 
emerges is that Musharraf would try things, then he would somehow, he 
would run into some snag or whatever, either it was for his survival that he 
got stuck, and he never really, and then later he took big u-turns, like the 
Zardari NRO. And I think in this entire period there was a section of society 
that had initially given him a blanket welcome, and then they thought, wait, 
what’s going on here… slowly people started turning against him, anti-
incumbency factor was also part of it, and then the media and the main 
actors of the civil society, what we call the intelligentsia, people who form 
opinions, what was their role?… [I]nformed critique on any issue was 
missing. 
 
He went on to discuss how the media and intelligentsia had not done their 
job in providing critical analysis of the Musharraf regime, and instead opposed him 
just because he was a dictator. On the state of the economy for example, and the 
critique that the growth that the country experienced was limited to a certain section 
of society, he explained: 
On the economy as well, the main critique was that ‘well, there is growth 
but no distribution,’ and that may be true but there are no specifics about 
how to address the growing disparities, if that was actually the case, and 
Shaukat Aziz [the finance minister imported from abroad] and Musharraf 
would just say that you know ‘the person who was earlier riding a bicycle, 
now rides a motorbike,’ and then it became a data war, and it’s quite 
possible that Musharraf actually believed that the economy has improved… 
I mean, Shaukat Aziz118 must be the one briefing him, right? How does a 
person in Musharraf’s position know that things are not going well? He 
relies on Shaukat Aziz, but what else does he have as a feedback 
mechanism? That’s the media. And if the media only gives rhetoric, won’t 
give specifics, then Shaukat Aziz will say ‘No, no, they didn’t do a survey, 
they are bullshitting; [I’m telling you] the guy who used to ride a bicycle 
now has a motorbike.’ So we need to understand that how discourse in the 
media affects public opinion and how discourse in the media can affect the 
leadership. What I’m saying is speculation about what Musharraf must be 
thinking, but it is important to see that if your criticism is rhetoric based, 
then what do you expect from the leadership to do about… even solid 
criticism is usually not received very well, so when it’s just rhetoric, they’ll 
                                                 
118 Shaukat Aziz, who worked at CitiBank for almost 30 years (eventually as the Executive Vice 
President) before being appointed Finance Minister of Pakistan from 1999-2004 and then Prime 
Minister of the country from 2004-2007. 
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think ‘oh, this is just criticism for the sake of criticism.’… So what was 
lacking was an informed debate about what should happen, and what was 
too much in abundance was that ‘everything is wrong,’ and if you don’t find 
any other reason, then just say ‘I don’t care what Musharraf does, I don’t 
care if he’s doing anything good or bad, he’s a dictator so I don’t give a shit 
what he’s doing, [I’m against him].’ 
 
But while the problems with Musharraf’s rule included the fact that people 
expected too much of him, that he overestimated his own capabilities, that the people he 
chose to run the country with him were misinforming him, and that the media was not 
providing honest, critical analysis of his performance—all factors external to him, the 
politicians are for the most part personally responsible for all the ills that the democratic 
system faces in Pakistan:   
Why is it that we haven’t emerged with a more sustainable and more solid 
democracy? ... One standard answer is—and I have a problem with that 
answer—it’s that the military takes over, and the whole process is stopped 
so the political system doesn’t evolve. And that’s why we’re back to square 
one. And if you let this process go for maybe ten years then maybe things 
will get better. That’s an oversimplification in some ways… [Some people 
say] that the whole problem is the military, so curse the military. Don’t curse 
the politicians as much, or ‘don’t curse them at all, lest the military takes 
over again’ [mocking those who make that argument]. Because if we 
criticize them too much, the military will take over… [but] they 
exaggerate… [and] sometimes even the glaring misdeeds of political parties 
do get covered [up]… [T]he other view [about why democracy has not been 
able to sustain itself] is that the political parties also carry a lot of blame. If 
the system is not functioning properly, if the democratic system becomes a 
circus, which it has in the past, and the problems of governance are as it is, 
are very serious, so it’s very hard for a government  to deliver anyway, but 
if they’re busy really looting the country and they’re being seen that they 
are not even serious about doing any good work and even the basic system 
is not functioning properly, I mean the way there was so much confrontation 
in the 1990s, so those things basically shape the whole edifice of the system.   
 
Commenting further on the group of people he described above, those who 
are against criticizing politicians too much, he said:  
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There’s this whole history of Zia’s period, I mean the generation that’s 
about ten years older than myself. I grew up in the 1990s, but people who 
grew up in the 1980s and belonged to certain families or had certain 
backgrounds where they really saw how bad Zia’s period was, some of those 
people have developed that hangover where they have an extra disliking for 
the military because of what Zia did and they have an extra liking for the 
People’s party. I think some of those people have not overcome that 
hangover. 
 
Another activist, a foreign-educated professional, who described herself as a 
radical leftist and was a more seasoned activist compared to many other interviewees, 
talked about her anger at people in her group—which was formed after the emergency to 
oppose Musharraf—who had initially supported Musharraf and described their reasons 
for doing so as having to do with what was earlier described as life-style liberalism:  
 It was very much an English speaking [group], most of them foreign 
educated people, and they were… liberals who had supported Musharraf 
and we were really angry in ’99, a lot of the NGOs had stood with Musharraf 
and had said we are happy to get rid of Nawaz Sharif because Nawaz Sharif 
was very much a religious right-winger and um, so many of the liberal and 
many of the women groups had stood by Musharraf because… and to me, 
it was really, again, a very short-sighted, myopic viewpoint. Because to me 
a lot of these women were those who were happy to be part of the modern 
so-called Western frame of women who didn’t mind not wearing duppatas 
[the scarves traditionally worn by women in Pakistan] or who wanted to 
hang out in jeans, or whatever.  
 
Younger, newly politicized activists talked about the sense of contentment 
or indifference they and their counterparts felt when Musharraf overthrew Nawaz 
Sharif’s government. It was especially interesting because this was not a question 
that I as the interviewer asked, but many of the interviewees mentioned their 
initial support for Musharraf. Most of them expressed regret at having done so, 
but a handful still tried to explain how things could still have turned out well if 
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only Musharraf had not fired the Chief Justice. This recently politicized activist, a 
working professional who graduated very recently recounted how 
[W]hen Musharraf came to power, especially people from my generation, I 
don't recall anyone expressing any kind of regret at the fact that the Nawaz 
Sharif government had gone. In fact, I was one of the people who supported 
him [Musharraf], like a lot of people. There was no sense that a military 
dictatorship had come to power; that was like an alien concept… on a 
personal level I feel quite ashamed that I supported him in the first place. 
 
Another activist, with a very similar background but slightly older, had something 
very similar to say: 
I remember in 1999 when he [Musharraf] imposed Martial Law or whatever 
it was, no, not Martial Law, you know he came into power, I remember I 
had just started working a few months ago and was at a work dinner. It 
wasn’t taken seriously at all. People were laughing that now we won’t have 
cell phone reception for the next two hours; electricity will not be available 
in many places and stuff like that.119  But there was calm in general and then 
there was this numbness, even though we knew what happened during Zia’s 
time. For me, as someone who has grown up under Zia, there was still some 
confusion: was what just happened [military takeover] right or not? And 
later I felt very guilty for a very long time [for having supported Musharraf]. 
 
What was also interesting was even within people who were, at least at the time 
that the interviews were conducted, very anti-Musharraf, the ones who had initially 
supported Musharraf would use certain language or say things that showed their previous 
biases towards the military. One student activist for example, studying at an elite private 
institute, describing Musharraf’s takeover said that “I was really glad when Nawaz Sharif 
was voted out and, in fact I was pleased that he'd be consigned to Saudi Arabia.” Notice 
the use of the phrase “voted out” in order to explain Musharraf’s illegal coup. Another 
                                                 
119 Military coups or other major events in Pakistan are usually followed by temporarily 
disconnecting phone lines/disabling cell phone coverage/blackout of electronic media by the 
authorities in charge. 
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student activist, from a different private institute, while trying to justify his initial support 
for Musharraf said:  
 [O]ver the past, ah, every time the, previous instances of martial law in 
Pakistan - first by Ayub, then by Zia and then by Musharraf… have been 
supported by the people. So Ayub came when he was popular; when Zia 
came, Bhutto was very unpopular; the majority of the people supported Zia; 
and same with Musharraf; like, people distributed sweets when Musharraf 
came to power. This was the first time when people actually stood up 
against martial law.  
 
Thus, completely leaving out the opposition previous dictators faced in Pakistan. 
But this is a rather common conception in Pakistan. The anti-Ayub and anti-Zia 
movements are not taught in schools or discussed on TV. If you grow up in a middle- or 
upper-middle class family that supports the military or despises politicians, your parents 
may never talk about those movements either, so for many youth who were recently 
politicized, this seemed like the first time there was ever an opposition to a military 
dictatorship in the country.  
It must be noted that all the interviewees quoted above who mentioned their initial 
support for Musharraf belonged to seemingly upper-middle or upper-class families; and 
all except for one preferred giving the interview in English – a mastery of English is 
usually a very good indicator of a person’s class position in Pakistan.  While there were 
definitely activists who spoke in English and said they had not supported Musharraf since 
the beginning—all of whom were either academics, lawyers, people belonging to 
political families, or those who had been active against Ayub, Zia, or both—all the 
interviewees who spoke in Urdu, except for the one quoted above, said they had never 
supported Musharraf. Amongst the latter group, the interviewees were mostly political 
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party workers and activists who had participated in anti-Ayub and /or anti-Zia protests as 
well. 
When it came to discussing politicians, all recently politicized activists—the 
younger professionals and private university students—talked about the “corrupt” 
politicians. When the more seasoned activists criticized politicians, they didn’t normally 
talk about corruption but about misgovernance in general, and a lot of them followed that 
with how inept politicians are still preferable over military rulers.   
One recently politicized young student, already mentioned above, said this about 
politicians: 
Since my family is apolitical and I've sort of been raised to hate all these 
politicians, I didn't really have a good opinion about any politician. The only 
one who I probably had a good opinion about was Imran Khan, but other 
than that I didn't have a good opinion about any of these politicians. I 
thought all of them were corrupt and many of them have had murder cases 
and some of them have been proven as well. I didn't like any of the political 
parties at all, except for maybe Imran Khan's. But, pretty much everything 
else, when I started the movement, I really disliked the politicians, and that's 
pretty common in most Pakistanis and that was one reason they supported 
Musharraf as well. 
 
Another activist said: 
People’s Party I’ve always considered them thoroughly corrupt… Nawaz 
Sharif, I think he is corrupt, um, second time he, the two times he’s been 
proven corrupt, I don’t think third time he’ll be any better.  Um, I don’t 
think people change. Um, they, they probably will not. I, I and they’re 
gearing up, I dread and fear that um, next time around, which will, seems to 
be very soon, that Nawaz Sharif and the Muslim League will come over and 
take over the powers of the country [emphasis mine].  Um, I don’t suspect 
much change in this, but definitely the only difference between People’s 
Party and Muslim League is that, they invest, probably invest a little bit 
more businesses in Pakistan as compared to People’s Party. 
 
The disdain for politicians was also obvious in the views of this interviewee: 
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Now look at the kind of people we have [in power]. I mean Zardari, for 
God's sake, and what's his name...I call them Mickey Mouse and Minnie 
Mouse. Zardari is Mickey Mouse and Gilani is Minnie Mouse. So it's 
Disney World ruling Pakistan. 
 
The sentiments of another interviewee were similar: 
[To succeed] in any struggle… basically [you need] a high moral spirit; a 
high moral ground. Once you have that, you can, you can conquer almost 
half the thing [sic]. This last year [referring to the government that came to 
power in 2008], I give an example, the problem with the country right now 
is when you look at the leaders, ‘oh,’ they say, ‘come on, you can’t have 
this in your, as a leader,’ and you already have a negative setback from the 
start… [and] you lose that high moral ground. Any economic pressure, in 
any economic problem that’s the case, it’s not actually the money that 
counts; it’s actually the high moral ground. So, I think Musharraf provided 
that high moral ground. 
 
A young lawyer, who was very active in the movement said: 
I don’t think any political party has ever run a campaign for anything 
positive, in and out of power; it’s not in our culture maybe. These political 
parties have made it certain that the public is devoid of awareness. People 
came to know what their rights are after this movement, so they started 
speaking up, and God willing, as the movement continues, they will get 
more vision. 
 
It was interesting that even though the movement was sparked by the Chief 
Justice’s defiance to the actions of a military dictator, a lot of the interviewees, when 
discussing the Chief Justice or the judiciary, made comparisons to politicians, not to the 
military.  “[The] independence of judiciary [will allow] the judges to stand up and 
empower them to stand up against the corrupt politicians,” said one activist. Another 
activist, talking about why he liked the Chief Justice, compared his bravery to the corrupt 
politicians, not to the military man or institution who was hindering the independence of 
the judiciary:  
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I think the fact that there was a Chief Justice who took a stand, about whom 
you can say that he was doing some good work, as opposed to political 
parties that come into power and loot the country, they don’t do anything, 
so there’s that difference. 
 
The more seasoned activists on the other hand had a different critique of 
politicians or political parties. This foreign-educated activist belonging to the 
NGO world, described most political parties as “anti-people.” When describing 
the governments of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, she said: 
[T]he so called democratic regime in those days, even though that Nawaz 
Sharif and BB [Benazir Bhutto] were really quite, you know, just terrible, 
but even then, to have a democratic system was better than to have a military 
regime. 
 
Another activist, who had been active in the anti-Zia MRD movement but 
refused to participate in the Lawyers’ movement because, among other reasons, 
he thought that it was very influenced by religious groups, criticized political 
parties for not building their internal structures and then warned against not 
falling into the trap of demonizing politics and politicians for the sake of it: 
Then the fixed ideas on Pakistan's politics - as in everything wrong having 
been done by the army and the politicians being completely blameless, not 
having done a thing [is also not right] … Those who are not running their 
political parties as an institution are themselves responsible for their own 
problems. They themselves don’t want to turn it into a proper institution… 
Actually, when we criticize politicians, we must take care not to fall victim 
to that propaganda which has been generated against politics… that 
propaganda that the martial law governments propagated here, that politics 
is a bad thing and politicians are corrupt but everyone else is good. This is 
what they're saying, in effect… I think that is a very dangerous. 
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This young activist, who was also a member of a small leftist political party 
complained about the reluctance of many other fellow activist to take political parties 
seriously:  
a lot people among us are still uncomfortable with the political parties 
because it's still (thought) that the political culture is dirty... the middle class 
in Pakistan, especially…in fact the urban middle class is still too besotted 
with idealism to bother about how rough and tough you need to be in order 
to survive the real politics. 
 
One of the biggest complaints against politicians and political parties that almost 
all interviewees had was the lack of support for the Lawyers’ movement. Many praised 
the PML-N (Nawaz Sharif’s party) for eventually backing the movement120 and strongly 
criticized the PPP for only giving lip service to the movement. Of all the interviewees, 
only two talked about political party workers (as opposed to leaders) who participated in 
the movement; to everyone else, the party workers were almost invisible. One of them, a 
lawyer who, by virtue of working in the office of one of the most prominent lawyers of 
the movement found himself in the middle of all the action—talked about the sacrifices 
made by party workers, especially those belonging to the PPP:  
What is important to realize is that, what people forget, and lawyers 
generally forget, is the backbone of all five phases of the movement has 
been the political parties. Although...and what people also forget is 
that...about 98% of the people who've been killed have been political 
activists, not lawyers and not a single PML-N activist has been killed. 
Majority of the activists who have been killed are either PPP workers or 
ANP workers. 
 
                                                 
120 Nawaz Sharif had made the issue of reinstatement of judges a part of his 2008 election 
campaign. After the elections, when the ruling PPP party kept delaying fulfilling their promises 
of reinstatement, all PMN(N) federal ministers resigned from their cabinet positions in May 
2008. 
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Needless to say, there were also activists, especially those who had been active in 
the anti-Ayub or anti-Zia movement, some academics, and members of political parties 
(the PPP in particular), who were very critical of the role that the military has played in 
Pakistan’s history. This foreign-educated academic, for example, described the military 
as being the root cause of all the ill’s in Pakistani politics:  
I think this is a central problem of Pakistani politics: the domination of the 
army; the domination of Pakistani society by the army. And it's happened 
in many different ways. I mean, for example, Zia was a very different kind 
of dictator who has completely destroyed Pakistan, by especially 
introducing fundamentalism. Musharraf was a very different kind of 
dictator; he was kind of the anti-Zia in some ways. He very consciously set 
himself up as the kinder, gentler dictator who liked arts and all these other 
things; this enlightened moderation. But the structural problem still 
remains. So yeah, I mean if I had to pick would I rather have Musharraf than 
Zia, of course. But again, a false choice, right? So yeah, I think that's 
absolutely the central problem of Pakistani politics. And, I mean I just kind 
of dream of a day in which the army in Pakistan will be reduced to a normal 
army, like most…I mean most other countries have… But yeah, 
unfortunately we're so far from that. 
 
Another, much older academic, who had been active as a student against Ayub’s 
regime, and now against Musharraf, said that amongst the worst consequences of the 
military’s involvement in Pakistani politics is the 
[H]ogging of resources… [which has resulted in the] impoverishment of 
Pakistani society as a whole… [They] take away resources in so many 
different ways that people could really suffer… [Much] of our under-
development is because of excessive expenditure on the military. But this is 
not just resources for being able to do well in battlefield. All of these, much 
of these resources go into their living very lucratively.  I mean, you just go 
and see how the military retire, military officers, or just the culture in which 
the officers live and then you can… understand where the resources go.  
 
Similarly, this seasoned PPP politician with a lower-middle class background, 
had no qualms criticizing the military’s role in Pakistani politics: 
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Whether you call it good or bad, the gravest consequence [of Ayub’s rule] 
was the separation of East Pakistan [now Bangladesh]. Ayub Khan’s 
Marshall Law and Pakistani Army’s interference is purely responsible for 
the disintegration of Pakistan. Even today, any separatist movements, be it 
Jeay Sindh or Balochistan, the root of all is military dictatorship, be it Ayub, 
Yahya, Zia, or Musharraf. Basically, it’s very simple. The military has its 
own role to play. The military is a respectable institution, because people 
think that they defend our country; if there’s ever such a time, they will 
defend us. But our experience is that Pakistani military has never defended 
us; instead it has strong-armed us into submission, using powers it is given 
for other purposes. They have destroyed the system. You know how people 
say that politicians, politicians are never given a chance to work. They work 
for four years, and the military takes over, they work for two years, and the 
military takes over.  Politicians make mistakes, they need time to learn from 
their mistakes and go through a political process, which is never given to 
them. An army man can never be, ah, if you put a very capable engineer in 
place of an incapable physician, he won’t be a better option just because 
he’s a very capable engineer. The political system would fail even if you 
replace incapable politicians with a capable army. An army has its own 
constitutional role, to defend the nation… If a military man wants to be 
effective politically, he should run for office… To kick out governments by 
using guns is not okay. They get rid of governments, jail people, administer 
lashings… What did they achieve with all the atrocities they enacted? They 
said ‘we are here to fix things.’ What did they fix? Did Pakistan achieve 
anything during their time? ... The military used to be a respected institution, 
but it is now a symbol of hatred everywhere in Pakistan. 
 
3.3 Signs of Class and Urban-Rural Divide within the Movement 
The urban-rural and class-divide described above showed up in the movement in 
several ways. For one, as described above, the participation and sacrifices of the PPP 
activists in the movement (who tend to be lower class workers living in urban areas) was 
invisible to most people interviewed. Additionally, a number of interviewees made 
references to how the PPP pays people to attend Benazir’s rallies (which tend to be huge, 
attended mostly by lower class people), but when talking about the Long March 
organized by the lawyers, they made it a point to mention that no one had paid people to 
join that rally. The starkest comparison was drawn probably by the young English-
speaking professional, who only became politically active after the Lawyers’ movement: 
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[W]hen Benazir came, I know how people were gathered together from the 
countryside by paying them Rs 200, Rs 250, [but during the long march] for 
the first time it happened that ordinary people like aunties [a term usually 
used to refer to middle or upper class women relatively close to your 
mothers age] with their kids participated in a movement, in sort of a 
gathering which was based on principle rather than for any, uh, other than 
any partisan politics. 
 
Another activist, also an English-speaking professional, speaking of the 
Long March, said that: 
[I]f you had seen the way people, you know, moved from Karachi, from one 
end of the country to the other… it was not at all funded by anybody 
(emphasis original), people just went on their own, people just looked after 
their own food needs… people went with children, there were families, 
there were so many people… and that was not a judiciary only thing, it was 
really an anger and people’s feelings pouring out, and it was across all kinds 
of people, it was not necessarily even the political parties, you know. 
 
The lawyer mentioned earlier though, who was in the thick of things, had a 
different opinion: “[At the long march] 60-70% of the people who were mobilized in 
Islamabad were mobilized by the PML-N.” 
Siddiqa, a military analyst and researcher, described this phenomenon of many 
educated middle-class urbanites being surprised at the huge reception awarded to Benazir 
Bhutto upon her return to Pakistan in October - none of the protests during the Lawyers’ 
movement came close to being as big as the reception she got.  Benazir had been living in 
self-imposed exile for years owing to the corruption charges against her and her husband. 
She returned to Pakistan in October 2007 after Musharraf passed an ordinance (the 
National Reconciliation Ordinance or NRO) which granted amnesty to thousands of 
bureaucrats and politicians who were accused of corruption, embezzlement, money 
laundering and other charges during the period of the two states of martial law in 
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Pakistan.  “[P]eople’s reaction to corruption or methods of defining credibility of the 
politicians [in Pakistan] depicts the urban-rural divide,” says Siddiqa (2007).  For the 
people who welcome Bhutto in the streets “corruption does not necessarily have any 
impact on the choices which [they]… eventually make in selecting their leaders in 
elections” (ibid). Corruption and the credibility of the political leadership seems to matter 
more to educated middle class urbanites, most of whom do not vote in elections (ibid). 
She compares this group of educated urbanites to two other groups who have different 
attitudes towards politics. One is people belonging to lower classes but living in urban 
areas. This group of people, according to Siddiqa (2007), “vote depending on how active 
their party of choice and its leaders are in taking them to the polling stations. Many of 
these people are committed to ideological agendas and are diehard supporters of the PPP 
and PML-N.” Then you have the more than 60% of the population living in rural areas 
who are “not bothered with the middle class’s definition of credibility… this voter 
responds to a patronage-based political system in which each party provides facilities and 
rewards to its workers and supporters… This has nothing to do with the villagers’ lack of 
education and more with his sharp perception of socio-political realities… This shouldn’t 
come as a surprise because all powerful groups [including the military and civil 
bureaucracy] provide patronage to their members” (ibid).  Interviews for this research 
were only conducted in urban areas, so I can neither confirm nor deny Siddiqa’s point 
about why rural voters vote, but her observations about the two urban groups she 
mentioned, the diehard party supporters who belong to lower socioeconomic class and 
educated middle class urbanites, with their preoccupation with corruption in politics, 
were definitely observed during the course of this research as well. One of the young 
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activists interviewed, a foreign-educated professional, while talking about the prospects 
of a democratic Pakistan, said: 
[I]f you’re talking about electoral democracy, I don’t know what shape it 
will take here [in Pakistan]. Because when you have an electorate, I mean 
what happens here are not necessarily simply based on the manifesto of the 
party, there are lots of allegiances and alliances and historical factors come 
into play.  Our electorate is also largely illiterate, which also affects how 
you vote.  Lots of such things.  I don’t know that there is a formula for 
implementing a perfect democracy in that sense. 
 
This retired civil servant discussed how many of his friends and colleagues, while 
discussing politics at end do not take any action, and how they shouldn’t expect the 
person who serves them tea to know how to fix things. A lot of attitudes discussed earlier, 
regarding political parties and how the poor don’t know what’s wrong with the country 
are obvious here: 
[F]or the last four years I have retired civil servants, federal secretaries, 
ambassadors, foreign secretaries, they come here at my house every Friday 
and we let our hair down and we discuss everything under the sun. They 
deliver eloquent speeches against the government, criticizing this and that 
but what’s pathetic is that not one of them is prepared to follow it up. There 
is no point in … analyzing the political situation in my drawing room; it 
must be followed up by some action, which they don’t do… They come 
here every Friday. Nobody goes to demonstrate, nobody writes any articles, 
civil servants are a spineless lot. Sometimes I tell them, ‘look! This is your 
country, you don’t expect this man who is serving us tea [almost all upper 
middle- and upper-class people in Pakistan have some form of domestic 
help at home] to know what’s wrong with Pakistan and what is the answer 
to the problem of Pakistan. But you as an educated person and a citizen of 
Pakistan, it is your duty to do what is to be done,’ but they have left it to the 
political parties. It is their job. Political parties’ record is not very 
encouraging. 
 
Another way the urban-rural divide was evident in the movement was in the 
socio-economic status of the participants.  One young student activist from a private 
college, while talking about how they recruited members for their group said: “We 
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wanted the movement to be a fresh movement of basically educated, middle class 
Pakistanis and that's what we were targeting.” One of the activists, a young professional, 
described the membership of his group in these words: “The people in it [the group] are 
from such diverse backgrounds and such influential backgrounds that if you work 
together, they can achieve much more.”  
Another member of the same group said of its membership: 
Most people [in this group], I would say are affluent, they are professionals, 
they are, you know English speaking… which kind of by definition [means 
that they are] not very comfortable in Urdu, and certainly not in any of the 
other [local] languages.  And, generally young, generally young.  
 
Yet another student activist, describing his group’s core membership and 
supporters, said: 
[Their class background] is middle class, I guess, pretty much. And the average 
age would be about 24, 25; so, it's amongst a higher age group. So that's the 
main people who've been active. Then, the most active people are actually high 
school students for us. A lot of them are from the upper middle class or lower 
upper class, if you can call it. 
 
It is interesting though that he described the group’s core membership as 
mostly middle class because the interviewee happens to know that most of those 
people had gone abroad for their undergraduate degrees, which is not something 
that a typical middle-class family can easily afford. At some point during the 
interview, he also discussed how certain group members had to face intimidation 
from the police: 
So, I mean we've had, we've faced intimidation but after a while, you know, 
they’re like these guys aren't going to stop and they can't, they can only 
scare you, they can't really arrest you or keep you in detention because most 
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people are sort of connected with the lawyers and other people, and 
especially given the media presence, it's really hard. So that has sort of given 
confidence to people that even if they protest, nothing bad is going to 
happen to them. 
 
But many people were actually arrested. Being connected to lawyers in Pakistan 
does not provide you much protection. Even lawyers were being arrested. What provides 
you with the kind of sense of security evident here is one’s class status. The activist 
himself, later in the interview talked about how some lawyers and human rights activists 
had initially been arrested: 
If I were an observer, and especially after what happened on 3rd November, 
I haven't expected anybody to come to the streets because everybody who 
was against the State was arrested. A lot of them were put in solitary 
confinements and there were stories of them being tortured, so I wouldn't 
expect an ordinary citizen to risk their life and stuff. 
 
One could at times sense some tension or discomfort along the lines of whether 
someone can speak English fluently or not. Speaking English fluently is often use as a 
marker of a higher social status in Pakistan and can sometimes be the cause of friction 
between individuals or groups.  The seasoned activist mentioned above, who had been 
very active against Zia but decided to not participate in the Lawyers’ movement, and felt 
more comfortable speaking in Urdu, said about the young student activists from the elite 
institutions:   
Just because you are studying in big institutions like LUMS and FAST, it 
does not mean that you know everything. Fine, one can find lots through 
the internet but you need to understand what has already happened. Only 
then can you wage a meaningful struggle.  
 
Another much older activist, who had been active in all three pro-democracy 
movement but did not feel comfortable speaking English, while talking about the 
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depoliticization of campuses and how the tradition of inviting speakers to discuss 
political matters is now dead, said: “[T]he kids at LUMS did it. And from whom nothing 
at all is expected. So, the boys called me to LUMS, although I'm not an entity; I have no 
status in English. [These are] not [just] upper class, [but] super upper-class kids.” 
While he was not talking about it negatively, you can sense the acknowledgement 
of that class-based language difference. Another activist, while talking about intra-group 
differences in the group she belonged to, also acknowledged this language difference but 
said it didn’t cause any problems in the group: 
[T]he class bifurcation, the English-speaking standards, you know, people 
who can speak English get the lead role, come from a particular segment of 
society, get lead roles, and uh the voice and opinion of others is not 
respected. And I can’t say that happened inside [our group]. [Our group] 
was really democratic. I know that there are people inside [our group] who 
don’t speak a word of English or refuse to actually speak English in many 
instances. And they get and have equal space. That to me is very 
encouraging. 
 
Another activist from the same group, said this about younger, newly 
politicized, English-speaking professionals who had just joined the movement: 
Then there are also youngsters in there who have recently joined the 
movement. They are all newcomers. I think many of them have come from 
the US and we were actually very skeptical in the beginning, we were very, 
very skeptical. Because of US backgrounds, we don’t know why they were 
here, what was going on. And everybody was really paranoid. So, but over 
time, that [divide] also has been bridged.  
  
What is interesting though is that the interviewee herself had spent quite a 
few years in the US getting a degree. What was different is that she had spent the 
last few years working with poorer communities in Pakistan and identified more 
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with the radical leftists as opposed to liberals, which most of the younger folks she 
mentioned identified as.  
Other activists too, especially foreign educated English-speaking academics 
from the social sciences and younger professionals familiar with leftist politics, 
some of whom had been politically active even before the movement, also 
acknowledged these differences. One such activist—a foreign-educated 
professional—said:  
This movement, the class character of this movement is very clear, it’s not 
a working-class movement, it’s a middle class, you know professional, the 
professional classes.  So, we found more support amongst the elite, in the 
elite institutions. 
 
This young student activist, familiar with the leftist tradition in Pakistan (which is 
very rare amongst the youth today) because of an older relative, joked about how he was 
so unprepared for participating in the protests, owing to his class background:  
There were two protests on 26th March; but I didn’t go. But then I talked to 
my [older relative], who is a long-time activist, and he said I should 
definitely go, so I went to the later protests, carrying my camera. I didn’t 
want to get hurt so I pretended that I was part of the press. I was such a 
mummy-daddy that I took a First-Aid kit with me. 
 
“Mummy-daddy” is a term used to refer to someone belonging to a rich family 
(usually a boy), who has had a pampered, sheltered, privileged childhood and is largely 
unaware of what’s going on in the country or how the majority of the population lives.  
 
3.4 Self-reflections on the Class Composition of the Movement and its Limitations 
As mentioned above, many of the activists interviewed talked about the 
class composition of the movement, why it was the way it was, and what – if 
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anything – that meant for the movement. One of the activists, an academic, talked 
about how the nature of the movement makes him think that it can’t reach out to 
“ordinary people:” 
 It was never a movement, only a protest; it remains an urban phenomenon, 
confined to urban groups and classes. In that sense it is a significant, positive 
change that has happened and there is hope for possibility of a sustaining, 
supporting, creating hope for a representative form of government and people 
who think in terms of rule of law; improving governance to that degree. But if 
one is thinking in terms of becoming a movement reaching out to ordinary 
citizens, I don’t see much hope for that. 
 
Another activist, a foreign-educated social scientist talked about this issue in 
much detail and seemed to have given it much thought even before the interview:  
The people composed in this core group of [group name] are affluent; 
they’re elite, um, they’re really elite folks. Um, Karachi is… divided, I 
mean, geographically divided between the rich part, which is Clifton, 
Defense, and the rest of the city. Not that rich people don’t live in the rest 
of the city, but I mean… [that side is like], I don’t know, the Beverly Hills, 
or something, of Karachi. And uh, there’s a bridge that you have to cross to 
get from one side to the other. And that bridge, well actually, there’re a 
couple of bridges… so the bridges have become like this really, I mean, you 
know, it’s a huge cultural, psychological, class divide. And one of the things 
that we were always frustrated by, and limited by, was that most of us came 
from one side of the bridge, the rich side of the bridge and most people in 
the group, the most active people in the group, didn’t really know anything 
about the city, and life in the city on the other side. And we wanted to kind 
of, you know, one of the kind of visions was that initially we would, we 
would have flash protests and then people in… other parts of the city would 
copycat and you know, do the same thing, and so this phenomenon would 
spread throughout the city, but that didn’t happen, because we just didn’t 
have those links with, you know, other parts of the city. And we, you know, 
also did not take into account that political action and organizing and 
mobilization, I mean, political action just looks different depending on who 
you are.  
 
She went on to explain why this phenomenon may actually make sense:  
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If you kind of think about tiers of organizing, like one tier you will say that 
people who organize and who are successful in organizing are the people 
who can afford to be, who have the kind of resources to do that. And I think 
that actually does apply to this too, in the case of [group name]. I mean, so 
like, you know, these folks are, you know, they’re rich people. And they 
don’t have to worry about, like basic necessities. So, if there’s an aata 
[flour] shortage in the country, which there was, a desperate one, you know, 
these are the people who are not going to go hungry. 
 
This absence of more working-class people in the movement was also described 
by the lawyer mentioned earlier, explaining how the particular circumstances of the 
movement itself led to this phenomenon. It was interesting though that he was among the 
very few people who talked about it in terms of the participation of political parties – that 
too, portraying a political party in a positive light:  
[During the first phase of the movement, the time when the Chief Justice 
was initially removed and then reinstated], there was a lot of talk about 
[trying to get different unions involved]...but the first phase has also been 
the curse of the Lawyers' Movement because at least we never thought that 
we would get restoration so early and so conclusively (emphasis original). 
I mean it was beyond our expectations. So… the perception among [the 
lawyers] was that they had led the movement and that they were the 
vanguard group in the movement. So, what… the restoration of the Chief 
Justice [in July 2007] does is that it creates this whole narrative... this whole 
discourse in the Lawyers' Movement that this is now a revolutionary 
movement; it will transform Pakistan. On the extreme fringes there are even 
suggestions that it can really replace mobilization by political parties. So... 
this talk about mobilization of various groups does not really occur 
because... it's a very short span in which it happens, March 9th to July 
20th...I mean you're really talking about months. So, I think that's the reason 
why there is no conscious effort which is made. But the main reason why it 
didn't happen is because this kind of mobilization can only be done by 
groups which have linkages with trade unions, with various associations. 
And the only political party which has those linkages is the PPP... and in 
the [later] you have this distancing from the Lawyers' Movement from the 
PPP side. So that's the reason, I think, why these linkage mobilizations did 
not take place.  
 
  182 
Another foreign educated, English-speaking professional described the absence of 
“regular people” in terms of their relationship to the lawyers’ community. Lawyers, in 
general, and the legal system have never enjoyed a very positive image in Pakistan, 
known (rightly or wrongly) as being more interested in minting money off of people 
rather than providing justice: 
You can imagine that lawyers are not the most favored or liked people, 
especially by those who “un kay shakanjay main phans jatay hain, un ko 
rishwat bhee daitay hain, un kay haat zaleel bhee hotay hain” [get caught in 
their trap; they have to pay bribes and face humiliation on their account] 
and so a lot of working people, working class people really don’t like 
lawyers and so… you know when they say this was not a national 
movement, it was a professional movement of the lawyers, that’s right. 
Because the “regular person” would say ‘what’s this, this is not about roti 
kapra [bread and clothing], it’s their own political problem/issue.’ So, they 
supported it, but that’s, they didn’t come out for it. 
 
A student activist belonging to an elite university—who also belonged to a 
small leftist political party—talked about how, over time, he didn’t feel as close to 
the group that he himself helped create because it focused on elite, private colleges 
rather than public ones:  
Soon the [group name], I felt, started becoming centered on private 
institutions and sort of elite institutions, which... I thought was going to be 
problematic, because... I still argue [that]... private institutions cannot be the 
force, the real force that's going to institute any change because we're a very 
small minority. If there's going to be any change, we can certainly help 
through our…some sort of intellectual, financial, other wealth, but the real 
mass that's going to come, it's going to come from the state institutions 
[public colleges and universities]. And that's one of the differences, frankly, 
between this movement and the previous one is that this one was started by 
private university students and that was something that shouldn't have 
continued for very long. I mean I commend those who... I was one of them 
who started it, but I do feel that in order for there to be something more 
meaningful it had to grow into something bigger... that meant linking up 
properly with the state institutions. 
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While this student was one of the very few younger activists who knew about the 
movement of the sixties, older activists who had either participated in that movement or 
were old enough to know about the movement, did all mention the class differences 
between the two movements.  One of the academics mentioned earlier, who had been part 
of the movement of the sixties, said: 
This [movement] is something very different from the 60s. During that time, 
it was an ordinary tongawallah, rickshawallah, [tonga driver, rickshaw 
driver] or a laborer, who would sacrifice their day and participate in the 
protest. Today it’s different, and a different kind of breed that’s 
participating… The success of the 60s movement was that it went out from 
the urban areas into the rural areas. Even today, if PPP has a strong presence 
in the rural areas, it’s an indication of that. None of the other political parties 
have been able to do that. And there is a great opportunity here in that sense. 
 
Another activist, also mentioned above—from a modest background and not 
comfortable speaking in English—who had been very active in all three movements 
described how in the sixties, movement participants of more well-to-do background 
actively made connections with people from the working class and how that, combined 
with the kind of slogans used by the PPP that resonated with working class people, meant 
that the nature of the movement participants was very different from the anti-Musharraf 
movement: 
If they used to start a procession from I-9, there used to be a long line of 
laborers till Fatima Jinnah University [two areas more than 5 miles apart]. 
‘The one who sows the seeds should be the one who eats it,’ ‘the machine 
belongs to he who turns the wheel:’ these were the slogans which motivated 
people. We were behind it. We backbenchers who used to sit and study or 
mix with the laborers... I used to go mix with the laborers, form a study 
circle; Dr. [ ] used to go, Dr. [ ] used to go, even Dr. [ ] used to go [all names 
of university professors]. And there were many other people. That part of 
the intelligentsia which had come from Europe, or that population who was 
well educated in universities here. Well educated, not merely literate. That 
part also influenced the labor class. These people with doctorates would go 
to the laborers’ dwellings; we used to go there and do theatre also, as well 
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as speeches; we'd also help them out in their minor problems, like taking 
someone to the hospital, helping out someone whose kid needs admission 
(in school). All those things came together in Bhutto's People's Party. 
 
These kinds of connections were mentioned by almost all the activists who had 
been active in the sixties. There was nothing comparable to this mentioned by any activist 
in the anti-Musharraf movement though. One of the lawyers mentioned earlier, who was 
not around in the sixties but was very well-read, made a similar comparison:  
The main thing about the Lawyers' Movement is that the class composition 
of the 1960’s movement and the Lawyers' Movement was completely 
different. This was mainly a middle-class movement. And the... late 1960’s 
movement was not mainly a middle-class movement. I mean… I mean in 
1968 – end of 1968, beginning 1969 – even the clerks' organizations in 
Pakistan went on strike. You don't see a single trade union strike in 2007 or 
2008. You don't see a single group mobilization of any community in 2007, 
2008. 
 
Another individual, who was active in the movement of the sixties as a student 
but moved abroad soon afterward, made a similar comparison but with a harsh 
judgement of the anti-Musharraf movement: 
[The anti-Musharraf movement] is a bourgeois movement. I mean these 
were the professional and regular bourgeoisie who wanted to displace, [I 
mean like] in the French Revolution, officeholders used to be aristocrats 
and they used their office, as Pakistani bureaucrats use, for personal profit. 
And the shopkeepers and doctors and lawyers and all those people were left 
out. So, they launched a movement on the back of the common people and 
got rid of aristocracy. But these people [anti-Musharraf] launched a 
movement to dislodge the army. I mean it was a fight within the family… 
Sixties were the heydays of progressive radical movement… Then it 
culminated in the 1968 movement… And after that it has been all the way 
down. Progressive movements and radicals and leftists went down, and neo-
liberals came up. And then of course Soviet Union imploded. The lawyers’ 
movement is a social democratic movement. Our movement was a radical 
leftist movement. There’s an earth of difference. We came from the lower 
classes and these people came from the prosperous, affluent, professional 
class. We appealed to the needs of the people, and these people appeal to 
the needs of office. I mean what difference does it make [whether] Zardari 
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sits there or Musharraf sits there [in government]. So, there's very much of 
a gulf between what was then and what is now. Class background, 
ideological background [was different]. I mean these people do not want to 
demolish the system. We wanted to demolish the system. 
 
 
3.5 Consequences of the Class and Urban-Rural Divide for the Movement 
[The] core organizers in [group name] are from, are affluent and they don’t 
really know, they don’t really know any other social reality.  Which is not 
to say that they’re elitist, right, but that they’re just kind of stuck in their 
class positions… despite the best intentions of everybody in the group, I 
think that it was just impossible for all of us to escape our class position...  
[And that, I think] limited us in terms of our goals in ways I can’t even 
imagine.  
 
This quote from one of the activists speaks to the main argument of this section. It 
is not about whether this movement was ‘better’ or ‘worse’ in terms of its composition 
and goals, compared to previous movements; it is just that the composition of this 
movement affected other aspects of the movement. This section discusses how the 
composition of the movement in terms of class and urbanity affected or was reflected in 
the means of communication, modes of protest, as well as the goals of the movement (in 
particular, the non-lawyers’ section of the movement). 
In the year 2007 Pakistan had an estimated population of 161 million people,121 
35% of whom lived in urban areas and about 56% were 18 years or older of age 
(UNICEF 2008: 7). The literacy rate in 2006 was about 55% (UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics online data). Since we will be discussing activism that happened mostly with 
the use of texts, email, and online social media, it is important to look at how many 
                                                 
121 Given that the 2017 census recorded Pakistan’s population at 207.8 million, 161 million in 
2007 may be an underestimate. Since the country did not hold a census between 1998 and 2007, 
the previous estimates for the years in between may not be very accurate. 
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people have access to these services.  In the year 2007, the number of Mobile cellular 
subscriptions was 38 per hundred people, which went up to 53 in 2008 (World Bank 
Open Data122). In comparison, in the United States these numbers were 82 per 100 in 
2007, 85 in 2008. The statistics regarding internet connectivity are much lower though. In 
the year 2007, the percentage of individuals with access to internet was 7% in Pakistan 
(which remained the same in 2008), compared to 75 and 74% respectively in the United 
States. Although it may be argued that the actual number of people who use the internet 
is a little higher, owing to the availability of internet cafes where one can pay to use a 
computer with internet connection.  
A number of researchers and journalists have discussed the use of the internet by 
activists in this movement (Aslam 2007, Bolognani 2010, Kripalani 2007, Sarwar 2007, 
Yusuf 2009b).  According to Yusuf, “[p]art of the students’ success as an activist body 
stems from their connectivity. Before November 2007, most of these youngsters had 
never met each other and would not have known where to find like-minded students with 
whom they could become politically active” (Yusuf 2009b). This sentiment was 
reiterated by a number of activists interviewed for this research project. One of the young 
professional interviewed, who became politically active for the first time during this 
movement, said: 
I think one also feels in other circumstances that one must do something - 
but I think the difference in this instance was that one found likeminded 
people very quickly; and that's where Facebook, internet, email helped. 
Because before, it also used to be [the case] that you felt outraged but this 
time what happened was that very quickly, [I mean] I still don't know, I still 
don't remember how I ended up, who put my name on the [email] list. I went 
to the [name of café], I met people. And without knowing it, I don't know 
why, how, I mean I don’t recall now how I went to the first meeting and 
                                                 
122 https://data.worldbank.org/  
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from there I met different people. So, I think especially the communication 
thing, it has worked wonders. Because there are so many people that I've 
never met in my life but I know them through their virtual identities. 
 
In the first few days after emergency was declared, there was a government-
imposed blackout on television news, so information wasn’t readily available. 
Newspapers continued to print critical analysis, but Pakistan has a very low readership 
rate123 – most people get their news from TV. According to Yusuf, “mobile service 
providers claim that a record number of SMS messages were exchanged in the five days 
after emergency rule was declared” (2009, p. 13).  Other newspaper reports published in 
the first few days of the emergency (Sarwar 2007, for example), mentioned how the sale 
of satellite dishes skyrocketed in those days—so people could get news from 
international media sources as cable channels were blocked—but within a few days, 
sellers were told they weren’t allowed to sell those anymore (Sarwar 2007). One can 
imagine that it was the more well-to-do people who were buying the satellite dishes.  
Once that option was also unavailable, the internet became the fastest and most reliable 
source of information.  
While lawyers, politicians from the main political parties, party workers, and the 
leading human rights activists were detained by the thousands in the first few days after 
emergency was declared, students and civil society activists came up with innovative 
ideas to show their opposition in ways that significantly reduced the risk of being 
arrested.  As described by a number of reporters and researchers (Aslam 2007, Bolognani 
                                                 
123 According to the Pak Mediacom National Readership Survey (2008), in the year 2007 about 
39% Pakistanis read newspapers at least once a week. English dailies happen to be the most 
critical when it comes to the military, but readership for these papers is much lower. 
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2010, Kripalani 2007, Sarwar 2007, Yusuf 2009b) and the activists interviewed, these 
forms of protest included flash protests, on campus rallies, and taking flowers to deposed 
judges.  Flash protests was the name given to protests where a small number of activists 
showed up at a given venue at an agreed upon time; shouted slogans, unfurled banners, 
handed out flyers and dispersed before the police arrived. The on-campus protests in elite 
institutions like LUMS had the added security that police were not allowed inside the 
campus but the protests were aired live on the internet (Bolognani 2010, Yusuf 2009)124. 
Some online publications and blogs such as Emergency Times, Teeth Maestro, and We 
Oppose Emergency in Pakistan, became the go-to sites for information both locally and 
internationally.  
Once restrictions were eased other protests were held in public areas, some groups 
performed street theater, and others hosted public gatherings with popular cable TV 
political talk-show hosts who were not allowed to air their programs on cable TV. The 
recordings of these shows were posted online and sometimes smuggled to Dubai and 
aired on satellite TV (Aslam 2007).  The main medium used to spread information, as 
described by the interviewees, was emails and SMS (text messages).  As one activist said 
about the group that he belonged to: “I think the entire movement probably gelled at the 
mailing list.” While newly formed student groups also met in person, a lot of the 
organizing happened over email. Emails and SMS’s were used to spread information 
about upcoming protests and other events. A few individuals and groups also took upon 
themselves to keep track of anyone who got arrested and share that information with 
                                                 
124 Bolognani (2011) discussed the negotiations and mutual understanding between the students 
and campus administrators about the student protests. The students were to abide by a strict 
code of conduct and the administration would make sure that the police did not enter the 
campus to intimidate the protesting students and faculty.  
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everyone else. Groups of activists, usually accompanied by a lawyer, would then show up 
at the police station in support.   
Much has been written about the reinvigoration of student politics in Pakistan and 
the use of internet and texts as a means to organize. Manjeet Kripalani, for example, a 
journalist for Newsweek, wrote on November 12th, 2007: 
Pakistan may be under military siege, but its citizens have found a place to 
make themselves heard through the sophisticated use of the Internet. An 
unexpected but robust underground e-resistance movement is under way in 
Pakistan—from blogs, to flash mobs, to e-mails, to streaming video 
broadcasts, to cell-phone multimedia and text messages. Pakistan's student 
community may be made up of young members of the country's elite, but 
they have become a vital addition to the lawyers' democracy movement. 
The students, and Pakistan's independent media—like the Geo, Aaj, and 
ARY television channels—have moved rapidly to the Internet to 
disseminate news and information locally, as much as possible, and to 
galvanize the Pakistani diaspora and international community (Kripalani 
2007). 
Abid Aslam, a journalist for IPS, wrote in the same vein on November 13th, 
2007: 
The keystroke revolt has limited reach in an overwhelmingly poor and 
mostly rural country. Two-thirds of Pakistanis live in the countryside, 
according to official statistics, and fewer than half the country's 160 million 
people can read and write. Only 12 million -- or 7.5 percent -- use the 
Internet. Fewer still are students and not all of these are politically active. 
Even among the politicised, no one has yet claimed that opponents of 
military rule enjoy a monopoly… Even so, the click-and-protest crowd may 
yet prove worrisome to the government precisely because it is a mostly 
urban, high-caste mob. International organisations describe Pakistan's as 
one of the world's most unequal societies. In such a setting, the children of 
privilege and those in a position to aspire to it are not to be dismissed lightly 
(Aslam 2007).   
 
While it is true that no matter how small and how elite the movement may 
be, it can still be important and effective, the question of how these phenomena 
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affect the movement and its goals is nonetheless worthy of asking. It was clear 
during the course of the interviews that the more seasoned activists, especially older 
activists who had participated in previous movements were aware of the limitations 
of this kind of activism that used the internet and text messages as the main 
medium.  One activist—an academic quoted earlier who had also discussed in 
length the dynamics of activism in her city in terms of class—said that “a lot of the 
organizing was done online and in English and so yeah, that totally limited who was 
involved.” Another activist discussed her own unease with the online activism in 
these words: 
[W]hat I just did not like [about our group] was that it was really very much 
a cyberspace kind of a thing. And it has really remained [that way] … 
Maybe I’m an old timer and I don’t understand this kind of thing, although 
I participate [in it], but to me it… excludes a lot of people who either do not 
have the fluency in English or do not have the space or a computer or access 
to that technology, you know. It’s, it’s a new kind of activism which is 
[happening] globally… And maybe we are just more resistant to the idea 
because it’s new and a new form of interacting. I don’t know. 
 
One academic-cum-activist belonging to a small group that had in the past worked 
with people belonging to poorer communities such as farmers or slumdwellers on 
different issues, made a point to differentiate his group in how they spread the word about 
upcoming events:    
[We used] fliers, stickers, posters… And of course, you know, because of, 
some of the types, the elite kids types, their thing was you know, texts and 
emails and all of that. Which of course I’m sure you know, everybody’s 
talked about it so much… but we were mostly fliers. 
 
Another academic who participated in all three pro-democracy movements spoke 
at length about this issue and made comparisons to the anti-Zia movement of the 80s: 
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Writing on walls, [and] board chalking… is a very important, very good, 
useful medium.  [In my younger days] I used to do this very frequently… 
And when this movement… was heating up, we told these younger ones to, 
you know, train themselves, and do this.   They never did.  Not a single day.  
And I remember that in our active days, we used to, you know, chalk up 
almost every wall that was available in the town in one night.  Just go up 
and just do it, organize ourselves and do this, so that everybody gets to know 
of this thing in the morning… [But] on the other hand, these younger people 
made extremely good videos… [But] by doing this Internet thing, they’re 
doing this thing in a different plane… They are young professionals, who 
also participate in this and do this, but do it on a plane which is not available 
to the common people… [The Islamic parties use] wall chalking and other 
things and therefore they are able to connect with the people really… 
During the last years of Musharraf, there wasn’t any curfew, there wasn’t 
any restriction on such protests, and they could easily do it. And when we 
did this (emphasis original), there was so much restrictions that you know, 
anybody getting caught in these things would have been thrown in prison.  
So, you would recall that in the early 80s, in fact in 1980, some of the 
University people were actually arrested, one of them, one of the University 
teachers was arrested for distributing a [pro-democracy ] leaflet [and] was 
tortured, not only here but also in the Lahore Fort125 and he was in prison 
for three years…  And there were two others arrested with him and they 
were all University professors, and they were arrested, and they were 
tortured and they, they served prison sentences.  Even those days we would 
come out, and you know, distribute leaflets, and come out and write slogans 
on walls, it was the kind of resistance that we were trained in… That kind 
of training is missing in young people… and that is worrying, because then 
they do not care about reaching out to the common people, you know.  
Whereas the target should have been to reach out to the common people. 
 
Another activist, who had been very active in the Anti-Ayub movement in 
particular, talked about the outreach work that they used to do, going to working class 
neighborhoods and holding meetings there: “There were actually, you can say the 
meetings at the local levels in mohallah126 committees, and [in other] various places there 
used to gather hundred, two hundred [people].” 
                                                 
125 This is a jail notorious for holding and torturing anti-dictatorship and anti-state politicians and 
activists. 
126 ‘Mohallah’ literally translates into ‘neighborhood’ but is usually used to refer to inner city 
neighborhoods. 
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On the positive side though, the connections that the movement participants had 
built with the burgeoning cable networks, had some very positive consequences for the 
support that the movement received. As this lawyer explained: 
What the media [in Pakistan] did… especially the visual Urdu media, is that 
they created two kinds of narratives among the public imagination. The first 
narrative was that the whole country is mobilized, which, strictly speaking, 
[it] wasn't. Yes, there was immense support for the movement, but the 
country wasn't mobilized. Yes, there were massive mobilizations in certain 
parts of Punjab but you can't talk about the whole country being mobilized 
like in the 1960s... In terms of their camera images, in terms of the language 
they used, they created this narrative [that]... the whole country is up in 
arms… The second thing which it did, and this was critically important for 
the politicians, is that they created a narrative as this being the issue in 
Pakistan (emphasis original) and all other issues being subordinate to this 
issue… You didn't have day and night talk shows about poverty or access 
to justice, but you had day and night talk shows about the judiciary. And 
that… created a certain deception within the public imagination. That 
doesn't take away from the fact that this movement had more or less 
unanimous support among people. But movements are about mobilization, 
not about support. 
 
 
3.5.1 Effects of the Class and Urban-Rural Divides on the Goals of the Movement 
As mentioned earlier, quite a bit has been written about the online activism of the 
anti-Musharraf movement, but not much has been written about how the movement’s 
composition affected the goals of the movement, Bolognani (2010) probably being the 
only exception, although her focus was mainly on the effects of online activism. She 
argues that “this form of mobilisation was mainly led by a social group that had both the 
electronic resources and the vocabulary to do so… [T]he rest of the Nation was quite 
impermeable to the kind of discussions of the rule of law engaged in by the virtual 
participants” (ibid). I argue that both the kind of activism as well as the goals of the 
movement is a result of the particular composition of the movement – an urban, mostly 
upper-middle and upper-class group of people.   
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While it is not surprising at all that the phrase “Rule of Law” and “Independence 
of Judiciary” became the rallying calls for the movement, given that the earlier 
incarnation of the movement was started solely by lawyers, even in its later phases, the 
non-lawyer part of the movement continued to use the same language and did not include 
other broader goals. While some interviewees, for example this activist belonging to a 
small political party, portrayed the (lack of the) “rule of law” as the biggest problem 
facing the country:  
[You] can’t run a country without rule of law. You can’t fight terrorism 
without the rule of law. Without rule of law, you can’t bring discipline in a 
nation. Without rule of law you can’t go after corrupt people. So, I feel 
(emphasis original) that rule of law is the only problem in this country. 
 
Another activist, a middle-aged urban professional, went as far as to say that if we 
had the rule of law and supremacy of the judiciary, even having a dictator rule over the 
country would be fine. The only thing that matters is that the dictator be answerable to 
the courts: 
[If] you’re at a traffic light, and I regrettably admit to doing that, it’s at night 
around 12 or 1 o’clock, if you’re at a traffic light and it’s red, and there’s no 
one in sight, you break the signal [drive on red]. And, and, with a police 
officer standing in the corner, you stop there. You say, ‘no, no, I’ve got to 
stand because I cannot, I, I don’t have extraordinary powers where I can 
drive away, through the cop [meaning get away] … [so] I will stand in line 
until the red light turns green…  So, actually, you need a traffic cop standing 
on [sic] the light to actually enforce good democracy. That is what is 
missing, the bureaucracy is running, running free, doing what it wants, 
wants to break tons of traffic lights, wants to do everything it wants, but the 
traffic cop is not standing on the light. That is what you need.  I think you 
can have any democracy, any form of democracy, presidential, prime 
ministry, any form of democracy, the only thing you need is a traffic cop, 
even to the extent, I would go to the extent of have a martial law, a military 
ruler even run the system, but a military ruler that comes under the judiciary. 
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Others seemed more aware of the fact that for a vast majority of the country, this 
principle may not mean as much. This old-time activist and academic for example, spoke 
at length about why she thought people from working class backgrounds did not join the 
movement: 
[By] and large those who were leading the movement, and the civil society 
which was part of that, because it remains very middle class, a movement 
of educated, middle class, intelligentsia. It was not a movement that had a 
support, although it had the support but could not bring people out in the 
street from rural areas, but if you go to rural areas and talk about whether 
the Chief Justice should be restored, they would say yes. So, to that extent 
it has the support, across the board, but the movement was not in the 
position to bring the ordinary worker from the factory and peasants to come 
out in the streets. Those who did come to the street were lawyers, and the 
educated class, educated middle class, professionals – so it remained very, 
very, a bit of a middle-class sort of movement.  Because the issue is 
something that in a way affects, people feel, the legitimacy, someone who 
is poor feel yes, the judiciary should be independent, but if you say, ‘leave 
your work today to come and protest’, they’re not going to. For example, if 
he’s losing a job, for example PTCL workers, if they are going to privatize 
it, they will come and protest. It was a direct affect. So, in a way they did 
realize that independent judiciary will benefit me, so they supported it, but 
not an immediate issue. So, they gave moral support, but not motivated 
enough to leave out today’s work and go to the demo. So ordinary people, 
poor people, did not become part of the movement. 
 
But many activists stressed how the Rule of Law or Independence of judiciary 
was good for the “ordinary citizen.” This gentleman for example, a veteran of all three 
pro-democracy movements, said: 
Today if any movement emerges in Pakistan, for the rule of law…I say in 
every leaflet of mine that we want an independent judiciary because the 
people of the lower class cannot buy justice. If the judiciary is not 
independent, we will not get justice. We need an independent and strong 
judiciary because only the judiciary can safeguard our rights. 
 
A younger activist, a recently politicized professional, explained why “ordinary 
people” supported the Rule of Law as the movement’s goal: 
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If people stand up for the judiciary it's not because they want to restore the 
judiciary… they were effectively behind the goals of judiciary, the things 
that the judiciary symbolized: rule of law, equality before law, etc., etc. I 
think it was this yearning for those principles which inspired a lot of 
people… It was not a Lawyers' Movement or a pro judiciary movement; it 
was a movement for principles; so that's why ordinary people, who don't 
even know how to go to courts, what are the cases, what's the procedure, 
they just knew they were standing for something much more than that. So, 
it was more of a movement for principles. 
 
He not only argued that the rule of law is more important to poor people, he also 
tried to address some of the arguments that he must have heard or thought about, about 
the ‘rule of law being more of an urban and upper middle-class concern. He said that: 
Maybe it was just restricted to urban areas and people and, because food 
and clothing are more important compared to this thing, but I've seen it with 
my own eyes. I remember I was in Lahore once with a taxi driver; this was 
in summertime, right after Emergency. So, I was asking him these things, 
about Iftikhar Chaudhary. So, he began telling me how once he [the Chief 
Justice] had intervened on behalf of one of his colleagues whose daughter 
didn't get admission in college, they were being asked to give bribes, so he 
took a suo motu127 action. So, he [taxi driver] appreciated it… so what I 
think is that people of the lower strata of life, they're much more conscious 
and they're much more desirous of independence of judiciary rather than 
people in the upper or middle class. So, this...you know the way they say 
that food and clothing is what is needed, I don't buy this argument 
completely. 
 
One of the lawyers, in explaining the movement’s goal, said: “If there is a true 
democratic government in the country that functions according to the aspirations of 
people of Pakistan; that is also rule of law.” Another lawyer had a more personal reason 
for why the rule of law was important to him:  
                                                 
127 The Chief Justice was famous for taking suo motu actions. Suo Motu is Latin for “on its own 
motion” (Collins Dictionary). The term is used for when a court or government agency takes 
action on its own accord rather than in response to the motion or request of an individual or 
group of individuals.  
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The day Iftikhar Chaudhary was removed my immediate reaction was that 
now I will get no relief from the, against the government. So, my initial 
reaction was based on my vested interest, that if independence of the 
judiciary goes, then [since] my main cases are against the government, the 
judges would be too afraid to decide against the government. So that was 
my initial reaction. An independent judiciary is actually very good for 
business. And I think that is the main reasons for mobilization among the 
lawyers. They have a vested interest in an independent judiciary. I mean if 
it's a dependent judiciary then there's no use for lawyers. 
 
But he went on to talk about reforms within the legal system – the only 
interviewee, lawyer or otherwise, to do so:  
I think the potential of this movement, and the language which was used, 
the narrative which was developed about the connection between the 
independence of the judiciary and the rights of the common man, the whole 
notion about public interest litigation, the whole notion about direct justice, 
the whole notion about this institution also being able to give people their 
political, social and economic rights, this narrative has been publicly 
developed by the leadership for the first time. So that has created an 
expectation and a potential that this institution can be used, like in other 
countries, for an enlargement of rights through the court system by the 
common man… [The judiciary] is a very class biased institution... there has 
been a structural disconnect where access to justice only meant access to 
particular classes... [The lawyers], in order to sell their movement, in order 
for propaganda purposes, they use this narrative. But I think there is, there's 
not been a thought process on this narrative, or how it's going to take place. 
Because the lawyers have a vested interest for this project not to develop 
because the lawyers know that their own community is very class based. 
Access to justice is limited to access to a rich lawyer. So, they know that 
head-on dealing with these issues, the main issue is one of legal aid. Legal 
aid means that you basically hit the economic interest of the lawyers. So 
that is why I think there have, there's not been any serious talk about this. 
 
So while most of the interviewees talked about how the “rule of law” and 
“independence of judiciary” was good for the “common man” and that is what the 
movement was pushing for, by asking for the reinstatement of the Chief Justice, this 
lawyer, who was known by many to have put in a lot of thought into the movement talked 
about those would remain mere slogans unless the lawyers worked for reforms within the 
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judicial system. There was nothing intrinsic about the movement that was good for the 
“common man.” What was also interesting is that while most activists who were 
interviewed reiterated some version of “you can’t have a democracy unless you have an 
independent judiciary,” this lawyer, by contrast, said that “the fundamental requirement 
for an independent judiciary is democracy.” 
Another interesting phenomenon, which I believe relates to the particular 
composition of this movement (in terms of class and urbanity) was the insistence of most 
of the groups to boycott the elections that were announced by Musharraf.128 The 
argument was that one could not expect free and fair elections to be held under 
Musharraf, even after he had resigned as army chief. Some political parties, most notably 
the PML-N, initially decided to go along with the Lawyers’ suggestion (even though 
there was disagreement within the movement about this strategy), but since the PPP never 
announced a boycott, PML-N also eventually changed their decision and ran in the 
elections, to the dismay of many activists.  
Given that despite the threat of violence from militant Islamic groups,129 voter 
turnout in the elections was 44% (PILDAT 2013: 34), compared to the previous two 
elections held under democratic governments (35% in 1997 and 40.3% in 1993) (Gallup 
1997: 20), one can imagine that most of the people who usually vote in the elections were 
not convinced by the arguments that elections needed to be boycotted. Additionally, 
many of the activists, who, during the course of the interviews talked about who they 
                                                 
128 Elections were supposed to be held on January 8th, 2008 but were postponed until February 
18th, 2008 after Benazir Bhutto’s assassination. 
129 “The election campaigning was low-keyed because of the threat of terrorism. There were 
several instances of bomb explosions and suicide bombings in January-February 2008 that 
dampened election enthusiasm. There were less big public meetings and rallies or marches” 
(PILDAT 2013: 34) 
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voted for, said they voted for PML-N because of the party’s support for the movement.130  
Some of the activists mentioned that they had never voted before, and/or that had it not 
been for PML-N’s support of the movement, they would not have voted for anyone; 
meaning that active support for the Lawyers’ movement was the deciding factor. Yet, 
when a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in November 2007—a 
few weeks after emergency was declared—asked potential voters “When it comes to 
casting your vote in the next election, which of these issues determine which party you 
will vote for?” 53% chose inflation, followed by 15% unemployment, 9% poverty, 6% 
terrorism, and 4% chose law and order. Only 3% chose the recent declaration of 
emergency and another 3% chose corruption (IRI 2007:13). The same question asked in 
January 2008, a few months after the emergency, got the following results:  55% of the 
respondents chose inflation, 15% chose unemployment, 12% chose terrorism, 6 % each 
poverty and law and order, and only 1% chose corruption (IRI 2008:13).  One could 
argue that the IRI poll may include people who don’t vote, but the percentages are 
comparable to previous exit poll results. Gallup’s 1997 Exit Poll Survey for example 
showed that 31% of the respondents said “Inflation” should be the next government’s 
first priority followed by “Unemployment” (15%).  Ten percent of the respondents chose 
“Accountability” and 8% chose “Corruption.” Inflation and unemployment seem to 
                                                 
130 The PPP and Benazir Bhutto had initially voiced her strong support for the Lawyers’ 
movement, but the general perception was that by the time emergency was declared, she no 
longer strongly supported the movement as a favor to Musharraf for the deal that she had struck 
with him. The details of the deal were not clear. According to some media reports, Benazir had 
been negotiating with the General since the beginning of 2007 in order to get corruption 
charges against herself, her husband and other legislators dropped to be able to return to the 
country; to convince the general to retire from the military before holding elections and reduce 
his presidential powers (Walsh and Black 2007). A lot of the activists interviewed though, said 
that the deal was for her to become prime minister.   
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always top the priorities of voters in Pakistan. This shows the disconnect between the 
demands and preferences of many of those active in the movement and the actual voters.  
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
Shafqat (1990), in an article about the Pakistani political culture, argues that the 
Pakistani political culture is “characterized by disharmony between democratic ideals and 
the autocratic reality on the ground131” (p. 42). He defines political culture as “a set of 
beliefs, attitudes, values and orientations towards political objects [such as political 
parties, various types of elites, social classes, political institutions, etc.] in a given 
political system…  [that] serve as a general frame of reference within which political 
sentiments and activity are formulated, expressed and translated into action. Indeed, 
political culture conveys a strong sense of historical continuity, identifies regularity in 
patterns of political behavior and style of people. In the process, it also permits dissent, 
i.e. encourage differences in political values and orientations without upsetting the 
general frame of reference” (Shafqat 1990, p. 42). 
Just like the Thai urban middle class’ mixed history of sometimes supporting 
democracy and at others supporting a military takeover of democratically elected 
governments, Pakistan seems to follow a similar pattern. While at times the urban middle 
class has either actively supported or been indifferent to military takeovers of 
democratically elected governments (in 1977 against Bhutto, and 1999 against Sharif), 
                                                 
131 “In our view the democratic ideal implies consensus, interpersonal trust, tolerance (religious 
and academic), fraternity, achievement orientation and faith in the principle of competitive 
politics and parliamentary institutions. Autocratic reality, on the other hand, connotes 
centralization, authoritarianism, unity through Islam, suppression of dissent, personalization of 
power and assertion of the power of the military-bureaucratic elites” (Shafqat 1990, p. 42). 
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they have also been the ones who eventually came to the streets (albeit after the military 
had ruled for a long time) to demand an end to the dictatorship (in the late-60s against 
Ayub, the mid-80s against Zia and late-00s against Musharraf). 
This mixed support for democracy in Pakistan is also evident when analyzing the 
World Values Survey results.132 While a majority of the people surveyed in 2012 (85%) 
said that they had “A great deal” or “Quite a lot” of confidence in the armed forces, only 
36% said they had confidence in the government in Islamabad, 30% in Political Parties, 
and 27% in Parliament.133 For each of these institutions, the percentage of people who 
said they had no confidence at all was about 5, 26, 25, and 32% respectively. When asked 
about different types of political systems, 45% said “Having a strong leader who does not 
have to bother with parliament and elections” is a “Very good” or “Fairly good” way of 
governing Pakistan. Almost sixty percent said the same about “Having Army rule” in the 
country. And while all this seems consistent, 76% said “Having a democratic political 
system” is a “Very good” or “Fairly good” system.134 Additionally, when asked whether 
the army taking over when government is incompetent is an essential characteristic of 
democracy, 54% chose between an 8 and a 10, where 1 meant “not at all” and 10 meant 
“an essential characteristic of democracy.” Close to three-quarters (72%) chose between a 
6 and a 10. Similarly, when Gallup conducted a poll in urban areas the day after 
Musharraf’s coup in 1999, 75% of the respondents said they approved the military’s 
                                                 
132 “The World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) is a global network of social 
scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life, led by an 
international team of scholars, with the WVS association and secretariat headquartered in 
Stockholm, Sweden.” The Survey is conducted periodically in about a hundred countries. 
(World Values Survey website)  
133 More people (62.4%) claimed to have more confidence in Banks than in the parliament or 
government! 
134 These questions were asked one at a time which is why the percentages don’t add up to 100%. 
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action, but only one third favored direct military rule, and 60% of the respondents said 
they would prefer holding elections after 2-3 days, not within ninety days135 (Gallup 
Pakistan, 1999). 
Nothing demonstrates this disharmony or contradiction better than this activist—a 
middle-aged, English-speaking professional—explaining his views about military rule in 
Pakistan: 
I think army should not be in power, definitely. But a lot of people say that 
Pakistanis can only be ruled by a stick. That, that notion, even to date stands.  
I mean, when you look at Zardari ruling us, you think, yaar (man), that era 
[Musharraf’s] was better because at least you had some sanity… So, ruling 
by the stick, you can’t necessarily [say], um is a solution but maybe in 
Pakistani culture, in Pakistani society that probably is the only way out.  
 
While on the one hand one can see this disharmony of values (support for 
democracy as well as for military intervention when necessary), I argue in this chapter 
that the class and urban-rural divides that exist in the country lead to people having 
different opinions about voting, politicians, and electoral politics in general. It is mostly 
the poorer sections of rural Pakistan that votes in the elections; the anti-Musharraf 
movement on the other hand was populated mostly by upper middle- and upper-class 
people. While people from these backgrounds have also participated in previous pro-
democracy movements, the almost complete absence of working-class people from the 
current movement sets it apart from previous ones – the streets for the most part, did 
indeed remain silent. The fact that 1) the first people who responded to Musharraf’s 
proclamation of emergency in November 2007 were mostly students belonging to elite 
colleges as well as young professionals – all of whom were most comfortable with social 
                                                 
135 In the past when democratic governments have been toppled, it was promised that elections 
will be held within ninety days. 
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media, 2) that the previous military regime of Zia had destroyed most means and venues 
of political activism so any connections that existed between activists belonging to higher 
classes and the working class were almost nonexistent, 3) and that over time, especially 
owing to certain policies enacted under Zia, the elite have become even more alienated 
from the needs of the “common man;” what initially started as a movement for the “Rule 
of Law,” was not able to widen its goals to include goals that would be more appealing to 
working class people or people living in rural areas. While most of the people supported 
the Lawyers’ movement, the movement demands were not enough for working class 
people to give up their daily wages like they did in the 60s. When it came to participating 
in the movement, it was limited to the more elite sections of the society and diehard 
political party activists. 
Yet, even though the anti-Musharraf movement did not see the kind of broad 
participation as the anti-Ayub movement did, the movement participants were 
nonetheless successful in achieving most of their objectives, which may be partly because 
of the fact that they had the tools to make an impression internationally, and even though 
Musharraf must have known that these are not the people who will be voting in the 
elections, the movement gave the political parties strength to negotiate with Musharraf. 
The conscious efforts of the movement to make connections with and create awareness in 
the international media about what was going on in Pakistan helped put pressure on 
Musharraf to eventually resign. 
It will be interesting to see in coming years whether this movement helped bring 
about any changes in the way people (especially youth) belonging to different class 
backgrounds engage with electoral politics. As mentioned earlier, a lot of the younger 
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activists who belonged to more affluent backgrounds mentioned that they/their families 
usually don’t vote. And while many of them were attracted to Imran Khan because they 
perceived him to be a voice of the middle/upper middle class, quite a few activists also 
mentioned how they may consider voting for Nawaz Sharif because of the principled 
stance he took with regards to the Lawyers’ movement. After the 2008 elections and the 
movements’ and PML-N’s (Sharif’s party) repeated demands to the government to 
reinstate the deposed judges, Sharif’s party decided to withdraw from the cabinet – 
something that has not happened too often in Pakistani history, and even though some 
activists perceived that as politics of self-interest, many other activists said that even 
though they had never liked PML-N or never voted for them in the past, they may 
consider doing so next time as a result. In supporting the movement the way it did after 
the elections, Sharif’s party may have in the process increased its support base in terms of 
their class background. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND, UNLESS… 
 
The 2008 movement created strange alliances, and yet somehow the movement 
succeeded, posing the question of how such disparate groups were able to work together. 
This chapter will discuss the diversity that existed within the movement, in terms of 
ideological leanings, explore some of the alliances or the lack thereof, and look at the 
conflicts that came up as a result.  The main thrust of the movement was the National Bar 
Association (the lawyers), but they were joined by different leftist or left leaning groups 
(The Communist Party of Pakistan, student groups, and other citizen groups), more 
centrist/liberal groups (which consisted mostly of NGOs, student groups, political parties, 
and other citizen groups), as well as conservative Islamic groups (Islamic political parties 
and their student wings), and at different points during the movement, the main political 
parties: PPP and PML-N. 
Chapter two discussed the rather fractured nature of civil society in Pakistan, 
influenced by national and international events as well as years of repression and 
manipulation at the hands of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies, and also to 
some extent by democratically elected governments. This chapter explores how the 
nature of Civil Society may be visible in the pro-democracy movement. While the 
movement started as a Lawyers’ movement for the reinstatement of the Chief Justice 
dismissed by General Musharraf, it gained support amongst many sections of civil 
society. After Musharraf imposed Emergency rule on November 3rd, many civilian 
groups and individuals that until then had been either silent spectators or casual 
participants, became more active. A number of new groups were formed in different 
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cities, and some groups that had been created in the recent past found a raison d’être.  
The movement turned out to be a mixture of all kinds of small groups: a few student 
groups; a few groups formed by a combination of people working in NGOs, academics, 
working professionals, longtime activists, and/or people belonging to small leftist parties; 
political party activists; groups made up of ex-military men; as well as religious groups. 
All of them latched on to the lawyers’ movement – the only group that already had an 
extensive, well-organized, and tested structure (the bar associations) to be able to 
mobilize its members.  
In the past Social Movements were seen as a unified, cohesive unit: a group of 
people coming together for a particular goal/purpose – a group with differences but 
nonetheless somewhat cohesive, sharing a collective identity, and fighting for a common 
goal. More recently, theorists have come up with different formulations of social 
movements with a focus on Alliances and Coalitions, Weak vs. Strong Coalitions, and 
more recently, Frenemies. While the conception of a social movement as a cohesive unit 
definitely does not fit the Lawyers’ movement, it is not clear if the movement fits any of 
the other formulations either.  The movement was populated by people covering the 
whole spectrum of political ideologies, and there was a lot of variation within the goals 
and motives of different groups. The movement seemed like a hodgepodge of groups that 
couldn’t even agree upon the one goal that sparked the whole movement: the 
reinstatement of the Chief Justice. There seemed to be more disagreement about 
movement goals than one would imagine. Different groups seemed to have come together 
to protest and/or continue doing their own thing, but there was nothing that really unified 
them. 
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The one thing that they had in common was that their goals were somehow, 
directly or indirectly, related to the then dictator, General Musharraf. The lawyers hated 
Musharraf because he unlawfully fired the Chief Justice and wanted him reinstated. Some 
people became part of the movement because they were inspired by the lawyers’ 
relentless struggle and/or they perceived the Chief Justice as a good and principled man 
who deserved their support. Others hated the Chief Justice for having supported 
Musharraf when he took power (and other judgments he gave) but were in the movement 
because they saw it as a way to get rid of Musharraf, the dictator. Others hated Musharraf 
because he sided with the United States during the “War on Terror.” Still others hated 
him because he was too liberal and secular and not “Muslim” enough. The stated goal of 
the movement though, was the reinstatement of the Chief Justice, and the slogan was 
“Rule of Law.”  
Some of the social movement literature focuses on how groups within a 
movement or members of a group negotiate their differences, but there didn’t seem to be 
much negotiation in this movement. Intra-group negotiations obviously did take place, 
but not much between groups. All these groups organized their own protests, and 
depending on whom the organizer was, attended protests by other groups as well. The 
one time that they all came together was at protests organized by the lawyers. Relying on 
information received through the interviews, I explore such differences as the times when 
certain people or groups refused to work with each other, for example women’s group 
refusing to work with religious groups because of their beliefs about women’s rights; 
mainstream centrist student groups refusing to work with the radical leftist groups or 
parties because they were too “rigid” in their ideological beliefs; leftist radical groups 
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disagreeing with women’s rights groups for their support of the PPP after Bhutto’s 
assassination; non-lawyers complaining that the lawyers never consulted them or made 
them part of the decision making process, etc. It was also interesting that some of the 
more conservative groups found common ground with radical leftist groups because of 
their anti-Americanism or anti-imperialism. They also both disliked the liberals on the 
same grounds and chided them for what they thought was an overemphasis on the 
problem of increasing Islamic militancy in the region. The liberals complained that the 
radical leftists were ideologically too rigid.  
The chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the social movement 
literature as it relates to coalitions and coalition formation. The social movement 
literature has gone a long way from looking at movements as unified entities with a clear 
Collective Identity, to treating them as more complex and varied, depending on the 
context.  After exploring some of these conceptions, the chapter discusses the diversity, 
internal conflicts and difference in opinions within the movement as well as the rationales 
behind forming alliances with certain groups and not others, based on the accounts of the 
interviewees.  
 
4.1 Social Movements 
While social movements used to be conceived as unified, homogeneous entities 
with a well- defined collective identity, over time this conception came to be challenged 
by many social scientists (Melucci 1988, Meyer, David, and Corrigall-Brown 2005, 
Levitsky 2007, Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Some theorists, while still working 
within the framework that conceptualizes a social movement as a somewhat unified 
  208 
entity, addressed the issue of diversity and its relation to collective identity within social 
movements. Bernstein (2005), for example, discussed unlike movements where the goals 
and grievances are directly related to an identity (for example race or sexual orientation), 
movements that are not based on such identities (environmental movement) still need a 
collective identity. But this identity, rather than being imposed externally, has to be 
constructed internally.  Others who addressed diversity within social movements 
analyzed it in terms of organizations competing against each other for resources including 
funding, activists, media coverage etc. (Zald and McCarthy 1980, Klandermans 1992, 
Benford 1993, Haider-Markel 1997).  Different groups, it has been argued, try to become 
specialized in terms of their ideologies or self-definitions in order to distinguish 
themselves from other groups and are thus in competition with each other (Wilson 1995, 
Haider-Markel 1997).   
Levitsky (2007), on the other hand, suggests that movement identity also has a 
structural dimension, i.e. groups are not just trying to differentiate themselves in terms of 
ideology, but rather focusing on specializing in specific forms of movement activity or 
tasks (Levitsky 2007: 272). According to this model (the niche activism model), “as 
organizations specialize, they develop structural interdependencies that sustain a sense of 
movement identity even in the face of widely diverging ideologies and interests” 
(Levitsky 2007: 282).  Analyzing the GLBT movement in Chicago in an effort to 
understand how movement heterogeneity or organizational diversity “contribute to or 
detract from a sense of solidarity or purpose among movement actors,” she concludes that 
the niche activism model helps produce a unified movement identity (ibid: 271). 
Ghaziani and Bhaldassarri (2011), while still analyzing heterogeneity within social 
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movements, move away from the models that analyze heterogeneity as inherently good or 
bad – what they call the “Coherence camp,” (focusing on how activists overcome 
differences to build collective identities) and the “Incoherence camp” (focusing on 
internal differences, arguing that they are bad for a movement and end up dividing and 
destroying movements). The authors instead focus on the “thin coherence” of 
heterogeneous movements that requires a “cultural anchor” to survive – something that 
keeps the movement united. 
It seems though that much of the literature that focuses on heterogeneity within 
social movements still portrays or conceives of movements as sharing a collective 
identity. Even though theorists disagree on the nature of collective identity (i.e. is it a 
precondition for a movement to start or a process that takes place as a movement 
proceeds?) and the merits of heterogeneity within a movement (i.e. is it a hindrance to the 
process of building a collective identity or does it actually strengthen the collective 
identity?), the focus of theorists dealing with heterogeneity nonetheless seems to be on 
some aspect of collective identity.  Other questions, such as how diverse groups do or do 
not work together and whether diversity undercuts a movement’s ability to achieve its 
goals have until recently not been addressed. Among the few exceptions may be 
McAdam (1982) and Haines (1984), both of whom analyzed the effects of factionalism 
within the civil rights movement, concluding that the more moderate groups benefitted 
from the presence of more radical groups in terms of receiving funds.   
 
4.1.1 Social Movements and Coalitions 
As mentioned earlier, the idea of social movements as a unified or cohesive unit 
slowly gave way to movements being conceived of in terms of alliances and coalitions 
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formed between different groups. So rather than being viewed as “homogeneous social 
entities,” social movements were now defined more in terms of being “comprised of 
multiple formal coalitions, competing for predominance and adherents while 
cooperating—to some extent—on matters of policy” (Meyer, David, and Corrigall-
Brown 2005: 328). Van Dyke and McCammon (2010) similarly described social 
movements as “organizational clusters or coalitional networks” encompassing “varied 
constituencies, ideological perspectives, identities and tactical preferences” brought to the 
movement by different groups as well as tensions that emerge between different groups 
within the movement (p. xii).  
A coalition or alliance is said to occur when two or more groups cooperate in 
order to achieve a common goal. This coalition can be limited to a single event or task or 
be long-term (Tarrow 2005, Levi and Murphy 2006, Van Dyke and McCammon 2010); 
may exist within the same larger movement and across different movements 
(McCammon and Campbell 2006, Gilmore 2008, Obach 2010, Van Dyke and 
McCammon 2010); may encompass conflicts within the movement (McAdam 1999, 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001); and the cooperating groups may have ideologically 
little or a lot in common (Meyer and Whittier 1994, Van Dyke and McCammon 2010, 
Kadivar 2014). According to Pullum (2017), most of the research on coalitions has for 
the most part focused on long-term partnerships (p. 2), and within that body of research, 
much of the focus has been on factors that lead to coalition formation and/or coalition 
success (Guenther 2010: 122). 
Of the body of research focusing on factors that lend themselves to coalition 
formation or coalition success, there seems to be some consensus on what the most 
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important factors are. These include the presence of external threats and opportunities 
(Staggenborg 1986, McCammon and Campbell 2002, Meyer, David, and Corrigall-
Brown 2005, Borland 2010, Guenther 2010, Tattersall 2010, Van Dyke and McCammon 
2010, Van Dyke and Amos 2017); shared or compatible ideologies between cooperating 
groups (Brecher & Costello 1990, Lichterman 1995, Guenther 2010, Van Dyke and 
McCammon 2010, Whittier 2014, Staggenborg 2015), pre-existing ties between groups 
or common group members (Rose 2000, Levi and Murphy 2006, Corrigall-Brown and 
Meyer 2010, Guenther 2010); managing tensions between groups (Meyer, David, and 
Corrigall-Brown 2005: 338) including race and class barriers (Staggenborg 2010: 324-
25); using broad frames to avoid conflict (Pullum 2017: 13); being able to trust coalition 
partners (Pullum 2017: 10); and having a strong relationship with political parties 
(Tattersall 2010).  McCammon and Van Dyke (2010), using qualitative comparative 
analysis, conducted a meta-analysis of existing literature on coalition formation in social 
movements (based on 24 studies) and concluded that “a common set of beliefs, values, 
identities, or even strategic orientations among movement organizations is a circumstance 
that itself is often sufficient to result in an alliance” and that other causal factors “may not 
necessarily be required to prompt collaboration when the groups’ ideological stances are 
reasonably well aligned” (p. 310).  
While many studies have focused on how the presence of a shared ideology 
between groups aids coalition formation (some examples mentioned in the previous 
paragraph), a number of studies also show how the lack of a shared ideology or presence 
of ideological conflicts make coalition work difficult (Barkan 1986, Gerhards & Rucht 
1992, Obach 2004, Staggenborg 2010). Still other studies show that when a coalition is 
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too broad, i.e. it incorporates too broad an array of groups, the coalitions are not as 
successful (Tattersall 2006, Tattersall 2010). At the extreme you have some studies 
concluding the opposite, i.e. diversity of groups is actually good for the coalition (Gelb 
and Shogan 2005, Almeida 2010). Haydu (2012), based on his analysis of the Clean Food 
movement in the late 19th century, warns against exaggerating the importance of a shared 
ideology between groups in order to form a coalition. He shows how the diversity of 
groups within the Clean Food movement which “featured a diverse coalition of groups 
with quite different ways of defining the problem, identifying the relevant actors, and 
balancing political and consumerist tactics… rather than undermining cooperation or 
impeding success, helped to broaden the coalition for pure food and to win passage of the 
1906 Food and Drug Act” (Haydu 2012). Van Dyke and Amos (2017), based on a review 
of the relevant literature, argued that this inconsistency between findings can be 
explained by the fact that “the necessity of a shared ideology, or the degree to which 
organizational ideologies must overlap for collaboration, depends on the structure and 
nature of the coalition. A looser fit between organizations may be sufficient for ad hoc or 
casual alliances… [but for] more intensive coalitions, where participants are working 
closely together, attending meetings, and planning joint events, a greater degree of 
ideological and cultural fit is necessary” (Van Dyke and Amos 2017: 6). 
 
4.1.2 Weak or Casual Coalitions 
This brings us to another body of literature that has focused on what have been 
referred to as Weak, Casual, Broad, or Intentionally Limited coalitions (Guenther 2010, 
Reese, Petit and Meyer 2010, Staggenborg 2010, Haydu 2012, Pullum 2017).  Guenther 
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describes strong coalitions as having formalized organizational ties, overlapping 
organizations, and possibly shared umbrella organizations while weak coalitions have 
few continuous formal ties with probably no umbrella organizations (Guenther 2010: 
123). “When there is little if any organization among partners or little in the way of 
formal agreement, groups may act in ‘coalition’ insofar as they are working toward 
common goals” (Staggenborg 2010: 318). Such coalitions may be characterized by 
multiple understandings of the main problem/issue at hand (as was the case in the Clean 
Food movement described by Haydu 2010) and/or cooperating groups with different 
strategic interests that co-operate in limited, clearly defined ways (such as the coalition 
between education workers and parent-teacher community organization in Idaho 
described by Pullum 2017). 
As Guenther points out, the weakness of such coalitions is usually a condition for 
their success (2010: 135). “Weak coalitions do not require full recognition and discussion 
of identities, ideologies, and goals, and they permit only limited challenges to group 
boundaries. The closer collaboration and tighter communication and understanding 
necessary for strong coalitions would likely yield conflict and highlight difference… Low 
levels of integration permit the coalitions to thrive in coalition environments in which 
differences are rarely explicitly acknowledged or discussed” (ibid). Additionally, loose 
affiliations also translate into information being spread to a wider section of the 
population (Granovetter1973, Reese, Petit, and Meyer 2010). The downside of such 
coalitions though is that they do not allow different groups and activists the opportunity 
to talk, debate and share experiences (Guenther 2010); the movements’ messages have to 
be watered down in order to promote broad-based framing of the goals (Diani 2004, 
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Pullum 2017); and the movements’ goals cannot be as radical as other movements where 
groups are more ideologically similar (Petray 2010). The watering down of messages can 
be a double-edged sword though. While having too ambiguous a narrative has its 
disadvantages, the ambiguity also allows people to shape that narrative to their own 
experiences as they see fit (Polletta 2006), hence potentially increasing the movement 
audience (Haydu 2012).  
 
4.1.3 Frenemies 
While analyzing social movements as coalitions—whether strong, weak, or 
intentionally limited—went a long way in helping understand different kinds of social 
movements, this framework still provides some challenges for analyzing certain kinds of 
movements. McCammon and Van Dyke, for example contend that “[it] almost goes 
without saying that two organizations will not work in coalition with one another unless 
they share at least some common interests and goals, or unless their ideologies or group 
identities align at least to some degree. Rarely do we see coalitions among organizations 
with diametrically opposing views” (2010: 294). Van Dyke and Amos, in a similar vein 
said that “we [obviously] would not expect groups with diametrically opposed goals, 
such as pro- and anti-LGBT rights, to work together” (2017: 5).  Yet that is exactly what 
Nancy Whittier found when she started studying anti-pornography movements in the U.S. 
involving both feminist as well as conservative groups (2014).  
[W]hile anti-pornography feminist and anti-pornography conservative 
movements shared a similar goal—the reduction or elimination of 
pornography—they did not possess the characteristics of a coalition. They 
differed in the ideological and strategic bases for this goal, their ties to elites, 
and the specific legislative and policy changes they supported. Unlike 
coalitions, they did not have preexisting ties, overlapping networks, or 
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compatible collective identities, and they did not develop agreed-upon 
frames or coordinate strategically. They explicitly opposed each other’s 
larger social movements, ideologies, and agendas and did not engage in 
shared collective action. At least around the issue of pornography, however, 
they were not countermovements either. Instead, they interacted 
sporadically because of their similar goal and because this goal drew them 
into the same state contexts. Such groups that are simultaneously friends 
and enemies, known in popular culture by the portmanteau “frenemies,” are 
widely recognized but rarely analyzed systematically. Here, I call them 
collaborative adversarial movements, to call attention to their ongoing 
opposition even as they interact in delimited ways around shared goals 
(Whitter 2014: 176). 
 
This concept of CAMs or Frenemies was further developed in her 2018 study of 
movements against pornography, child sexual abuse, and violence against women, all of 
which involved very diverse groups. The main thrust of the argument is that we need to 
think of movement relationships along two separate dimensions: interaction between 
movements and congruence of ideology and collective identity (Whitter 2014: 177). This 
yields nine different kinds of movement relationships, Frenemies (or CAMs) being the 
one that has not been previously conceptualized (see table below for details). 
 
 Table from Whittier 2018, p. 8 
Table 4.1 Types of Movement Relationships  
 
 
While social movements and even coalitions can be internally diverse with 
organizations with different goals, ideologies, and strategies, they usually do not involve 
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interaction with the “enemy” (Whitter 2014: 178).  Whitter argues that “in order to 
understand frenemies, we need to consider a wider range of social movement dimensions, 
including organizations, leaders, grassroots participation, collective identity, frames, 
specific campaigns, and overall goals. Movements may converge along each dimension 
fully, partially or covertly, or not at all” (Whittier 2018: 8-9). While Coalitions are 
compatible in most of these dimensions, and Opposing movements interact in hardly any 
of these dimension, Frenemies or CAMs interact on fewer dimensions compared to 
coalitions and that too very narrowly (ibid). 
Whitter identifies a few characteristics common in relationships between 
Frenemies. First, given the fact that such relationships “entail contradictory mixtures of 
cooperation and conflict, participants face risks to their reputations as other members of 
their parent movements criticize them for ‘sleeping with the enemy’... Second, frenemy 
relationships rely on hybrid or compromise elements that can appeal to different factions 
in different ways to hold them together. This might be a hybrid frame, a deliberately 
apolitical frame, or a specific, narrow goal… Third, they come together around a single 
issue or specific legislative goals… Fourth, emotional and personal narratives were 
important in cementing all three relationships, providing an authority that transcended 
politics and lent weight to expert knowledge. Fifth, differences in collective identity, 
ideology, networks, and outside movement allies precluded more extensive collaboration 
or institutionalization of the relationships. Frenemies' relationships are by nature partial 
or short-lived or both. Finally, their outcomes must be assessed differently from 
outcomes for coalitions” (Whittier 2018: 198-99). 
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4.2 The Pro-Democracy Movement 
What makes the pro-democracy movement in Pakistan interesting is that it does 
not neatly fit any of the social movement conceptions described above, but rather seems 
to be an amalgamation of different kinds of movements. For example you had a number 
of umbrella groups formed in the major cities that included somewhat diverse groups (for 
example an umbrella group for NGOs, Human Rights Groups, and small leftist parties or 
groups – that sounds like your typical coalition – or a student umbrella group with some 
members who identified as socialists, communists or radical leftists and others who 
belonged to conservative religious groups – that may better fit the description of 
Frenemies), you had some political parties including religious political parties, lots of 
smaller citizen groups, and then of course you had the lawyers who organized via the Bar 
Councils and Associations and formed the backbone of the movement. Some of these 
groups worked together, holding joint meetings and events. Others did not actively work 
together but went to events organized by each other. Some groups, for example Women’s 
Rights groups and religious parties, wouldn’t ever think of cooperating with each other 
(and have in the past been part of opposing movements), nonetheless they came face to 
face on many occasions because they were attending many of the same protests. Others, 
like the lawyers, did a lot of the organizing by themselves, and despite having the respect 
of most other groups, were also chided for refusing to take non-lawyer groups into 
confidence or making them part of the decision-making process. 
In an attempt to explain the nature of the pro-democracy movement, the rest of 
the chapter has been organized as such: using interviews conducted with movement 
activists, I first show the diversity within the movement in terms of ideological leanings 
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and beliefs and opinions regarding the main issues taken up by the movement. I then 
discuss disagreements and disputes that came up in the course of the movement, as 
described by the activists. The next section discusses strategies used to overcome these 
differences and the consequences of these strategies. The chapter ends with some 
concluding remarks.  
 
4.2.1 Diversity of Beliefs and Opinions about Movement Goals 
In his study of the Pure Food movement, Haydu argues that the assumption that 
coalitions need a unifying frame is not necessarily true and that movement goals can be 
interpreted differently by coalition partners (2012).  
One reason that divergent frames may coexist within a coalition is 
organizational: where partners have considerable autonomy and where 
tightly coordinated action is rarely expected, different definitions of 
coalition goals and strategies may do no harm. Another reason… [is that] 
actors can interpret ostensibly common goals and practices in very different 
ways… In the case of pure food [movement], crusading chemists saw the 
issue as a quest for honest representation of food ingredients; progressive 
women saw it as a matter of exercising their responsibility to protect the 
health of their families. These contrasting understandings of pure food 
rarely impeded practical cooperation in pursuit of legislation (Haydu 2012). 
 
That seems to be true for the Pakistani pro-democracy movement of 2007-2008 as 
well. When asked what were the main goals of their group or organization as a member 
of the wider pro-democracy movement, activists provided a range of answers including: 
the restoration of the judiciary (which included all the judges who had either been 
dismissed or refused to take a new oath after emergency was declared); the restoration of 
the Chief Justice; independence of the judiciary; Rule of Law (which was the slogan of 
the Lawyers’ movements); to get rid of Musharraf; to get rid of a dictatorship/bring 
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democracy to the country; constitutionalism; to strengthen the country’s institutions; to 
create a space for progressive politics; to radicalize the discourse within the movement; 
to politicize the student body; to build a leftist party, etc. Even amongst those who said 
that their main goal was to get rid of the dictatorship, while some wanted the dictatorship 
gone because they thought the democratic government that would replace it would be 
better, others were fighting to change it into a different kind of democracy, if that. One 
long-time activist belonging to a leftist group as well as one of the umbrella organizations 
that included other centrist and leftist groups that were not as radical as their own, had 
this to say: 
[We were] trying to push the… tenor of the movement in a direction that 
we… wanted in terms of our [own] politics. So, for example, the primary 
slogan [of the movement] was ‘Go Musharraf, Go.’ We always tried to 
insist that this was not just about this one guy, but about the institution 
[and] the structure of the state… Because we know Musharraf’s going to 
go eventually and some looli-langri jamhooriat (rough translation: half-
baked, quasi-democracy) will be instituted in his place. But that… for us, 
would be just the tip of the iceberg… [We saw] this contradiction within 
the state… that this forever subservient judiciary, for whatever reason, had 
[for the first time] picked a fight with the military…  Our purpose was to 
continue raising issues that would sharpen these contradictions in the 
structure of the state. 
 
So while they were definitely interested in getting rid of the dictatorship, their 
goals were more long-term; they did not expect much in terms of what the movement 
would be able to achieve in the short run but were nonetheless committed to trying to 
broaden the movement so as to make their long-term goals of a different kind of 
democracy more feasible. In trying to define democracy and justifying their participation 
in a movement that was potentially fighting for a kind of democracy that he didn’t really 
agree with, the interviewee said that: 
  220 
[If] we can have a thoroughly capitalist democracy in which economic 
democracy remains something of a distant dream, that’s still progress for 
us.  We don’t even have that… [Even] though I don’t think that constitutes 
democracy. For me it would have to be substantive economic democracy, 
but… I don’t think we’re going to get that without some kind of decisive 
confrontation with the military… So, our point would be to say: let’s at least 
have a real national bourgeoisie; we would benefit [even from that].  We 
don’t even have that, right? [What we have is a] military which is the 
landlord, the capitalists, and the state power all at once. And so who could 
even think of economic democracy [at this point] … Let’s at least [as a start] 
get some sort of meaningful political process instituted. 
 
Similarly, another activist—this one belonging to the student wing of a religious 
political party—also had longer term goals in mind, but with a different kind of 
democracy in mind: 
“[We] are convinced of an Islamic democracy [not a Western democracy] 
… We believe that the people’s mind must be changed; that the people must 
be made aware of what is right and what is wrong… [And then] according 
to their knowledge and intelligence [they] elect… good, religious, pious and 
skilled, competent persons to the Pakistani parliament. If this process is 
allowed to function in Pakistan, then this is Islamic democracy as well as 
the Islamic system of government and Inshallah (God willing) it will be 
successful. But the problem is that in Pakistan, from independence till now, 
for the duration that democracy has existed, it has been in the hands of 
landlords and capitalists… [They] are in control of the politics in Pakistan, 
under the pretense of democracy… [But] we will take advantage of this very 
democracy and send good and pious people, skilled people to Parliament.       
 
When asked to elaborate on what sets Islamic democracy apart from what he called 
“Western democracy,” his definition was clearly different from the previous activists’ 
quoted above. He said that: 
Western democracy is the kind that keeps count; it depends on how many 
people are in favor of a thing being decided on. The will of the maximum 
majority will be you future; your parliament can pass laws on that basis. 
Islamic democracy [on the other hand] says that you begin by electing only 
those people who are skilled, religious persons… And then these very 
people go to the Parliament and will take decisions according to the Quran 
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and Sunnah.136 A Parliament which takes decisions against the Quran and 
Sunnah, even if it has come to be on the basis of democracy, will not be 
known as an Islamic democracy or an Islamic Parliament, rather it will be 
part of a Western democracy. 
 
He then went on to explain that since the parliament under Musharraf had been 
passing laws that, according to him, were un-Islamic, we thus could not consider this an 
Islamic democracy. His opposition was not based on the fact that Musharraf had taken 
power illegally and gotten a parliament elected in completely rigged elections, but rather 
that certain amendments to the constitution made by the current parliament were not 
Islamic. One could then potentially stretch that reasoning to conclude that had the 
parliament under Musharraf passed laws that were Islamic in nature, the activist would 
have not been opposed to the dictator. 
The way in which, for some time now, efforts have been made to amend 
Pakistan's Constitution, there have been efforts to remove the Islamic rules 
or the Islamic articles which have been made part of it. An example of that 
is the Women's Protection Bill137, in which there is no protection for 
women, I believe… But in that an amendment has been made, with regard 
to the Hudood Ordinance [which goes against Islam]. 
 
In a similar vein, you had other activists on the more secular end of the spectrum, 
like this middle-aged professional who had been politically active for a couple of years 
                                                 
136 Defined by Encyclopedia Britannica as “the body of traditional social and legal custom and 
practice of the Islamic community. Along with the Quran (the holy book of Islam) and Hadith 
(recorded sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), it is a major source of Shariah, or Islamic law.” 
137 This law, passed by the National Assembly under Musharraf’s rule, was meant to redo some of 
the provisions of the Hudood Ordinance of 1979, under which rape was a matter covered under 
Islamic law rather than the Pakistani Penal Code. This meant, among other things, that any 
report of rape by a woman would be considered legitimate only if she could produce four male 
pious witnesses, barring which she could be punished for adultery, the punishment for which 
included lashes, amputation, and stoning. The Women’s Protection bill brought rape cases back 
under the Penal Code and created a new set of procedures including forensic and circumstantial 
evidence being allowed as a basis for convictions. Read “Pakistan Moves Toward Altering 
Rape Law” (https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/16/world/asia/16pakistan.html) for more 
details. 
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when the Lawyers’ movement started, who were also okay with a dictator running the 
country, as long as the dictator can be held accountable.  
There are a lot of people who say Pakistanis can only be ruled by a stick. 
That notion, even to date, stands… Ruling by the stick is not necessarily the 
solution but maybe in Pakistani culture, maybe in Pakistani society that is 
probably the only way out but Musharraf, as I said Musharraf was, for eight 
years he sustained himself… because he was a little more connected to 
society, but I don’t know about another army general who might one day 
come up and say ‘I want to rule’, and not necessarily, be as good as 
Musharraf… I think democracy in any form will work, provided you have 
an independent judiciary... I would [even go as far to suggest that it’s okay 
to] have a martial law, a military ruler even, run the system, but a military 
ruler that comes under the judiciary (i.e. is accountable under law). 
 
The above quotes from three different activists provide a picture of how diverse 
movement participants’ views were about “democracy” and what they hoped to achieve 
from this movement. Similarly, in terms of the rhetoric and discourse being used by the 
lawyers (the Rule of Law and Independence of the Judiciary), there were activists who 
completely bought into it and described those or the restoration of the judiciary as the 
main goal. One young student activist, who had also spent some time abroad for his 
education and was part of a newly formed student group said that “getting the judiciary 
[restored was the] … prime goal.”  Another young professional who was recently 
politicized and belonged to an umbrella group, said of the group’s goals that: “our 
platform [was] very simple. It [was] just (for) the supremacy of the Constitution; and if 
you fight for the supremacy of the Constitution then all matters are automatically taken 
care of.”  Another member of a very similar group said that “at the very top of the list of 
[goals was] … the restoration of the judiciary,” but others within the group were not so 
sure. This other member, a foreign educated activist, talked about her concerns about 
what it meant to stand with the judiciary in Pakistan. “To tell you the truth,” she said “to 
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stand with the judiciary was very difficult… In the beginning we were not sure what to 
do… We were ambivalent at that point in time, with respect to the judiciary movement. 
And it was very much an elitist movement to us, to talk about a judiciary in Pakistan 
when the judiciary is actually responsible for much of the misery of the people.” For her 
and her group (which was part of this bigger umbrella group) the decision to join the 
movement was more about resisting Musharraf, given that he was a military dictator, 
rather than supporting the Chief Justice or the judiciary. She talked about how even 
though they weren’t sure initially whether to support the movement or not, they decided 
to do so because “it was one way of weakening Musharraf.” She said, “it was better to 
stand against Musharraf rather than to say, oh well, Chaudhry sahib (Mr. Chaudhry, 
referring to the Chief Justice) is no icon to stand behind.” As one of the lawyers who was 
very active in the movement said, “Reinstating Iftikhar Chaudhry and all that stuff was 
just symbolic… [The real issue] was a frustration of several years of military regime 
because of which people wanted to break free of the oppression and revive a democratic 
setup and bring back constitutionalism.” 
Other activists as well decided to join the movement not necessarily because of 
the judiciary or Chief Justice, but because they opposed Musharraf. The reasons for being 
opposed to Musharraf though were again extremely varied, as was discussed in chapter 3. 
So, while some opposed him because he was a dictator; others didn’t quite mind the fact 
that he was a dictator but didn’t like the fact that he dismissed the Chief Justice either 
because they saw the Chief Justice as an upright person or because they thought that 
Musharraf had finally crossed a line. Still others, especially those belonging to religious 
groups, disliked him because he was too westernized and/or because he sided with the 
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U.S. in its War on Terror. This young student activist, for example, belonging to the 
student wing of a major religious party said that: 
[Since 9/11] the cultural [and social] change that has come about in Pakistan 
was not accepted by the Pakistani nation as a whole… [Basically] with the 
passage of time the policies of the government [were becoming 
unacceptable] …  Musharraf's policies and their effects on the culture of 
Pakistan were such that the religious or Islamic identity of Pakistan has 
changed. Since this campaign [the War on Terror] was largely against 
terrorists, and steps were taken against Mujahideen, placing restrictions on 
mosques, changing the curriculum in Pakistan’s educational system so as to 
exclude the Islamic system of life, [etc]… all these things were 
unacceptable for the Pakistani nation… But there was no such leadership 
that could gather people against General Musharraf and bring them to the 
streets… [Finally, in 2007] Iftikhar Chaudhry appeared in the form of a 
leader to the people, [a savior].   
 
So, while activists belonging to religious groups disliked Musharraf for his 
“Westernized” ways and his role in the U.S. War on Terror, this retired military man—
part of one of the few Ex-military-men groups that emerged during that time—had very 
different reasons for opposing Musharraf. For him it was not so much about Musharraf 
the individual, but about the honor of the military as an institution. He said that: 
We have seen the Army deteriorating right from the time when Ayub Khan 
declared the first Martial Law in 1958… [We] realized that the Army was 
not run on professional basis. The Martial Laws were directly affecting the 
professional capabilities of the Army… [The Generals] were busier in 
politics rather than looking after the Army as a professional Army… To say 
that people from the army have always connived with the ruling Junta is not 
correct. There were only a handful of people who benefited from the coups 
and the Martial Laws and were supporters of it, majority of the army 
disliked it… [In our first meeting of our group] we raised three demands. 
[The first one was that] Musharraf must quit, and [that] he must be tried for 
all the crimes he committed.  
 
For this group, clearly, the highest priority in terms of their demands was the 
dismissal and trial of Musharraf. Just as activists had different understandings of the 
goals of the movement, they also described the movement in many different ways. When 
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asked what they would call this movement, activists described it as: a pro-democracy 
movement; a pro-judiciary movement; an anti-Musharraf movement; a movement to take 
back Pakistan; a pro-human rights movement; a movement for the rule of law; an anti-
dictatorship movement; and Lawyers’ movement.  The most common answers though 
were “pro-judiciary movement” or “anti-Musharraf movement.” A number of activists 
said what while they wished it had been a pro-democracy movement, in most ways it 
didn’t go beyond Musharraf and hence they wouldn’t call it a pro-democracy movement.   
Maybe more surprising than that though is the fact that the person whose actions 
triggered the whole movement and who was held up as the icon of the movement, Chief 
Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, even he did not enjoy anywhere near unanimous support 
within the movement. Even within the lawyers’ community itself, lots of lawyers talked 
about their reservations about the Chief Justice. While there was definitely a lot of 
admiration for the Chief Justice amongst younger and newly politicized activists, and 
many seasoned activists and lawyers praised him for not giving in to Musharraf’s 
intimidation when “asked” to resign, many of them also made it a point to mention the 
Chief Justice’s misdeeds in the past. Many tried to distance themselves from the Chief 
Justice to argue that this movement had nothing to do with the Chief Justice as a person 
but was about the office of the Chief Justice or about the judiciary as an institution. 
One of the activists, for example, who was associated with the NGO world and 
was part of a large umbrella groups said that “[it was very difficult] to stand with the 
judiciary… which had sworn in Musharraf. It was the same judiciary which had really 
ignored the whole Okara thing [referring to the farmers’ movement for land rights against 
the military]. It had passed many of the ordinances [that harmed small farmers], and so 
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for us, it was actually quite hypocritical to talk about [the Chief Justice].” Another 
activist, this one a student who was part of a newly formed student umbrella group but 
had been active even before the movement started, talked about the support that 
Musharraf had received from the Judiciary since taking power. “It was the same Mr. 
Chaudhry,” he said, “who had given Musharraf a right which the Supreme Court itself 
did not have, i.e. [the right] to amend the Constitution. They had also justified [Musharraf 
being able to] rule for three years. So, to say that the character [of the Chief Justice] 
would change suddenly was not accurate.” 
Similar concerns were raised by other interviewees including long-time activists, 
academics, political party activists and lawyers. One lawyer said that “one does not see a 
single critical judgment – critical of the government – by Iftikhar Chaudhry [before 
2006].” Another senior lawyer said that “Prior to March 2007, I was not personally close 
– perhaps even estranged – from Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.”  
Activists, nonetheless, had their own rationales for supporting a movement whose 
main purpose was the reinstatement of a person they did not quite admire. This lawyer for 
example, who had earlier in the interview criticized the Chief Justice for his initial 
support for Musharraf made sure to give a detailed explanation of his reasons for 
seemingly supporting an individual that he otherwise may not: 
If you ask me to rationalize or justify my support for this movement, I would 
give you [two answers] … [One] is that for me individuals are not really 
important; what is important is the political struggle which takes place. So 
even if I have a devil judge supporting a good cause, I would support him. 
Because my reading of history is a sociological reading: structures, conflict, 
play a role. Individuals are basically used in these conflicts and individuals 
have their own vested interests. Like Zardari138 might have his own personal 
vested interest to make a lot of money and to enhance his power, but… he 
can only do that by deepening democracy in Pakistan. The other reason… 
                                                 
138 Zardari, the then president and widower of Benazir Bhutto is notorious for his corruption. 
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[has its roots in] the famous saying: ‘hate the sin, not the sinner.’ We've all 
sinned in the past. Bhutto also sinned in the past. But then you don't 
remember Bhutto in the pre-1965 period.139 You remember him as the 
leader who brought democracy to Pakistan… So, I think that is how 
individual lawyers saw Iftikhar Chaudhry. But then of course there is a 
narrative which is developed; that's different, that's for propaganda 
purposes… But to the credit of Iftikhar Chaudhry, he's apologized for past 
sins. 
 
A longtime pro-democracy activist, who had also spent time in jail for his 
opposition to Zia’s rule, but had refused to join or actively support the Lawyers’ 
movement was not convinced by such arguments though. While explaining his reasons 
for his decision to not be part of the movement, he mentioned one of the judges who had 
been part of the bench that had declared Musharraf’s coup legitimate, giving him three 
years to rule the country and introduce amendments to the constitution. The activist 
mentioned that this judge had still not apologized for that decision and had in fact been 
justifying his actions. “This means that even today he believes that he was right. And the 
Lawyers' Movement says, basically, that [that decision] was wrong. So, I mean what on 
earth are you doing [supporting these judges] ...you should think of what you are doing.” 
 
4.2.2 Disagreements and Disputes within the Movement 
All the activists who were interviewed for this research had tales of conflicts and 
disputes that they observed and/or were a part of during the course of their involvement 
in the movement. The themes that came up repeatedly though included disagreements 
about the issue of Islamic extremism in Pakistan and how to deal with it; conflicts 
between religious groups and women’s rights groups and other secular or leftist groups; 
                                                 
139 Referring to the fact that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, one of the most prominent leaders of the Anti-
Ayub movement, served under a few different official positions under Ayub’s military rule, 
before resigning in 1965.  
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the issue of whether to boycott elections or not, and once held, how to engage with the 
elected government; conflicts or differences based on political ideologies or perceived 
ideologies of others; as well as conflicts or differences that different groups had with 
political parties.  
In terms of the effects of these kinds of disputes and disagreements, there were 
two categories of consequences reported by interviewees. One was in terms of inter-
group conflicts which manifested themselves during protests and rallies. For example 
when women’s rights activists sparred with religious groups when asked by the latter to 
stay quiet during prayer time at a rally; or when religious slogans by religious groups 
were countered by non-religious slogans by leftist-secular groups (challenging the 
country’s identity as a “Muslim” country); or when a leftist-secular group refused to 
listen to a speaker invited to a rally by the organizers (a centrist-secular group) because 
he was known to be sympathetic to religious outfits in the country; and the like. But apart 
from small spats here and there, once or twice ending in a rally lasting less than it would 
have otherwise, such disputes didn’t seem to cause too much trouble. They seem to have 
taken place at rallies and protests where groups that may not otherwise work together 
were forced to share the same space, and seem to have been mostly related to religion, or 
maybe more accurately, mixing religion with politics. 
The other kind of consequence was in terms of in-group discussions.  These seem 
to have been along three themes: (i) the issue of fundamentalism in Pakistan; (ii) 
ideological differences (leftist radicals vs. liberals, liberals vs. religious right, etc); and 
(iii) matters of strategy (whether to boycott elections or not, how to deal with the newly 
elected government, etc). These came about owing to the fact that a lot of the groups 
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operating during that time were umbrella groups encompassing individuals and smaller 
groups with different ideologies. While these umbrella groups were not as broad so as to 
encompass all ideological leanings (for example communists, women’s rights activists, 
and people belonging to religious groups all in the same group), they did have people of 
different ideological leanings (liberals and radical leftists, for example), who disagreed 
with each other substantially on a number of issues.  
At the time that the interviews were conducted, the Pakistani military was 
conducting a military operation against militants in the north western part of the country 
purportedly in an effort to root out extremism. Since the media was not allowed to be 
there, there were a lot of unknowns but nonetheless many people were being displaced as 
a result of those operations. The Taliban within Pakistan were becoming stronger and had 
started taking over small towns and cities in the Swat Valley, in the North of Pakistan. 
The issue of drone strikes by the U.S. was also discussed on the media a lot and suicide 
bombings and other similar violence had escalated in 2007-2009 (the interviews were 
conducted in 2008-2009).  The table below shows the rise in fatalities owing to terrorism 
in the country. It was thus not a surprise that there was a lot of discussion and 
disagreement within the movement on how to deal with the issue of Islamic extremism. 
While many liberals and some leftists supported the military’s operation in the North 
western parts of the country, many leftists and people belonging to the religious right 
strongly opposed the military operations. The fact that these operations were a part of the 
War on Terror started by the U.S. made things a little more complicated. Some leftists 
saw support for these military operations as support for the Pakistani military, the U.S. 
war on terror, or both. Others saw opposition to those operations as support for militancy. 
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Some thought militancy was actually the biggest problem facing the country, others saw 
it as a minor problem, and still others thought it was a made-up problem.  Some of the 
interviewees reported that their groups struggled with things like whether to condemn a 
suicide attack bombing that just took place or not, and if so, did they need to mention the 
U.S. in their statement or not.  Conflicts also arose within groups when members of 
certain groups wanted to organize panels and talks about the negative effects of the 
military’s operations in the North western parts of the countries and condemn the 
Pakistani military.   
 
  Civilians Security 
Force 
Personnel 
Terrorists/Insurgents140 Total 
2000 45 0 0 45 
2001 29 9 0 38 
2002 88 7 44 139 
2003 140 24 25 189 
2004 435 184 244 863 
2005 430 81 137 648 
2006 608 325 538 1471 
2007 1522 597 1479 3598 
2008 2155 654 3906 6715 
2009 2324 991 8389 11704 
Table 4.2 Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 
2000-2008141 
 
Other differences, which, for the lack of a better word, I call ideological 
differences, were those that arose because of differences in people’s understanding of 
politics and history based on their ideological leanings. For example, a lot of liberals and 
                                                 
140 It should be noted that often people belonging to separatist movements in Balochistan and 
other such “anti-state” actors who are killed in illegal raids and operations are termed 
“terrorists/insurgents” by the state, so these numbers may be misleading. 
141 Data from the Institute of Conflict Management’s South Asia Terrorism Portal website 
(http://www.satp.org/Datasheets.aspx?countries=pakistan)  
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newly politicized, more centrist activists complained about how many radical leftists 
always tied every problem and issue back to U.S. imperialism and blamed them of being 
“ideologically rigid.” Radical leftists, on the flip side, complained that liberals and other 
centrists had very simplistic explanations of issues and events. These kinds of differences 
did not seem to cause any major hindrance in their work, except for long debates and 
minor annoyances.  As one activist put it while discussing such differences with other 
members of the group: 
So, we do have these kinds of differences amongst ourselves… [But 
nonetheless] there was this basic trust… I mean I may not like someone 
personally, or certain positions, but I know that that position is because of 
their understanding of the political situation. They are not people who are 
not honest and not committed; who don’t want to bring change. I trust and 
respect them [and] their commitment to change. I think that’s how the group 
remained intact despite [the fact] that a lot of us are not so fond of each 
other (laughs). 
 
In terms of matters of strategy, the two disputes that were mentioned most often 
were on the issues of whether to boycott the elections of 2008 or not, and once elections 
were held and the new government was in power, on how much pressure to put on the 
government in order to get the judges reinstated. Once Musharraf announced elections at 
the end of 2007, many activists and lawyers argued that elections under Musharraf could 
not be free and fair, especially without a free judiciary. Since the then judges had taken 
oath under Musharraf’s new provisional orders after he declared emergency, the 
argument was that they will be loyal to him. The lawyers, as a collective body, had thus 
called for a boycott of the elections. While some political parties paid heed to that call, 
most parties changed course and decided to take part in the elections. Activists who were 
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against the boycott argued that it would be easier to get the judges reinstated once you 
had a democratic government in power. 
The other issue was about how much pressure to put on the newly elected 
government. In the buildup to elections, political parties faced violence at the hand of 
extremist groups and other hurdles, including the assassination of one of the most 
prominent political leaders, Benazir Bhutto, but the polling and counting of votes were 
declared free and fair by election observers. As a result, Benazir’s People’s Party (PPP) 
came to power. Once the government had been established though, some activists 
worried that pressurizing the government too much would give the military another 
chance to destabilize the newly elected government. Other activists whose sympathies lay 
with the PPP and were especially devastated with Benazir’s assassination, thought it was 
not a good time to pressurize the party as it had just been through a lot. For these and 
other reasons, there were a lot of debates and disagreements about what kinds of protests 
and rallies to hold; whether to organize a sit in or not, etc.  
 Although each of the above-mentioned consequences can be discussed at length, 
in the interest of space only the issue of terrorism and militancy is discussed here. It 
should be mentioned that the issue of rising fundamentalism in the country, support or 
opposition to Pakistani military operations in parts of the country especially in Swat 
Valley, the U.S. war on terror, and support or opposition to the Taliban as they waged 
their war against the U.S. in Afghanistan and/or extended their rule within Pakistan were 
all considered intertwined and discussed interchangeably by most activists.  
One foreign-educated academic belonging to one of the umbrella organizations, 
while describing the group’s decision to take up the issue of the military’s operations in 
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parts of Pakistan by holding talks and seminars about the effects of these operations, 
described the opposition they faced from within the group: 
The group seems to have mobilized very, very clearly against the wars in 
the North West Frontier Province, especially all these different army 
operations in Bajour and so on, as well as U.S. attacks in that region. And I 
know that some people aren’t on board with that because they see the 
Taliban as the most, as the biggest threat and believe that… a wholesale 
kind of army operation is part of the answer. And, [I know] it’s a tough issue 
[but]… the group seems to have gone in this direction [of opposing military 
operations] … But I know that some people [within our group] disagree 
with that. 
 
Another foreign-educated activist discussed the same difference in opinions 
within their group as the group, or some members of the group, decided to broaden the 
group’s agenda to include opposition to the military’s operations in the north western part 
of the country and the U.S. War on terror (drone strikes in particular).  She described this 
subset of group members as “those working on (against) the U.S. imperialist agenda.” 
She explained at length why they chose to focus on the U.S war on Terror as the problem 
rather than the issue of fundamentalism in Pakistan.  
There’s still a lot of opposition within [the group] on why are we talking 
about U.S. imperialism, and why don’t we talk about fundamentalism. But 
to me, fundamentalism is really a subset of U.S. imperialism. And it’s not a 
different sphere… Fundamentalism is part of their regime, which was an 
agenda pushed by the U.S. to fight the Soviets. And to reap what we are 
reaping is really the kind of work which our military did in training the 
Mujahideen and setting up the Mujahideen camps and M6 coming in and 
the Americans who had set up their own training camps in those days. So 
how can we make that into a fundamentalist issue? Fundamentalism is really 
something which the Americans created to answer their own requirements.” 
 
Another member of a similar group – a young professional who by his own 
account had been politically conscious for a long time but only became active for the first 
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time in this movement – even though he was on board with the group’s decision to work 
on the issue of displacement of people caused by the military operations, disagreed on 
what was the main cause of fundamentalism in Pakistan and spoke of his frustration with 
having to work with others in the group.    
I found a lot of leftist people talking a lot of nonsense... [They had] a very 
bookish stance on a lot of things… They had just very rigid and 
preconceived notions about how things are working and how it should be. 
You know… like everything is the fault of America (the U.S.) by extension 
because it’s imperialism which is dictating our lives, rather than looking at 
things in a more localized manner. So… I found their ideology a bit rigid. 
 
Similar differences were reported in other major umbrella organizations in other 
cities as well. Even though, unlike the younger activist quoted above, this activist – an 
academic and longtime women’s rights activist – described herself as an anti-imperialist, 
she was openly critical of the Taliban and described religious fundamentalism as a major 
issue. She described the tension within their group in these words: 
Some members feel we should remain quiet about Taliban (i.e. not criticize 
them) since they are fighting the U.S. and they are anti-Americans… [But] 
people like us, would say: ‘what are you talking about?’ (laughs as if to 
suggest it’s the most outrageous thing ever) … I mean for us the Taliban are 
as dangerous for the country. Plus, we also feel that they are not anti-
imperialist. They may be anti-American but no way they [are anti-
imperialist], because these are the people who have been very much 
together, you know the Taliban and Americans working together against 
Soviet Union when there was an invasion of Afghanistan. 
 
In contrast, you had people with views like these: 
[This] whole issue is spiraling into various subsets of fundamentalism inside 
the country and we don’t deny that they (Taliban, Al-Qaeda and similar 
groups) are really horrendous and they will infringe on women’s rights and 
all of that, but to think of it as an issue as big as imperialism, is [to 
misinterpret the situation]… To think of the war on terror in terms of Islamic 
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fundamentalists is crazy. We who live in an Islamic country who know the 
capacity and capabilities of these mullahs142 really don’t hold much water 
with thinking that these people are really trained and can take over the 
world, or any of that. To me, they are still bandits… they are not a major 
hegemonic force who can disrupt the whole world, by any means.  
 
Another older activist though, an author and longtime activist, who had also been 
active in previous prodemocracy movements, spoke about why he thought the military 
operations were justified. He said that: 
Those people who say that if we condemn the Taliban we'll be supporting 
America; that, to me, is wrong. They (the Taliban) have come into our 
homes, killing children; destroying women's schools; depriving people of 
education, not just women but everyone. So, we say that the State has to 
play its role. Why is the State not playing its role? … We [civilians] do not 
have weapons; we can only take verbal action. The State has an organ to 
terminate anti-state elements; why is it not being used? … [This menace] 
should have been terminated a long time ago… So, our plea is that the State 
plays its role. 
 
He went on to talk about how other people of the “semi-left” (he himself 
being a self-identified leftist) – some of whom belonged to the umbrella group 
that he was a part of – didn’t completely understand the issue: 
These people of the semi left, people like [activist belonging to a small self-
described radical-leftist organization], say that Shariat is the demand of the 
people there [in Swat, so we shouldn’t oppose it]. Now I employ a man; for 
six months he has been in my office. He is from Swat. He says he can’t go 
back because the Taliban took their land… He said that it is because of fear 
that they declare support for Shariat. ‘If we don't, they'll slit our throat the 
next day,’ he says. 
 
                                                 
142 The proper translation is a cleric or “a Muslim learned in Islamic theology and sacred law,” 
but in everyday usage, a lot of the times the term is used as a term of derision rather than 
reverence.  
  236 
The same sentiment was echoed by other activists as well, most of whom were 
older activists who had been active in previous pro-democracy movements as well. There 
seemed to be some correlation between age and how vocal activists were about the real or 
perceived threat of the Taliban and fundamentalism in the country. Except for this 
younger activist belonging to a small leftist party – who had only recently become 
politicized – who went even further when describing her own and her group’s position on 
the issue of religious extremism by proclaiming support for U.S. drone strikes within 
Pakistan – something that very few people were willing to do. To her, those opposing the 
military actions were doing so because of their anti-Americanism, i.e. they would oppose 
anything the U.S. did. In her own words: 
Our stance is that [Pakistani military actions and U.S. drone strikes against 
religious extremists in the tribal areas] … are justified because the Taliban 
are such a backward force that you cannot expect any progressive move 
from them. In this case we need to re-align our associations… [The Taliban 
cannot] be negotiated with… It’s not that, you know, as they say, "both are 
our enemies" (I believe she meant: the enemy of my enemy is my friend); 
it’s not that… But we need to re-align our strategies from time to time, from 
circumstances to circumstances. In this [case] we are [absolutely] against 
the Taliban… They will take Pakistan way back to the Stone Age… And 
there would be no way to move forward… Some people are [against 
Pakistani and U.S. military action/drone strikes in tribal areas] because of 
their anti-U.S. sentiment... they don’t understand the problem. They are 
anti-U.S. no matter what they do... The U.S. and this backward force are 
both our enemies… But at this time, we have to be pro-U.S., but not as a 
whole… [just] in this [one] thing, to diminish this force (the Taliban); to 
finish it. We cannot allow it to rise. 
 
On the other side of the spectrum you had people like this young foreign-educated 
activist in an umbrella group similar to that of the activist quoted above, referring 
probably to the people who shared similar views as the above activist. The quote below 
shows how some activists struggled with untangling the causes for the emergence of the 
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jihadi structure in Pakistan and Afghanistan (in which the U.S. and Pakistani 
governments played a huge role during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), to what was 
going on now in Pakistan in terms of religious militancy and the military’s reaction and 
in Afghanistan in terms of the resurgence of Taliban after they had been felled by NATO 
forces:   
There’s this pretense that this is all happening so as to secure… some sort 
of civilized society from these sorts of anachronisms; people who want to 
take you back into the stone ages.  That’s a joke.  That narrative is a joke 
because of all the reasons everybody knows now.  First and foremost, that 
this whole jihadi infrastructure was produced by whom [and] for what 
purpose?  And the fact that even now, clearly – at least some if not entirely 
– some segments of Pakistan’s establishment continue to patronize them. 
Everybody knows that, including the U.S.  And that the U.S. continues to 
support the Pakistani military, so then it’s a big joke, right? That they’re 
[U.S.] out here for freedom and democracy is ridiculous… I mean, in 
Afghanistan, it’s a national liberation struggle… they have more legitimacy, 
which the Americans will never have.   
 
This also translated into members of the same group or organization disagreeing 
about whether to work with more established religious groups or not. To be clear, these 
are not groups with explicit ties to terrorist organizations but groups that are seen as lying 
on the more benign side of a continuum of religious groups, but only in terms of the use 
of violence, not in terms of their views about women’s rights, etc. One foreign-educated 
academic and long-time activist belonging to an umbrella organization similar to those of 
activists quoted above, had this to say on the issue: 
[This was a serious debate between us] and the more liberal sorts, rather 
than leftists, who were always like: ‘no our biggest fight is with the maulvis 
(clerics).’ And we were like: ‘no, right now we’re not fighting the maulvis, 
the maulvis happen to be on our side in this particular context of this 
movement. There’s no point picking a fight with them within the 
movement.’ You don’t call them an ally, just call them, you know, someone 
who happens to be, as a matter of historical circumstance… happens to be 
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on the same side of the fence.  But within us (subgroup of self-identified 
radical leftists) we were quite clear that we don’t get along, we don’t have 
much to share with them; ultimately, we have much to oppose them on.  But 
this is not the time or place to pick a fight. 
 
The academic and longtime women’s rights activist mentioned above though, 
who belonged to a similar umbrella group, was not at all happy about having to deal with 
these religious groups though and talked about this issue at length. She talked about how 
she and others in the groups had been “very clear” since the beginning that they would 
not organize any joint activities with religious groups and parties, but given the 
circumstances, they nonetheless found themselves face to face with these groups at 
events and protests organized by other groups. In such situations, she said, they would try 
their best to keep their distance from such groups so people could clearly tell them apart. 
She also talked about the kinds of issues that came up during such events and protests, for 
example, the issue of prayer time. Muslims say their prayers five times a day, at a given 
time, and in Pakistan, as in all other Muslim majority countries, they are reminded of the 
time by the call of prayer, the azaan, broadcasted on loudspeakers in all mosques. People 
show their respect during the azaan by being quiet; women cover their heads with a scarf; 
and people prepare to say their prayers. The said activist talked about problems she (and 
others) had to face because they wanted to continue with the protest and shouting slogans 
while people belonging to religious groups, as well as others belonging to her own group, 
insisted that everyone take a break as a show of respect: 
[Upon hearing the azaan, these people] would immediately start praying 
and a lot of people in our group would say that we should stop raising 
slogans [during that time] and I said ‘why?’… [Their members] would say 
‘why do you need to shout slogans while we’re praying?’ And I would say 
‘if you want to pray, I’m not stopping you but… I took two hours off from 
work to protest. I want to protest. You have no right to stop me. 
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She talked about her frustration with having to deal with people belonging to 
religious groups. The issue, she said, was not merely about not being able to shout 
slogans for a few minutes. It was about people thinking they could dictate the terms to 
you. Given that this activist was active in the women’s rights movement during Zia’s 
time, where women were fighting religious laws that dictated women’s behavior is all 
spheres of life (private and public) it is no surprise that she and others in similar 
situations would feel this strongly about religious groups dictating their terms. The 
activist said that by forcing everyone to be silent while they prayed, they took over an 
event that wasn’t even organized by them: “they bring you to their wickets you know (a 
reference to the game of cricket; in this context meaning “they bring you to their turf”).”  
She also talked about other similar issues with such groups, specifically issues 
that they would have in terms of the kinds of slogans being raised, and even criticized 
the lawyers for not wanting to confront that issue (something that a few other activists 
had also talked about), and the lack of support from members of her own group: 
When they start shouting slogans like ‘Pakistan ka matlab kya, la ilaha 
illallah’ (what is the meaning of Pakistan? There is no God but Allah) then 
we would say ‘Pakistan ka matlab kya laathi, goli, martial law’ (what is the 
meaning of Pakistan? Batons, bullets, and martial law) … Ideologically, 
they were trying to make that push… But we did not allow that; you know 
when they said ‘nara-e-takbir’ [a slogan proclaiming the greatness of God, 
followed by everyone else shouting ‘Allah-u-akbar,’ meaning ‘Allah is 
great’] we’ll all say: ‘Stop it. This is not a religious movement. We are here 
for the lawyers’ movement.’ And a lot of lawyers would actually get very 
upset at me, I mean personally, with me. Because I used to just walk up to 
them (people belonging to religious groups) and say ‘there’s no point in 
raising that slogan. Let’s talk about the judiciary. You’re a Muslim; I’m a 
Muslim; I don’t want to say Allah-u-akbar here. I’m not here for that.’… 
[Sometimes] right wing lawyers [would also] try to [stop us]; but we 
managed… Although as I said even some people within our group would 
say: ‘you’re too radical. What difference does it make; let’s just show some 
respect.’ 
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A member of a different umbrella group in another city also mentioned the 
discomfort that some women and women’s rights activists felt with having to protest 
side-by-side next to religious groups and parties, and how that sometimes turned into 
long discussions about secularism: 
A lot of women that I know, I remember were very uncomfortable that they 
had to stand next to [name of an ultra-conservative religious group]. So, 
there was a lot of argument on this kind of issue. Some people would say 
that we should be secular; we should not use the name of Islam. [Once] we 
were just composing a press release… [and] I remember there was a 3-hour 
debate on whether the word 'secular' should be included in [one of the lines] 
or not. 
 
It should be mentioned here that women’s rights activists who have been active 
since at least the 1980s suffered a lot at the hands of the then military regime while 
fighting laws that discriminated against women, all of which were supported by the right-
wing Islamist parties and groups. And even though women’s rights activists were 
probably the most vocal about issues they had with religious groups, student groups also 
mentioned issues that they faced, but in the case of student groups, the differences 
seemed to be a combination of religious bent as well as turf wars because, as mentioned 
in chapter one, once student unions were crushed on campuses, the only groups that had 
been allowed to function freely in campuses were religious groups and until this day, they 
enjoy a monopoly on student politics in most public universities.  
This radical-leftist student activist, who, along with other fellow activists had 
tried to form a sort of umbrella organization on campus, described the difficulties they 
faced trying to work together. After mentioning how she and her fellow activists were at 
one point branded communists, which is still considered a serious accusation/liability in 
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student politics in Pakistan: “The news spread like wildfire. You know, our own people 
coming up to us and saying, ‘Are you really a communist?’ And getting very freaked out 
at the fact that they’re associated with us… You know, they were very upset.” 
She tried to make sense of why that may have happened in terms of the group’s 
relationship with a more established student wing of a national political party that had for 
a long time had a monopoly on student activism on this campus: 
Their role was interesting because initially, it was basically us and them.  
And they said let’s do something, and we’re like, ok, let’s do it together.  
No problem. And slowly when it appeared that strings were being pulled 
from outside (referring to the parent religious party), they were bringing 
their people, trying to highjack that thing, and they were told specifically 
not to let anything develop if it’s not under their control… In my own 
interaction with the [group name] leaders, it was basically agreed upon to 
tolerate each other and to not incite the other group with [say] slogans that 
would be a source of tension… But evidently something changed, and it 
wasn’t a consequence of our misunderstanding, but it was obviously 
something that they had been told from the outside that then caused a rift 
and then basically these two groups split and the [group name] element left.   
 
But then she went on to discuss the mixed relationship they had when they were 
not in the confines of university campus. She like activists in other groups also mentioned 
the different slogans that were sometimes a cause of conflict. It was interesting that she 
discussed and acknowledged the commonalities between the two groups that were 
alluded to by members of other groups in terms of their attitudes to the U.S. while 
describing the differences: 
Outside campus, whenever, you know [we went to protests], our slogans 
and what we would say and the energy, there was a lot of energy in our 
slogans and they were different.  So, everybody listened, and it was, 
ironically it was the right-wing groups’ workers and the people they would 
bus in who were the most attracted to our slogans, because we were, 
essentially we were talking about very, in some, you know, the common 
ground is huge.  But the differences are just so stark… Like some slogans 
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are extremely contradictory, I mean, antagonistic, I would say. Like 
‘Pakistan ka matlab kya?’ (What’s the meaning of Pakistan?). They say ‘La 
ilaha illalah’ (there is no god but Allah) obviously; we say ‘laathi goli, 
martial law’ [batons, bullets, martial law], right. So that’s a recipe for 
disaster, you know. And disasters happened as well, because our boys can’t 
control themselves either, so, it just blows up [sometimes].  
 
Then she went on to talk about similarities between the two groups, and this is some 
of the muddiness expressed earlier by other activists, where it’s sometimes difficult to 
distinguish between anti-Americanism and anti-Imperialism.  
The anti-, well, we’re anti-imperialist, (I believe she was going to say anti-
Americanism) but in terms of the opposition to American occupation in 
Afghanistan, you know, the IMF, the policies of, and generally, you know, 
America’s brawl in the world and in Pakistan and South Asia, Afghanistan, 
that’s something that we agree on, you know. What we don’t agree on is 
what’s happening in the name of Islam, in this country and how we just 
simply look over the role that has been played by the establishment and by 
these groups themselves. And certainly, the ideological basis for Pakistan is 
something we completely disagree on; they want an Islamic state, and 
believe it was created to be an Islamic state and we think it’s not. 
 
Another student activist belonging to a group similar to the above activist 
described similar troubles in dealing with the religious group. He described how leftists 
like him were labeled non-believers (a label which in Pakistan can lead to your death) 
and how that made it hard to recruit people to their group. He said that because his was a 
secular group, people belonging to the religious group probably thought that they were 
“trying to spread atheism” or that “secularism means to finish off completely with 
religion or that if we oppose the Taliban it means we oppose Islam.” But he said that 
these differences never escalated to violence. The two groups just decided to go their own 
ways but that the other group tried to undermine them by organizing their own events for 
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which, according to him, the religious groups faced some criticism by the campus 
community.   
A member of the religious group mentioned by the previous two activists on the 
other hand downplayed the differences and presented it as the leftist students leaving the 
religious group – which was the opposite of what the leftist activists had said: 
A few students separated themselves from us, under the name of [name of 
group] … But in spite of that we and they always participated in each other’s 
demonstrations. They would call us to whichever demonstration they 
organized; we would invite them to whichever demonstration we organized; 
so our campaign, in any case, continued side by side because in the end we 
said that it's for Pakistan that we have to run this campaign so leaving our 
ideological, or rather the actual reasons of our organizations aside, (we 
focused on) reasons of saving Pakistan.  
 
While these groups, despite their differences, were able to tolerate, if not actively 
work with each other; student groups in other cities did not have the same experiences.  
This student activist, a member of a newly formed student group in a different city 
described worse challenges:  
Our members have been beaten up numerous times by them. I've been 
beaten up a couple of times by them because they want to maintain their 
hegemony in different institutions, especially in [name of city]. So for them 
[our group] sort of becomes a threat. So even though they do support the 
restoration of the Chief Justice, or at least that is their party line, it's more 
important for them to maintain their hegemony on campus, to ensure that 
no other group stands up to them. So those guys were pretty hard. I mean, 
they would destroy our camps (stalls), for instance, beat our activists, [and] 
threaten us not to come to their territory again. 
 
Working against—and sometimes even working on the same side as—religious 
groups has always been somewhat perilous in Pakistan. The Pakistani establishment has 
for a long time patronized these religious groups so they can be used for their own 
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benefit, whenever necessary, may it be to oppose popular politicians or political parties in 
the country; cause trouble in Kashmir, India, or Afghanistan; or create instability in the 
country to justify the large military budgets.  This quote from a member of one of the 
major political parties, who had been active in all three pro-democracy movements, 
shows the perils of dealing with religious groups in Pakistan:  
Actually, in Pakistan it has always been that, the rightists have always had 
their [own] agenda. [For example, during the anti-Ayub movement our] 
party decided to observe a holiday on May 1st (Labor day) and to hold a 
demonstration and we began working on that; so to counter that, [name of 
Islamist party] led a rally by the name of Shauqat-e-Islam [Splendors/Glory 
of Islam] and in doing so labeled [our party] as non-believers. There were 
more difficulties for [us] as compared to the others. [It is not easy] when an 
open fatwa is issued against someone, labeling them a non-believer or 
asserting that a particular party is a party of non-believers. 
 
Despite all of that, all the groups mentioned somehow managed to work together 
in some cases, merely tolerate each other in others, and in yet others, just learn to share 
the same space for a small period of time. For some activists though, like the longtime 
pro-democracy activist, who had also spent time in jail for his opposition to Zia’s rule, 
described above, the collaboration with Islamist groups was one more reason to not be 
part of the movement: 
[In Ayub Khan's time the Islamists] disagreed with [Ayub’s] secularism; 
right now they disagree with the disturbance of their work after the Afghan 
jihad and that this is their point, to bring the State to this stage, by somehow 
exerting pressure [so they can continue with their activities]. Now that is 
why they are supporting the Lawyers’ movement. Everyone knows the 
extent of their relationship with the rule of law… especially people who 
have been beaten up and evicted from campuses by [their thugs] … So 
where they have control they care for neither rule of law nor democracy. 
Now, what did they (the alliance of religious parties) do in the government 
of the Frontier Province? They shut down even the Art Council. They 
obviously have no connection to democracy or human rights.  
 
  245 
He went on to complain about how there seemed to be a complete lack of 
discussion on this issue within the lawyers’ movement, something that a handful 
of other activists had also referred to. He also raised the age-old dilemma of 
whether criticizing one aspect of a cause or movement means you support the 
opposing side: 
When people raise these questions, those revolutionaries who were leading 
the Lawyers' Movement are befuddled in the face of these questions. 
Because, obviously, these questions definitely do not mean that you're 
supporting Pervez Musharraf; the purpose of these questions is to establish 
what you have to do, what direction you need to take; these things are 
supposed to be considered, lest you end up like the [leftists who supported 
Khomenei during the Iranian revolution], with you being the first person 
that Khomenei takes out. 
 
4.2.3 Strategies and Circumstances that kept the Movement Going 
How was it that despite all the differences and internal conflicts, this 
amalgamation of weak coalitions and frenemies was able to not just keep going but also 
accomplish what it set out to do: get the Chief Justice reinstated AND get rid of the 
military dictator while doing so? I believe there are three main reasons for that: the broad 
goals adopted by the movement; the fact that the coalitions or alliances that were formed 
were very loose/weak; and that the lawyers who were the backbone of this movement, 
vigorously guarded their autonomy. Whether these were well thought out strategies or 
just products of chance circumstances is debatable, but below I will discuss how these 
helped in the propagation of the movement.  
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4.2.3.1 Broad Goals and a Strong Anchor 
As was clear from the discussion above about the differences in opinions about 
the goals of the movement, different groups and individuals interpreted the movement’s 
goals in very different ways. Meyer, David, and Corrigall-Brown (2005) have argued that 
while individuals or groups may offer a detailed and thorough analysis of a problem, a 
movement focuses on the most urgent issues. In order to attract more participants, the 
movement’s claims need to be neither too narrow nor too broad. “A given mobilization 
can offer the chance to make claims only on the most urgent or promising set of issues. 
Articulating a fully developed long term agenda runs the risk of alienating potential 
supporters and invigorating political opposition. On the other hand, articulating an ill-
defined set of claims runs the risk of being easily co-opted and demobilized by political 
authorities. Activists thus face the challenge of developing demands that are clear enough 
to be significant and narrow enough to avoid alienating supporters and mobilizing the 
opposition” (Meyer, David, and Corrigall-Brown 2005: 330).  
The Lawyers’ movement, it seems, was able to find the fine balance. While they 
were definitely criticized by some for shying away from being more explicit about the 
problems, as was the case of this leftist student activist who said that: “the lawyers very 
openly said that we won’t speak against the military; that we won’t say that he 
(Musharraf) is corrupt or that he is bad or wrong or stuff like that. But the question is, if 
there is corruption and ill-governance in the country and we say that we won’t say who is 
responsible for that, then we’re not doing a very good job, we’re not identifying what is 
the cause of the problem;” they were nonetheless able to get a lot of support from a wide 
section of Pakistani society. The slogan of “Rule of Law” and “Independence of 
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Judiciary” was wide and vague enough for people to read it in many different ways. For 
those who thought that getting rid of a dictatorship was the most important issue, they 
could talk about how dictatorships and abrogating the constitution is unlawful, and for 
those who were more concerned about corruption, they could talk about how an 
independent judiciary would hold everyone, including the most influential people 
accountable.  
For those who were maybe not as swayed by the movement’s slogan, other 
environmental factors probably helped convince them to become part of the movement. 
Klandermans (2010), while discussing the anti-war protests in the U.S. before the second 
Iraq war argues that anti-war sentiments alone would not account for such huge anti-war 
protests as were seen before the second Iraq war. “For the demonstrations to grow big, 
more general oppositional sentiments must exist in a country… The driving force behind 
demonstrations of that size is more complex than the proximate goal suggests” 
(Klandermans 2010: 104).  In other words, there were probably lots of hidden grievances 
that accounted for such diverse sets of people to participate in the movement. As 
described above, the same was the case in the Lawyers’/pro-democracy movement in 
Pakistan. You definitely had people who were convinced by the lawyers’ rhetoric, but 
you also had people who were more skeptical, such as the more leftist groups as well as 
the more rightist religious groups, but they became part of the movement because they 
saw this movement as a means to their goals, be it decreasing the role of the military in 
politics or instituting an “Islamic democracy.”  
Given all that, General Musharraf acted as an “anchor” that seemingly held the 
movement together. Ghaziani and Bhaldassarri (2011) argue that sometimes movements 
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need cultural anchors to be held together.  They define cultural anchors as “aspects of 
social life that elicit broad consensus among involved actors, yet they [are] general 
enough to accommodate debate and dissent without paralyzing action” (Ghaziani and 
Bhaldassarri 2011: 198). Anchors are somewhat “ambiguous” and “thinly coherent” 
(ibid).  The “cultural anchor” that held the LGBT movement together throughout the four 
Marches to DC that they analyzed, was “community building.” While other goals kept 
changing, this aspect was constant. The “anchor” in the case of the Lawyers’ movement 
was not “cultural;” it was not an “aspect of social life” but rather a personality that at a 
certain moment in time elicited a lot of opposition for many different reasons, as already 
described.   
 
4.2.3.2 Loose/Weak Coalitions 
Another factor that helped the movement keep going was that in the cases where 
coalitions or umbrella groups were formed, they were extremely weak or loose in nature. 
Amongst the descriptors used by activists to characterize their group the most commonly 
repeated one was “loose coalition.” This activist, for example, described their groups as: 
“a loose coalition of civil society activists and organizations [without a] formal 
structure.” Another activist, talking of their group said that “[Our group] brought together 
a lot of different groups… It became a pretty decent sort of neutral vehicle to attach 
oneself to because it didn’t have extremes and didn’t have any baggage.” Another activist 
said this about the same group: “In my twenty years of activism in Pakistan, I’ve never 
seen such a diverse group of people coming together.” 
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Similar descriptions were used by other activists. Another umbrella group was 
described as “a collection of various movements and groups, and individuals working for 
rights, individuals who are just progressive in their mind… those who are pro-democracy, 
those who are for people’s rights… women’s groups, students’ groups, it’s just a 
collection.” Another member of the same group had helped create a different group in the 
same city, “for people who don’t belong to any ideology, who only talk about the Rule of 
Law, and the reinstatement of the Chief Justice.” He and a few other activists served as a 
liaison between the two groups. Almost all activists talked proudly about how diverse 
their groups were in terms of people’s ideological leanings. 
That, coupled with the broad goals (both of which go hand-in-hand), meant that 
individuals or groups within the umbrella groups did not have to put too much energy 
into overcoming their differences. It didn’t matter if some people thought that Musharraf 
was justified in toppling a democratically elected government in 2000 or not. What 
mattered was that the Chief Justice should not have been fired and work needed to be 
done to get him reinstated. A few activists realized and commented on what that weak but 
broad nature of their alliance meant for their group or activism. This foreign-educated 
activist, for example, who was part of one of the bigger umbrella groups, connected the 
wide nature of the group to the limitations they faced in coming up with more specific 
goals as discussed above: 
We tried to kind of articulate some core principles and goals that we had, 
and then attach some very specific tactics and strategies to those goals. But 
that didn’t really go very far because one of the strengths of [our group] was 
that it was a kind of neutral organization that could sort of focus on goals 
but didn’t really have an ideological character. I think the composition of 
the group meant that … [our] goals were not radical, in the overall sense… 
I think definitely the group did not want to go very far left as a result. 
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Perhaps this student activist described the situation best as the Lawyers’ not 
having the luxury of picking and choosing supporters: “You have to understand, you 
know, the lawyers were not a political party, they were like, more of a union. So, they 
had to tolerate everyone. The union has to tolerate everyone.” But nonetheless, even 
when the movement turned into something more than just a “Lawyers’ movement” it still 
continued to be very diverse. 
 
4.2.3.3 Lawyers Autonomy 
While describing the Australian anti-war movement (against the second Iraq war), 
Tattersall describes the coalition as “powerful and broad, with organizations spanning the 
political spectrum” (Tattersall 2010: 172). Yet, she says, “it was beset with 
contradictions. While it successfully coordinated some of the largest mobilizations in 
Australia’s history, it was severely constrained by its diversity. The only joint activity 
decision makers could agree on was to host rallies. When controversial events were 
organized, consensus evaporated into majority votes, and organizations began stacking 
meetings with allies rather than working in good faith. This social movement coalition 
was short-lived because organizations with highly diverse interests, values, and cultures 
were unable to identify agreed goals and sustain relationships after mass-based interest in 
the issue waned” (ibid).   
One way the pro-democracy movement in Pakistan was able to avoid this fate was 
that the lawyers, who formed the backbone of the movement, “jealously guard[ed] their 
autonomy,” as described by one of the activists. This was not just one comment by an 
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activist unhappy at not being included in the decision-making process, but a phenomenon 
reported by almost every activist who was interviewed, including lawyers themselves. 
While all the activists had a lot of praise for the lawyers, they also complained about 
never being taken into confidence for any kind of decision making. This foreign-educated 
academic said this about her experience working with lawyers: 
The lawyers were in some ways the easiest to deal with, in the sense that 
they have a very clear structure, there’s a very clear hierarchy and so you 
know exactly who to talk to if you need something done. But they were in 
some ways the most difficult to work with, because they really, really, really 
jealously guard their autonomy… One of their problems, their weaknesses 
is that they’re horrible about working with other groups, in terms of getting 
them on board in their decision making.  So, that was very frustrating, you 
know, to try to work with lawyers, when they wouldn’t include you in the 
decision-making processes at all and they wouldn’t really be interested in 
being that involved in our decision-making processes [either]. 
 
Another activist, belonging to a religious student group had this to say143: 
In the beginning we had our differences. When we'd go with them, they 
would say that this is a lawyers' campaign, so only lawyers will run it. Bur 
after a time, since they were unable to plan it properly, they realized that 
they would be unable to run the campaign alone, so they aligned students 
and political organizations with themselves. So, at that point we complained 
to them that if you had only included us from the beginning your campaign 
would have progressed in a good way. But it is this same difference that 
exists now as well. The lawyers made many big decisions; the last decision 
they took was a few days ago in which they again decided to have a long 
march. So, they plan by themselves. And any consulting with other schools 
of thought or the parties that were involved in that campaign is practically 
non-existent. 
 
                                                 
143 The activist claimed that his group later had meetings with lawyers on the Bar Council 
premises, but this information could not be verified.  
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One of the lawyers interviewed, who was in the forefront of the movement had no 
qualms in admitting that they purposefully decided to not let their agenda be hijacked by 
other groups: 
[We] whole heartedly welcomed, encouraged and applauded the 
participation of [all kinds of] groups… but so long as the platform of the 
Bar remained independent and the agenda was dictated by the Bar; the 
agenda being supremacy of the rule of law, the independence of the Bar and 
the judiciary and the restoration of civilian supremacy. 
 
Another lawyer, while discussing concerns brought up by political parties 
regarding not being made part of the decision-making process, explained that: 
[Political parties] say that the lawyers have established a platform apart 
from us, which is a fact. The lawyers did have a separate platform and they 
were very keen on keeping the platform as an independent, separate one… 
What the movement laid out was that it had kept itself independent because 
these one lakh (100,000) lawyers belong to different persuasions; they 
belong to different political parties. And if we give away the whole of the 
platform to one or two mainstream political parties then a difference of 
opinion will be generated amongst many of the lawyers. So, the success of 
the lawyers is that in spite of the fact that amongst themselves there were 
people who held different political opinions, they kept it unified on one 
platform, and they were able to do that because it was their own platform. 
 
Yet another lawyer spoke of the lawyers’ reluctance to work with political parties 
in particular, giving an earlier negative experience. He talked about when Musharraf had 
introduced what was known as the Legal Framework Order in 2002, which among other 
things included amendments to the country’s constitution. The lawyers’ community along 
with a few political parties had resisted that move, but the political party pulled out and 
ended up using the pressure that was built by the resistance to their own benefit by 
negotiating with the Musharraf regime.  
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[Given our past experience] we wanted to keep our distance from the 
political parties because we could have lost public confidence. We had our 
reservations. We wanted to save it from a political stunt. We wanted it to be 
a lawyers’ movement exclusively. We were compelled to do that, and we 
were justified in doing that… Wherever the Chief Justice would tour, he 
would talk to the bar associations with the boundaries of the law, but with 
political parties we never let them cross that boundary [of speaking to the 
bar associations] … Our supreme leadership demarcated that already that 
there wouldn’t be unnecessary mingling of political parties or any other 
groups like members of the civil society. Non-members would not be 
allowed in our premises. 
 
It is thus no surprise that activists who were not part of the lawyers’ community 
complained about not being made part of the decision-making process – it was a very 
deliberate decision on the part of the lawyers. The only time when anyone other than 
lawyers had any say in the decision making was after the elections when one of the major 
parties, PML-N had completely thrown its weight behind the movement, as was revealed 
by a few lawyers during interviews and was obvious from events on the ground.  
 
4.2.3.4 Environmental Factors 
Two factors that were “external” to the movement but nonetheless helped the 
movement were the current nature of civil society in the country and the elections that 
were held in 2008. To explain what I mean by how the nature of civil society helped the 
movement, I’ll use this quote from one of the lawyers who was interviewed: 
The response of the people [to the movement], the civil society, that support 
was fantastic. First of all, the civil society has an organized society in 
various NGOs and other civil society organizations. In previous times this 
was also not present. This is a process of the last 15 or 20 years. So those 
people were present here. And since there are many of these organizations, 
NGOs and such, which generally raise issues such as rule of law, women's 
issues, against terrorism, things like that or human rights issues, so such a 
mindset of the civil society already existed. 
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So, it would seem like the proliferation of NGOs in Pakistan discussed in chapter 
1 helped the movement because their rallying call “Rule of Law” was something that was 
attractive to a lot of these groups. This also is in line with the descriptions of most 
umbrella groups by their members as all of them mentioned that different NGOs or 
people working for NGOs were part of their groups, and indeed some of the interviewees 
were NGO workers.  
Another environmental factor that helped the movement was the 2008 elections. 
Even though the Lawyers had called for a boycott of the elections, which was initially 
heeded by some of the parties (but that decision was later overturned), once the new 
government was formed, the losing party, PML-N, became much more active in the 
movement. The party helped the movement by using other means (other than street 
protests) to pressurize the government (including its members quitting from the cabinet). 
This is why towards the end the leadership of the Lawyers’ movement was working much 
more closely with the PML-N and let go of some of its autonomy, something that was 
criticized by some of the lawyers. Tattersall (2010), Almeida (2010) and others have 
suggested that social movements gain from making alliances with political parties, 
especially oppositional parties, and that definitely seems to be the case here.  
 
4.3 Discussion 
While some of the factors discussed above are hard to distinguish in terms of 
whether they are causes or consequences, one can at least argue that broad frames and 
loose coalitions of diverse groups go hand in hand, and those two combined with a well-
guarded decision-making process by a core group led to the movement’s success. The 
  255 
movement had set out to get the Chief Justice reinstated and, in the process, consciously 
or unconsciously picked up an additional goal of getting rid of General Musharraf, and it 
was able to achieve both these goals.  
One aspect of this movement which makes it rather unique is the composition of 
the movement.  As mentioned earlier, the movement seems to encompass different kinds 
of models conceptualized by social movement analysts. It has some very tight knit, well 
organized groups (like the lawyers), some very loose alliances or coalitions (like the 
umbrella organizations described above), political parties and religious groups 
coordinating with different groups, and then some groups who under normal 
circumstances would never agree on pretty much any issue (as in the examples of 
women’s rights groups and Islamist groups), let along work together. Looking at 
Whittier’s classification of the different types of movement relationships (see table 4.1), 
the Lawyers’ (as an amalgamation of all the bar councils and associations around the 
country) can be seen as a coalition; some of the umbrella groups where member groups 
were more ideologically similar were loose coalitions (not mentioned in the table); other 
umbrella groups as described earlier in the chapter that included very diverse groups 
would be considered Pragmatic coalitions; leftist groups and rightist-Islamist groups 
working together could be considered Frenemies, and women’s rights groups and Islamist 
groups could be an example of Détente or Opposing movements that were sometimes 
forced to share the same space. Whether this movement is indeed a unique case, or if 
other/most movements are similar but are not analyzed as such for the sake of simplicity 
is something that needs to be explored further. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS 
This research started out as a comparison between two prodemocracy movements 
in Pakistan, one of the 1960s and one of the 2000s. What interested me in the most recent 
movement (2000s) was the composition of the movement: other than the lawyers, the 
movement was populated mostly by upper middle- and upper-class people, in stark 
contrast to the movement of the 1960s. Another major difference was the goals of both 
movements. While the movement of the sixties was demanding the end of the military 
regime and holding (what were to be the country’s first) general elections in the country, 
along with demands for the improvement of the economic conditions of the poor; the 
movement of the 2000s was demanding only the reinstatement of the Chief Justice (and 
later on other deposed judges) and Musharraf’s ouster.  
This theme changed somewhat as the interview process progressed and the 
movement of the 2000s ended up being the main focus of the research. Instead of doing a 
systematic comparison, only occasional comparisons were made to the 1960s, treating it 
more as a starting point of the pro-democracy movements in Pakistan. The reason for this 
change of focus was that all the interviewees that belonged to the movement of the 1960s 
were male and at least thirty years older than me. Given gender and age dynamics in 
Pakistan, it was often hard to get the kind of information that I needed – the content of 
these interviews was, to a large extent, dictated by the interviewee and many questions on 
my interview schedule went unanswered. While the information from these interviews 
was useful and interesting, it became clear that I should do more interviews with people 
who had been active in the movement of the 2000s.  
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Chapter 2 of the dissertation argues that to be able to completely understand a 
movement you need to look at the evolution of the country’s civil society, not just a snap 
shot of it. An in-depth analysis of Pakistani civil society makes it clear that civil society 
cannot just be conceived of as a static collection of different groups and organizations, 
but instead needs to be regarded as a combination of groups (or structures) and processes 
both of which change over time. Pakistani civil society has been affected by international 
events as well as by events and processes within its own borders, mainly the repeated 
military takeovers. Each dictatorship engaged in repression of groups and organizations 
that served as places for collective action (such as political parties, workers unions, and 
student organizations), in reshaping the structure of the democratic institutions (by for 
example introducing devolution plans or party-less elections), weakening the political 
party system (by constantly creating rifts within and between the dominant parties) as 
well as reshaping people’s discourses about politics, politicians and religion. One of the 
consequences of this particular history has been that Pakistani civil society has gone from 
being populated by groups where people advocated for their own rights (such as workers 
and unions) to groups that advocate for the rights of others and are dependent on external 
funds (such as NGOs). While a similar trend can be seen the world over, the switch is 
probably starker in Pakistan given the involvement of the very strong military in the 
country’s politics. 
This change in the nature of civil society had implications for the initiation and 
progression of social movements in the country.  Over time, the kinds of networks 
available to people to mobilize were different, and the political attitudes as well as socio-
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economic backgrounds of people populating these spaces were also different. These 
differences, in turn, affected the nature of social movements and their goals.  
This analysis also raises a few questions for the literature on civil society. Given 
the trials and tribulations that Pakistani civil society has been through at the hands of the 
Pakistani military (and sometimes elected governments) as well as international 
happenings, civil society is not formed along clear lines of religiosity vs. secularism and 
authoritarianism vs. democracy. The country, for example, had secular and seemingly 
progressive groups that welcomed Musharraf’s coup because to many, the fight for 
secularism was more important than the fight for democracy. Whether those two can be 
separated is up for debate, but it becomes even more questionable in the case of Pakistan 
where the military has had a long history of using religious groups for their own 
purposes. This is where the discussion about the relationship of the military with people 
belonging to different class backgrounds becomes relevant, as discussed in chapter 2.   
But nonetheless, the Pakistani case poses the challenge of how to characterize the 
relationship between civil society and democracy. Does civil society, by definition, 
support democracy in a country or can civil society be indifferent to it? Additionally, is 
civil society in a democratic country, by definition, stronger than a civil society in an 
authoritarian country? Do countries with stronger democracies have stronger civil 
societies? What exactly does it mean for a civil society to be strong? Pakistani civil 
society, as weak and fragmented as it is, has twice been able to depose military dictators. 
Pakistani dictators have also felt the need to gain legitimacy through the courts and 
through elections, however flawed and manipulated. This is probably unique among other 
countries that have undergone dictatorships. Whether this is a function of the alive, albeit 
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fractured, civil society in the country or the special relationship that the military has 
enjoyed with foreign governments (the U.S. in particular) or a combination of both is not 
clear. 
The third chapter discusses the class composition of the pro-democracy 
movement of the 2000s. Unlike the movement of the 1960s, the most recent movement 
did not include worker and student unions or other people from more working-class 
backgrounds. While theorists have argued the urban middle class usually favors 
democracy and the rule of law, the Pakistani case has been rather mixed. The Pakistani 
urban middle class has either actively supported or been indifferent to military takeovers 
of democratically elected governments (in 1977 against Bhutto, and 1999 against Sharif), 
yet a small subset of them have also been the ones who eventually came to the streets 
(albeit after the military had ruled for a long time) to demand an end to the dictatorship 
(in the late-60s against Ayub, the mid-80s against Zia and late-00s against Musharraf). 
The chapter discusses the class- and urban-rural divide in Pakistan, how it 
emerged over time and how these divides manifested themselves in the movement. I 
argue in this chapter that the class and urban-rural divides that exist in the country led to 
people having different opinions about voting, politicians, and electoral politics in 
general. It is mostly the poorer sections of rural Pakistan that votes in the elections; the 
anti-Musharraf movement on the other hand was populated mostly by upper middle- and 
upper-class people. While people from these backgrounds have also participated in 
previous pro-democracy movements, the almost complete absence of working-class 
people from the latest movement sets it apart from previous ones.  
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In the 1960s Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and other leaders and activists with socialist 
ideals led the movement; whereas in 2007, the first people who responded to Musharraf’s 
proclamation of emergency in November 2007 were mostly students belonging to elite 
colleges as well as young professionals.  Without an individual or a party that could 
connect the goals of the movement to demands that would resonate more with working 
class people, the movement faltered. In addition, and relatedly, the previous military 
regime of Zia had destroyed most means and venues of political activism so any 
connections that existed between activists belonging to higher classes and the working 
class were almost nonexistent. Finally, owing to certain policies enacted under Zia, as 
well as the market liberalization that took place under Musharraf, the elite have become 
even more alienated from the needs of the “common man.” What initially started out as a 
movement for the “Rule of Law” was not able to widen its goals to include demands that 
would appeal to working class people or people living in rural areas. While most of the 
people supported the Lawyers’ movement, the movement demands were not enough for 
working class people to give up their daily wages like they did in the 1960s. When it 
came to participating in the movement, it was limited to the more elite sections of the 
society and diehard political party activists. 
The diversity within the prodemocracy movement of the 2000s makes it rather 
unique compared to other movements analyzed in the social movement literature. Chapter 
4 discusses the diversity within this movement in terms of the wide array of ideological 
leanings of movement participants and the effects of this diversity on the movement goals 
and success. The movement seems to encompass different kinds of models 
conceptualized by social movement analysts. The Lawyers, as an amalgamation of all the 
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bar councils and associations around the country, can be seen as a coalition; some of the 
umbrella groups where member groups were more ideologically similar, as loose 
coalitions; other umbrella groups that included very diverse groups would be considered 
Pragmatic coalitions; leftist groups and rightist-Islamist groups working together could be 
considered Frenemies; and women’s rights groups and Islamist groups could be an 
example of Opposing movements that were sometimes forced to share the same space. 
Whether this movement is indeed a unique case, or if other movements are similar but are 
not analyzed as such for the sake of simplicity is not clear. 
While some of the factors discussed in the chapter are hard to distinguish in terms 
of whether they are causes or consequences, one can at least argue that broad frames and 
loose coalitions of diverse groups go hand in hand, and those two combined with a well-
guarded decision-making process by a core group led to the movement’s success. The 
movement had set out to get the Chief Justice reinstated and, in the process, consciously 
or unconsciously picked up an additional goal of ending General Musharraf’s reign – and 
it was able to achieve both these goals.    
Analyzing the movement in light of the evolution of civil society in the country – 
which over the years ended up being weak and fragmented, where organizations for 
working class organizing were replaced by NGOs and the like and where religious groups 
flourished – makes it easier to understand why the movement was as diverse as it was. 
Additionally, the intertwining of the nature of civil society with the alignment of the 
interests and/or business ventures of the military and the upper middle class, meant that a 
movement that was populated by members of that class as well as lawyers, had goals that 
were not as radical as the goals of the movement of the 1960s. The rather specific and 
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not-so-radical goals are probably also a function of the diversity within the movement. 
So, while on the one hand the diversity meant having very specific goals, it also probably 
made it easier to achieve those goals. Another factor that may have made the 
achievement of these goals easier is the class background of the people populating the 
movement in that this group of people had the tools to make an impression 
internationally, and even though Musharraf must have known that these are not the 
people who will be voting in the elections, political parties were able to use the leverage 
of the mounting pressure on Musharraf to negotiate with him. The conscious efforts of 
the movement to make connections with and create awareness in the international media 
about what was going on in Pakistan also helped put pressure on Musharraf to eventually 
resign. It is difficult to distinguish which of these factors are causes and which ones are 
consequences (for example: did the movement have such specific goals because it was so 
diverse, or was it this diverse because the goals were so specific that it attracted lots of 
people), but it would be safe to say that these factors go hand in hand. 
 
5.1 Theoretical Contributions 
This research expands the boundaries of social movement research by analyzing a 
country that is amongst the less-analyzed areas within the social movement literature. 
More specifically, it makes a number of theoretical contributions to the literature:   
▪ To be able to completely understand a movement you need to look at the 
evolution of the country’s civil society, not just a snapshot of it.  
▪ The nature of Civil Society in a country affects composition and goals of a 
movement. 
▪ Civil Society is not inherently democratic and secular/liberal. 
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▪ Class background of movement participants matters since the participants’ class 
interests affect their political behaviors, their tactics of choice, and as a result, the 
demands of the movement. 
▪ Different frameworks are needed to study social movements in countries with 
more fragmented civil societies. 
▪ There is no single “recipe” for movement success. 
▪ The nature of the transition to democracy in Pakistan seems to be rather unique.   
 
 
5.2 Missed Opportunities and Further Research 
Two areas/topics related to the pro-democracy movement of the 2000s that could 
have been analyzed but weren’t due to the lack of time, data, or a combination of both 
were: the role of social media and new forms of communication as well as the emergence 
of the new middle class and how those factors intersected with the movement.  
The following statistics make it clear why emerging forms of communication in 
Pakistan may be especially relevant to the study of the movement: According to the 
Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA),144 the Teledensity for cell phones—which 
is the number of cell phone connections for every hundred individuals living within an 
area—increased from 40% in 2006-2007 to 55% in 2007-2008 and currently stands at 
73% (in 2018).145  According to the PTA the day that the Chief Justice was first 
reinstated in July 2007, the country experienced the highest number of text messages ever 
generated in one day (until that point) (Yusuf 2009: 13). Mobile service providers claim 
that the five days after Emergency was declared in November of the same year saw the 
record number of text messages sent (ibid). Additionally, when restrictions were imposed 
                                                 
144 https://www.pta.gov.pk  
145 The teledensity for landline connections has remained almost constant at around 1% 
throughout the same time period. 
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on media outlets on covering the lawyers’ movement and some channels started live-
streaming programs online, Geo TV – one of the most popular channels – “registered 
300,000 simultaneous users, up from 100,000 before the emergency” as soon as it started 
live streaming (ibid: 9). 
Most activists who were interviewed for this research mentioned that their main 
tools for getting and spreading information were text messages, emails, and blogs. 
Almost all the older activists while praising some aspects of this kind of activism and the 
skills of younger activists to make videos and disseminate them online, also complained 
about this trend as not being a good replacement for face-to-face organizing. Bolognani, 
in her research on the anti-emergency student activism at LUMS (Lahore University of 
Management Sciences – one of the most elite educational institutes in the country) 
discussed how students very successfully used the media including text messages, blogs, 
live streaming protests, and uploading videos on youtube to reach an international 
audience and increase pressure on Musharraf’s regime. This analysis needs to be widened 
to include the whole pre-democracy movement in Pakistan. 
While similar patterns are seen the world over, in terms of the use of new 
technologies and social media in organizing, this kind of organizing may have different 
consequences for Pakistan and other similar countries where literacy levels are much 
lower compared to developed countries. Additionally, the non-availability of cellular 
platforms in local languages especially in places like Pakistan where the local languages 
are not written in the Latin script adds another layer to any such analysis. Whether the 
use of social media and online technologies makes a movement inaccessible to certain 
parts of the population or actually improves accessibility; whether it helps gain media 
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attention or not (especially internationally, and how that affects the movement); and 
whether it exaggerates the size and impact of the movement or not (as was suggested by a 
number of interviewees) and how that affects the movement, are all questions that 
deserve attention in this case.   
Zeynep Tufekci, in her book “Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of 
Networked Protest,” studied recent protest movements in New York, Turkey, and Egypt 
that coalesced around social media and argues that these “[digitally] networked protests 
of the twenty-first century differ in important ways from movements of the past and often 
operate with a different logic” (Tufekci 2017: 13). The strengths and weaknesses of these 
movements “do not neatly conform to our understandings of the trajectory of protest 
movements before the advent of digital technologies” and thus comparisons cannot be 
made by comparing variables such as the size of the marches or the number of cities that 
the protests took place in (ibid 14, 61). One of the ways in which movements of the pre- 
and post-digital era differ is that in previous movements organizing big rallies and 
protests involved first building capacity which involved and/or helped develop 
“collective decision-making capabilities, sometimes through formal and informal 
leadership structures” and build “collective capacities among movement participants 
through shared experience and tribulation” (ibid: 14). In more contemporary post-digital 
era movements on the other hand, organizing a protest is much easier and it is only after 
the first initial big protest that the task of building a social movement takes place (ibid: 
61). While Pakistan may not be as digitally advanced as the other countries mentioned, 
especially keeping in mind the literacy rates as mentioned above, Tufecki’s warning 
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about the possible pitfalls of comparing movements from two different eras using older 
frameworks are nonetheless to be taken into consideration.  
Another area that could be analyzed to get a fuller understanding of the pro-
democracy movement of the 2000s and its effects on the Pakistani civil society is what 
Leela Fernandez has referred to as the “New Middle Class.” Even though her research is 
focused specifically on India, one can see a similar trend in Pakistan as well. I quote at 
length here to give a comprehensive idea of what she means by the New Middle Class:  
The new Indian middle class represents a specific social category that has 
emerged in the context of economic policies of liberalisation that were 
initiated in India in the 1990s. This social group refers to a culturally 
constructed category. The boundaries of this middle class are defined by 
practices of consumption associated with newly available consumer goods 
in liberalising India. Advertising and media images have contributed to the 
creation of this image of the liberalising middle class as a social group… 
that embodies a cultural standard associated with the globalising Indian 
nation. The consumption of commodities such as cell-phones, colour 
televisions, washing machines and cars forms some of the status markers 
that distinguish this social group… This middle class is not new in a 
structural sense. It refers to particular segments of the professional middle 
classes, particularly those associated with new economy jobs such as the 
services sector and information technology (Fernandes 2004: 2418). 
This new middle class does not refer to people who just moved up into the middle 
class, but rather to a new kind of middle class characterized by its consumption patterns, 
lifestyles, and attitudes. While in the pre-liberalization era urban professionals entering 
the job market would have preferred jobs in public banks, they now prefer jobs in the 
expanding private sector: multinational companies, foreign banks, tech companies and 
the like (Fernandez 2004: 2418). It is the English-speaking urban professionals of this 
class that dominate the ads on TV. While it used to be the case that workers or rural 
villagers were portrayed as the “archetypical citizens” by the older state ideologies, 
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“mainstream national political discourses [now] increasingly depict the middle classes as 
the representative citizens of liberalizing India” (Fernandes 2004: 2415).  
Fernandez describes how people belonging to this class visit bowling alleys, 
shopping malls, video game parlors, and newly built upscale restaurants and movie 
theaters – all forms of entertainment not available to working class and lower middle-
class people, given how much they cost. Unlike older movie theaters that had both 
cheaper seats and more expensive balcony seats making it more accessible to people of 
different backgrounds, the new upscale theaters offer flat-rate but much higher prices for 
all seats. Fernandez says of this class that while they are characterized by their support 
for market liberalization and all that it accompanies, they are not as liberal when it comes 
to politics. This for example is evident in the support that many of them bestow to Hindu 
nationalism, their obsession with corruption within politics, and the way they have 
“increasingly debased politics and the new lower class/caste politicians as dirty, 
dishonest, corrupt, criminal, and vulgar” (Fernandes and Heller 2006: 510). 
Something very similar happened in Pakistan as well, especially under 
Musharraf’s rule when the country experienced rapid market liberalization, opening up 
the market to all kinds of foreign products and investments; new upscale malls, 
boutiques, cafes, restaurants and movie theaters were opened in the urban areas; and tons 
of new cable channels were introduced. Several interviewees as well as many people 
mentioned in the newspaper articles raved about all the new products and consumer 
goods that were now available to them.  
It would be interesting to see whether the intersection of the timing of the 
movement of the 2000s with the emergence of this ‘New middle class’ and the 
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mushrooming of media channels—both a result of Musharraf’s liberalization policies—
led to a change in the ‘urban-rural divide’ that has historically been characteristic of 
Pakistan. There is now a substantial segment of young, middle-class urbanites who are 
getting involved in electoral politics, even if only to vote, changing the landscape of the 
political parties. While some were politicized by the movement of the 2000s, others were 
inspired by cricketer-turned-philanthropist-turned-politician Imran Khan (and his party, 
PTI) who was able to mobilize many young middle- and upper-class people who had 
never participated in electoral politics. While the two most popular parties in Pakistan, 
the PPP and PMLN, have in the past mostly focused (verbally or in practice) on issues of 
poverty alleviation and development, the newly emerging PTI purports to work for 
eradicating corruption in politics (constantly debasing other politicians), fighting the US’ 
influence in the area, and bringing law and order back to the country, all preoccupations 
of the new middle class in the country.  
It may be an interesting exercise to use Mannheim’s problem of generations, 
which he described as “one of the indispensable guides to an understanding of the 
structure of social and intellectual movements” (Mannheim, 1952: 286), to look at the 
implications of the new middle class in Pakistan.  While conducting interviews for this 
research, I observed interesting generational differences between younger activists and 
activists of the 1960s that were also active in 2007-08 in terms of their views about 
politics and politicians. Most older activists for example, while very critical of most 
politicians, still seem to have faith in the democratic process. For many of them, one of 
the main reasons that democratic governments have not been able to deliver was the 
interference of the military in the political process. For most younger activists on the 
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other hand, politics itself was something bad. Most younger activists did not want to 
associate or work with politicians.  The nineties in Pakistan was a time for a young 
democracy struggling to survive, characterized by mismanagement by the political parties 
in power as well as constant behind the scenes manipulations and toppling of 
governments by the military.  It was also a time when TV was still dominated by the 
state-owned television channel along with one or two private channels, none of which not 
only ever talked negatively of the military but also constantly showed nationalist songs 
and plays portraying the military as the savior and most honorable institution of the 
country. It makes complete sense then, that for people in their 20s or early 30s, for whom 
the only exposure to democratic governments was the not so smooth era of the 90s and 
who did not experience or hear about the brutalities of the previous military regimes,  
their view of politicians and the military would be very different from activists who had 
experienced the brutalities and/or censorship of the previous military regimes up-close. 
The fact that Pakistan currently has the highest percentage of youth that it has ever had in 
its history146 adds even more importance to this question. 
Tufekci, among other sociologists, have described how movements are “actively 
[shunning] electoral politics as a political statement” because they no longer see electoral 
democracy as an effective means to solve social problems (2017: 113). She also 
described how she observed in these movement “the lines being drawn not according to 
sect or even ideology, but according to generation” (ibid: 85). While she does not connect 
these two phenomena, they definitely seemed to be more intertwined in the case of 
Pakistan and may be worthy of further study. 
                                                 
146 https://www.dawn.com/news/1405197 
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5.3 Epilogue – Where to, Democracy? 
At the time of this writing, Pakistan, after having conducted general elections, 
elected Imran Khan as its next Prime Minister. This was only the third time in the 
country’s 71 years of existence that an elected government was able to complete its 
tenure; and the second time a democratic turnover of power took place between elected 
civilian governments; but an elected prime minister is yet to complete their tenure. Like 
previous prime ministers who overstepped their “boundaries,” Nawaz Sharif too was 
removed from power when he tried to make decisions that were not acceptable to the 
military. Only this time it wasn’t done by means of a military coup, but the judiciary was 
used to disqualify him from holding and running from office on what are broadly 
believed to be made-up charges and/or flimsy evidence. International observers 
described the 2018 elections as being far from fair.  Pre-poll manipulations included 
many members of Nawaz Sharif’s party being disqualified and facing dubious charges 
as well as media censorship so that only Imran Khan’s party received favorable 
coverage. While the country has experienced pre-poll rigging in the past where the 
intelligence agencies manipulated events such that their favored party won the elections, 
the extent of the rigging this time around has been far greater. Additionally, in previous 
years, despite pre-poll manipulations the counting of votes was for the most part 
considered fair; that may not have been the case this year as there were extreme delays 
as well as unexplained inconsistencies in reporting results.  
Many supporters of Imran Khan have either ignored all reports of how the 
military helped their candidate get elected or think that it is justified because it gets rid 
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of the older “corrupt” politicians or because Khan will fix all the problems faced by the 
country. This seems to go hand in hand with the conflicting values about democracy this 
dissertation uncovers. While many countries around the world have seen the rise of 
populist right-wing leaders in recent years, what makes the Pakistani case different is 
that the military was behind this electoral win. Whether Khan continues to be the 
military’s poster boy or not is to be seen. If he were to “overstep his bounds” as all 
elected prime ministers have in the past—by the sheer act of independently making 
important decisions that lie within their legal realm—and if military generals respond 
the same way that they did in the past (i.e. months of propaganda against the ruling 
government followed by a coup), how will his supporters react? Will Khan also be 
relegated to the list of corrupt politicians by people who just recently entered the 
political arena and so enthusiastically supported him, or will they resist? 
No matter what happens, this movement provides a good case study for a 
movement to be analyzed as a continuum, i.e. the three pro-democracy movements in 
Pakistan so far (1960s, 1980s, 2000s). Considering these movements as one long-drawn 
out movement that shows its head whenever needed, especially given that there has 
always been an overlap of activists over time. Analysts have studied overlap of members 
between movements, so does it for example, make sense to study the overlap of 
members over time, from one pro-democracy movement to another? Tattersall alludes to 
a related phenomenon in her discussion of union activism: “We have seen that national 
history affects unions in particular: the extent to which a country’s unions are familiar 
with coalition practice may promote future coalition practice” (Tattersall 2010: 151). 
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While not exactly the same phenomenon, the idea is somewhat similar and may be 
worthy of future research. 
In the case of the pro-democracy movement in Pakistan, each time it surfaced it 
was a little different from its previous incarnation. One would hope that the movement of 
the 2000s was the last time a pro-democracy movement will be needed, but given the way 
things have proceeded thus far, it is not clear that will be the case. With the most recent 
elections the military has been able to make enemies even in the province of Punjab—
historically the military’s support base—where there is widespread support for Sharif’s 
PML-N. Sharif and his party took a principled stance once he was disqualified with many 
party members openly criticizing the military’s interference in the electoral process and 
politics in general. The other three provinces have been at the receiving end of the 
military’s might for different reasons for a long time, but this is the first time that anti-
military slogans were heard in the streets of Punjab in the run-up to elections as well as in 
protests held right after. The slogan “vote ko izzat do” (honor the vote) became popular 
right after Sharif was disqualified as a direct challenge to the military. At the same time 
though, the Pashtun Protection Movement (PTM), a grassroots non-violent movement 
started by the Pashtuns, protesting the military’s human rights abuses against Pashtuns in 
the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, has received lukewarm support, if 
that, from civil society. If the prodemocracy movement does need to resurface again, all 
these factors are sure to reshape it and morph it into something that will be different from 
what we have seen so far. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TIMELINE OF MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS IN PAKISTAN 
1947   Independence (from British Rule) and partition of India leads to the birth of 
Pakistan (with a Western and Eastern wing). This is followed by communal 
violence, hundreds of thousands of deaths, and millions becoming homeless. 
1948   Muhammed Ali Jinnah, founding leader of Pakistan, dies.  
1948   First war with India over disputed territory of Kashmir. 
1951   Jinnah's successor Liaquat Ali Khan is assassinated. 
1956   Pakistan gets its first constitution, turning the country from an autonomous 
dominion into an "Islamic Republic." 
1958   President Iskander Mirza carries out a coup d’état, suspending the constitution. 
Shortly afterwards, Army chief General Ayub Khan deposes Mirza and declares 
himself president. 
1962   The second constitution outlines a presidential form of government, with a 156-
member National Assembly and a Presidential electoral college of 80,000 "Basic 
Democrats."  
1965   General Ayub Khan defeats Fatima Jinnah (sister of the ‘father of the nation’) in a 
controversial and closely fought poll. 
1965   Second war with India over Kashmir. 
1969   General Ayub Khan resigns amid protests, handing power to Army Chief General 
Yahya Khan. Martial Law is proclaimed, and all assemblies are dissolved. 
1970   General elections are held, with East Pakistani leader Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman's 
party (Awami League) emerging as the overall winner. The results of the poll are 
contested and the military refuses to accept the results. 
1971   The controversy over the general election leads to a war. Pakistani army carries 
out a brutal military action in East Pakistan. India intervenes in support of East 
Pakistan which eventually breaks away to become Bangladesh. 
1972   Martial Law is lifted. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (whose party won the majority in West 
Pakistan in the 1971 elections) is elected as president. He also launches Pakistan's 
nuclear program. 
1973   A new constitution is enacted, declaring Pakistan a parliamentary democracy, with 
a prime minister as head of state, leading a bicameral legislature. Bhutto goes 
from president to prime minister.  
1976   Bhutto appoints General Zia ul Haq as his Chief of Army Staff. 
1977   General elections are held, with Bhutto's party winning the majority of seats in the 
national assembly. Riots erupt over allegations of vote rigging by Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP).  
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1977   General Zia ul Haq launches military coup. Bhutto is removed from power and 
imprisoned, constitution is suspended, and martial law declared. Zia promises 
elections within 90 days. 
1978   General Zia becomes president while retaining the office of army chief; ushers in 
Islamic legal system. 
1979   Bhutto is hanged on a disputed conviction for conspiring to commit political 
murder.  
1979   Zia enacts the controversial Hudood Ordinance, a law brought in as part of Zia's 
'Islamisation' policy that prescribed punishments considered more in line with the 
Quran. Elections are postponed and political parties banned. 
1980   US pledges military assistance to Pakistan following Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan. 
1984   Zia ul Haq holds a referendum on his Islamisation policies. His government claims 
that more than 95 per cent of votes cast were in support of Zia. 
1985   General elections are held (on a nonparty basis). Martial law is lifted, and the 
newly elected national assembly ratifies Zia's actions over the last eight years and 
elects him as President. Muhammad Khan Junejo is elected as prime minister. 
1986   Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter Benazir returns from exile to lead PPP in campaign 
for fresh elections. 
1988   Amid widening rifts, Zia dissolves parliament, dismissing Junejo's government 
and promises elections within 90 days.  
1988   General Zia, US ambassador, and top army brass die in air crash. 
1988   PPP (led by Benazir Bhutto) wins general election; Bhutto is sworn in as prime 
minister. 
1990   President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dissolves the National Assembly and Benazir 
Bhutto is dismissed as prime minister on charges of incompetence and corruption. 
1991   Fresh elections are held. Nawaz Sharif, groomed under Zia, and his PML, wins 
elections and Sharif becomes Prime minister. 
1991   Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif begins economic liberalisation program. Islamic 
Sharia law formally incorporated into legal code. 
1992   Government launches campaign to stamp out violence by Urdu speaking 
supporters of the Mohajir Quami Movement in the province of Sindh. 
1993   President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismisses Sharif's government for alleged 
corruption and incompetence. He himself resigns later in the year.  
1993   General election brings Benazir Bhutto back to power. 
1996   President Leghari dismisses Bhutto government amid corruption allegations. 
1997   Nawaz Sharif returns as prime minister after Muslim League party wins elections. 
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1998   Pakistan conducts its own nuclear tests after India explodes several nuclear 
devices. The international community imposes strict economic sanctions on the 
country in response. 
1999   Benazir Bhutto and husband convicted of corruption and given jail sentences. Ms. 
Bhutto stays out of the country. 
1999   Kargil conflict: Pakistan-backed forces clash with the Indian military in Indian-
held Kashmir. More than 1,000 people are killed on both sides. 
1999   October - Nawaz Sharif tries to replace army chief, Pervez Musharraf. In response, 
General Musharraf seizes power in coup. 
2000   April - Nawaz Sharif sentenced to life imprisonment on hijacking and terrorism 
charges over his actions to prevent the 1999 coup. 
2000   May - The Supreme Court validates Musharraf's coup and gives him executive and 
legislative authority for a period of three years.   
2000   December - Nawaz Sharif goes into exile in Saudi Arabia after being pardoned by 
military authorities. 
2001   June - Gen Pervez Musharraf names himself president while remaining head of the 
army. 
2001   September - Musharraf swings in behind the US in its fight against terrorism and 
supports attacks on Afghanistan. US lifts some sanctions imposed after Pakistan's 
nuclear tests in 1998. 
2002   April - President Musharraf wins another five years in office in a referendum 
criticized as unconstitutional and flawed. 
2002   August - President Musharraf grants himself sweeping new powers, including the 
right to dismiss an elected parliament. The government claims he wins the poll by 
more than 95 %. 
2002   General elections are held. Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto are not allowed to 
run. Due to wide-range manipulations, PML-Q, a party created by and loyal to 
Musharraf forms a government. For the first time in the country’s history, 
religious parties are able to make substantial gains in an election. 
2004   June - Pakistan mounts first military offensive against suspected Al-Qaeda 
militants and their supporters in tribal areas near Afghan border. US begins using 
drone strikes to target Al-Qaeda leaders in the area. 
2004   April - Parliament approves creation of military-led National Security Council, 
institutionalizing role of armed forces in civilian affairs. 
2004   May - Pakistan readmitted to Commonwealth. 
2006   September - Government signs peace accord to end fighting with pro-Al-Qaeda 
militants in Waziristan tribal areas near Afghan border. 
2007   March - President Musharraf suspends Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed 
Chaudhry, triggering a wave of protests across the country. 
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2007   July - Security forces storm the militant-occupied Red Mosque complex in 
Islamabad following a week-long siege.  
2007   October - Ex-prime minister Benazir Bhutto returns from exile. Dozens of people 
die in a suicide bomb targeting her homecoming parade in Karachi. 
2007   October-November - Musharraf wins presidential election but is challenged by 
Supreme Court. He declares emergency rule, dismisses Chief Justice Chaudhry 
and appoints new Supreme Court, which confirms his re-election. 
2007   November - Former PM Nawaz Sharif returns from exile. 
2007   December - State of emergency lifted.  
2007   December - Benazir Bhutto assassinated at political rally at election campaign 
rally in Rawalpindi. 
2008   February - Pakistan People's Party (PPP) wins the general election and forms a 
coalition government with Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League party. 
2008   August - President Musharraf resigns after the two main governing parties agree to 
launch impeachment proceedings against him. 
2008   August - Nawaz Sharif pulls his PML-N out of the coalition, accusing the PPP of 
breaking its promise to reinstate all judges sacked by Mr. Musharraf. 
2008   September - MPs elect Pakistan People's Party's (PPP) Asif Ali Zardari - the 
widower of assassinated former PM Benazir Bhutto - president. 
2008   September - Suicide bombing on Marriott Hotel in Islamabad kills 53 people. 
Soon after, government launches major offensive in Bajaur tribal area, killing 
more than 1,000 militants. 
2008   November - The government borrows billions of dollars from the International 
Monetary Fund to overcome its spiraling debt crisis. 
2009   February - Government agrees to implement Sharia law in north-western Swat 
valley in effort to persuade Islamist militants there to agree to permanent 
ceasefire. 
2009   March - After days of protests, government yields to demands for reinstatement of 
judges dismissed by former President Musharraf. 
 
Sources: 
Asad, Hashin. 2013. Pakistan: a political timeline. Aljazeera, 30 April 2013. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2012/01/20121181235768904.html, 
Accessed February 11, 2018 
BBC. 2017. Pakistan profile – Timeline. August 2, 2017. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12966786, Accessed February 11, 2018. 
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THE OBJECTIVES RESOLUTION 
Article 2(A) of the Constitution of Pakistan 
Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the 
authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people for being 
exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;  
This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a 
Constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan;  
Wherein the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen 
representatives of the people;  
Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as 
enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed;  
Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective 
spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy 
Quran and the Sunnah;  
Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to [freely]147 profess and 
practice their religions and develop their cultures;  
Wherein the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other 
territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation 
wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their 
powers and authority as may be prescribed;  
Wherein shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of 
opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of 
thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public 
morality;  
Wherein adequate provisions shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of 
minorities and backward and depressed classes;  
Wherein the independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured; 
Wherein the integrity of the territories of the Federation, its independence and all its 
rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded;  
So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honored 
place amongst the nations of the World and make their full contribution towards 
international peace and progress and happiness of humanity.  
                                                 
147 The word “freely” was inserted by Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, Section 
99 (with effect from April 19, 2010). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
FULL TEXT OF CHIEF FIELD-MARSHAL AYUB KHAN’S FIRST ADDRESS 
TO THE NATION AFTER SEIZING POWER148 
October 8, 1958 
 
Fellow citizens of Pakistan, As salaam-u-aleikum! 
I am going to address you on matters which are both solemn and serious. It is vital that 
you should listen to them carefully, understand them correctly, so as to be able to act 
constructively-as in correct action lies the salvation of us all and our future generations. 
You should have heard by now the declaration by the President abrogating the 
Constitution and imposing Martial Law throughout Pakistan. He has appointed me as the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator and all the armed forces of Pakistan, including the civil 
armed forces, have been put under my command. This is a drastic and extreme step taken 
with great reluctance, but with the fullest conviction that there was no alternative to it 
except the disintegration and complete ruination of the country. History would never 
have forgiven us if the present chaotic conditions were allowed to go on any further. 
These chaotic conditions, as you know, have been brought about by self-seekers who, in 
the garb of political leaders, have ravaged the country or tried to barter it away for 
personal gains. Some have done it as a matter of right because they professed to have 
created Pakistan, and others who were against the very idea of Pakistan openly worked 
for its dissolution or in any case did all they could to aggravate its problems. Their aim is 
nothing but self-aggrandizement or thirst for power. Meanwhile, weak and irresolute 
governments looked on with masterly inactivity and cowardice and allowed things to drift 
and deteriorate and discipline to go to pieces. 
Ever since the death of Quaid-i-Azam and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, politicians started a 
free-for-all type of fighting in which no holds were barred. They waged ceaseless and 
bitter war against each other, regardless of the ill-effects on the country; just to whet their 
appetites and satisfy their base motives. There has been no limit to the depth of their 
baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation. Having nothing constructive to offer, they 
used provincial feelings, sectarian, religious and racial differences to set a Pakistani 
against a Pakistani. They could see no good in anybody else. In this mad rush for power 
and acquisition all that mattered was self-interest. The country and people could go to the 
dogs as far as they were concerned. There were a few honourable exceptions but their 
conscience was dead and they were rendered ineffective by hordes of their supporters in 
the Assemblies changing party affiliations from day to day. 
There are two things a man a man of any conscience finds it very difficult to do: change 
his religion, change party affiliations. But our so-called representatives in the Assemblies 
shifted from one party to the other without turning a hair of feeling any pangs of 
                                                 
148 Source: https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/319011 
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conscience. This is the basis on which democracy has been run in Pakistan and in the 
sacred name of Islam. In the process, all ideals and the high sense of values inherent in 
our religion and culture have been destroyed. The result is total administrative, economic 
political and moral chaos in the country, which cannot be tolerated in these dangerous 
times. Pakistan certainly cannot afford this luxury. It has far too many internal problems 
to solve and external dangers to guard against to solution of which the prerequisite is a 
secure and stable base within the country. 
Our people are by nature patriotic and good people. They are tolerant, patient and can rise 
to great heights when well led. They are also intelligent and could see all this happening 
in front of their eyes. But they found themselves helpless as they did not wish to 
aggravate the problems facing the country or perhaps did not wish to hurt the feelings of 
the Army which, in the final analysis, is responsible for law and order and which had 
served them so well with loyalty and devotion. But lately I could see they were beginning 
to lose faith even in us for not saving them from the tyranny and mental and spiritual 
torture. I am sure they are sick and tired of the unscrupulous type of politicians who were 
busy tearing their dear country into pieces. The army too felt the same and much more, 
but held their patience for reasons which I will just now explain. 
This is the occasion on which I feel I should take my countrymen and women into 
confidence as to the Army s attitude and behaviour. Ever since the inception of Pakistan 
we in the Armed Forces saw very clearly the internal problems facing the country and the 
external dangers to which it was exposed. We were also conscious of our limited means. 
We solemnly decided to build a true national army free from politics, a model of devotion 
to duty and integrity imbued with the spirit of service to the people and capable of 
effectively defending the country. Further, I always told my people that our major task is 
to give cover to the country behind which it could build a sound democratic system and 
lay the foundation of stable future. We kept severely aloof from politics.  
You may not know, but I refused on several occasions the late Mr. Ghulam Mohammad s 
offer to take over the country. I did so in the belief that I could serve the cause of 
Pakistan better from the place where I was, and also had a faint hope that some 
politicians would rise to the occasion and lead the country to a better future. Events have 
falsified those hopes and we have come to the present pass. A perfectly sound country 
has been turned into a laughingstock. This is sad, but the situation has to be faced and 
remedies found, as God willing, they are going to be. 
Let me announce in unequivocal terms that our ultimate aim is to restore democracy but 
of the type that people can understand and work. When the time comes your opinion will 
be freely asked. But when that will be, events alone can tell. Meanwhile, we have to put 
this mess right and put the country on an even keel. 
There are certain problems which need immediate solution, yet there are others which are 
of a long-term nature. We shall do our utmost to solve them and eradicate evils. But in all 
this, I must demand your wholehearted understanding, co-operation and patience. I must 
also ask you to work hard and put in your best effort. This is the period when our State 
has to be built and this can only happen if people work. Slogan-mongering can never take 
the place of hard sweat. Remember that there are certain things which it should be in our 
power to put right. We shall see that that is done. But there are others, solutions to which 
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are beyond our control. Here all we can promise is our best endeavours, leaving the result 
to God. So, when judging our performance, do keep these hard realities of life in mind. 
As to the operation of Martial Law I propose to use the civilian agencies to the 
maximum. The Armed Forces will be utilized as little as possible. In the main, they will 
continue to attend to their prime role of external defence. Martial Law Regulations will 
be produced which will tighten up the existing laws on matters like malingering or 
inefficiency amongst officials, any form of bribery or corruption, hoarding, smuggling or 
black-marketing, or any other type of anti-social or anti-State activity. Such matters will 
be dealt with ruthlessly and expeditiously. In other words the nefarious activities of the 
bad characters of all description shall be firmly curbed in order that Pakistan is made safe 
for the law-abiding citizen.  
Since Martial Law will, in the main, be operated by the civilian agencies, I must ask them 
to discharge this onerous and perhaps unpleasant duty honestly, justly and faithfully. 
Here is an opportunity for you to show your mettle. Go to it and show us what sort of 
stuff you are made of! Your Services have tremendous traditions. Don t miss this 
opportunity to revive them and in doing so you can be assured of the Armed Forces 
faithful support. At this critical juncture it is more than ever necessary for the Armed 
Forces to be prepared at all times to face external aggression. But they are fully aware 
that internal stability is absolutely essential if they are to successfully repel aggression 
from outside. 
Some of them may have to be called upon to perform duties in connection with Martial 
Law. Whatever these duties may be, I expect them to do them loyally, efficiently and 
unhesitatingly. Their behaviour at all times must be correct, disciplined and impartial. I 
have every confidence in their ability to face any challenge, however difficult it may be. 
A word for the disruptionists, political opportunists, smugglers, black-marketers and 
other such social vermin, sharks and leeches. The soldiers and the people are sick of the 
sight of you. So it will be good for your health to turn a new leaf and begin to behave, 
otherwise retribution will be swift and sure. At any rate, they have no cause to feel 
neglected. We shall be making desperate efforts to catch up with them as soon as 
possible.  
I have spoken to you, my fellow citizens, at some length to put you in the picture and 
remove doubts and misgivings and to convince you that this extreme step has been taken 
in your interest and in the interest of the stability of Pakistan. Now let us all bow before 
Almighty God in all humility to guide us to a better future, so that we may emerge from 
this hour of trial as a sound, solid and strong nation! Amin! Pakistan Paindabad! 
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APPENDIX D 
 
FULL TEXT OF GENERAL MUSHARRAF'S FIRST ADDRESS TO THE 
NATION AFTER SEIZING POWER149 
October 12, 1999 
In the name of God, most merciful and compassionate. My dear countrymen, peace be 
upon you. 
You are all aware of the kind of turmoil and uncertainty that our country has gone 
through in recent times. Not only have all the institutions been played around with and 
systematically destroyed, the economy, too, is in a state of collapse. 
We are also aware of the self-serving policies being followed which have rocked the very 
foundation of the Federation of Pakistan.  
The armed forces have been facing incessant public clamour to remedy the fast-declining 
situation from all sides of the political divide.  
These concerns were always conveyed to the prime minister in all sincerity, keeping the 
interest of the country foremost. It is apparent that they were never taken in the correct 
spirit.  
My singular concern has been the well-being of our country alone… 
Despite all my advice, they tried to interfere with the armed forces - the last remaining 
viable institution in which all of you take so much pride and look up to at all times for the 
stability, unity and integrity of our beloved country.  
Our concerns again were conveyed in no uncertain terms, but the government of Mr 
Nawaz Sharif chose to ignore all this and tried to politicise the army, destabilise it, and 
tried to create dissension within its ranks. 
Our concerns again were conveyed in no uncertain terms, but the government of Mr 
Nawaz Sharif chose to ignore all this and tried to politicise the army, destabilise it, and 
tried to create dissension within its ranks.  
I was in Sri Lanka on an official visit. On my way back, the PIA [Pakistan International 
Airlines] commercial flight was not allowed to land at Karachi, but was ordered to be 
diverted to anywhere outside Pakistan. Despite acute shortage of fuel, imperilling the 
lives of all the passengers, thanks be to Allah, this evil design was thwarted through 
speedy army action.  
My dear countrymen, having briefly explained the background, I wish to inform you that 
the armed forces have moved in as a last resort to prevent any further destabilization. I 
have done so with all sincerity, loyalty and selfless devotion to the country with the 
armed forces firmly behind me.  
                                                 
149 Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/473175.stm 
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I do not wish to make a lengthy policy statement at this moment. I shall, however, do that 
very soon. For the moment, I only wish to assure you that the situation in the country is 
perfectly calm, stable and under control. Let no outside forces think that they can take 
advantage of the prevailing situation.  
Dear brothers and sisters. Your armed forces have never and shall never let you down. 
God willing, we shall preserve the integrity and sovereignty of our country to the last 
drop of our blood.  
I request you all to remain calm and support your armed forces in the re-establishment of 
order to pave the way for a prosperous future for Pakistan.  
May Allah guide us on the path of truth and honour. May God protect you. Long 
live Pakistan.  
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